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Abstract 
This thesis consists of three chapters focusing on negative reciprocity, 
transparency and job assignment, and overconfidence. To test my hypotheses I use 
experimental economics methods, which offer control over the data generating process by 
motivating people financially. Experimental methods are used to identify causal 
processes and motivations that can be confounded in field settings. Economics 
experiments reduce response noise, e.g. extreme outliers probably caused by thoughtless, 
unmotivated subjects (Smith and Walker, 1993). The central theme of my first two 
experiments is reciprocity – a kind reaction to kind and generous behaviour and 
retaliation to hostile behaviour. The first chapter discusses reciprocity in connection with 
violation of the property rights and the source of the endowment on an individual level. 
In the second chapter the reciprocity is studied in an employer-worker setting, in the 
presence of social comparisons. The last chapter deals with firm’s overconfidence when 
deciding about entering the market. All of the chapters study aspects of economic 
behaviour in social contexts, which have implications for the field. Each of the chapters is 
described briefly below. 
My first chapter experimentally explores the impact of the strength of property 
rights on retaliation decisions. I induce strong property rights by having experimental 
subjects earn money by performing a real effort task and weak property rights by 
endowing them with windfall gains. I ask whether people are less likely to respond to a 
hostile behaviour with retaliation when earned money as opposed to windfall money is at 
stake. My experimental design identifies two reasons why property rights might influence 
the size and frequency of retaliation. The first reason is that retaliation might be 
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perceived to be more costly when using earned as opposed to windfall money to pay for 
retaliation. The second reason is related to the violation of property rights. If another 
person decreases a decision-maker’s endowment and the endowment consists of earned 
money rather than windfall money, the decision-maker might consider it to be a stronger 
violation of his property rights, which in turn could trigger stronger retaliation. The 
purpose of this experiment is to separate these two effects. While I find support for the 
fact that subjects retaliate more because of the violation of their property rights, I also 
find that participants actually retaliate more with their earned money than with windfall. 
This suggests that participants do not perceive such retaliation to be more costly but 
rather that their behaviour is driven by violation of property rights. 
The second chapter focuses on the fairness perceptions of the job assignment 
process in an employer-worker relationship. In reality, employers have at their disposal 
jobs of different importance, which have to be assigned to different workers. Workers in 
more important jobs usually get offered higher wages and workers in less important jobs 
get offered lower wages. If the interpersonal concerns were absent, the employer would 
provide a higher wage to the worker in the more important job. When a worker decides 
what wage to accept, he may compare his wage to the other workers’ wage. An employer 
anticipating this might adjust the wage policy in order to avoid unnecessary losses or to 
maximise profits. I experimentally study the fairness perceptions from the workers’ and 
the employer’s point of view. I ask the following questions: 1. Do workers react to the 
wages paid to their co-workers and does the job assignment procedure affect workers’ 
wage rejections? 2. Do employers react to the fact that workers compare themselves with 
their co-workers and do they compress wages when the job assignment procedure is 
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perceived less fair? These questions have implications for labour market, in particular a 
firm’s wage policy.  If an unfair assignment elicits more wage rejections (i.e. zero profit 
for the employer and zero wage for the worker) due to social comparisons, it can have 
detrimental effects on the performance of the firm and thus firms might choose to 
practice wages secrecy. I examine the impact of job assignment in the presence of social 
comparisons. In order to test for social comparisons, the worker is only informed about 
the wage that the employer offered to his co-worker and which job he has been assigned 
to. Only after workers state their minimum acceptable offers, which determine if the 
offered wage is accepted or rejected, they come to know their own wage. I posit that a 
worker’s reaction to a specific job assignment depends on the procedure by which they 
are allocated to the jobs. An assignment to a less important job will not be perceived as 
unfair if it arises from an unbiased procedure, for example random assignment with equal 
probabilities. It will, however, be perceived as unfair if workers think that the employer 
favours some workers over others for reasons that are unrelated to efficiency concerns. 
This experiment does not provide evidence on social comparisons or employers 
compressing wages when the assignment to jobs is perceived unfair. 
My third chapter is a replication of the high-impact overconfidence and excess 
entry experiment by Camerer and Lovallo (1999). The topic of overconfidence is crucial 
for understanding business failures. Camerer and Lovallo were first to directly test 
overconfidence by measuring economic decisions and personal overconfidence at the 
same time. Camerer and Lovallo test whether managers’ overconfidence about their skills 
could predictably influence economic behaviour when entering into markets. I 
implemented Camerer and Lovallo’s experiment with modifications reflecting the 
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technological progress of economic experiments of past 15 years. While Camerer and 
Lovallo run their experiment with male participants (who have been shown to be more 
overconfident than females), my experiment studies the effect of overconfidence of both 
genders, making it a more conservative test.  
The thesis employs cutting edge techniques from Experimental Economics to 
study economic decision-making. My research provides empirical evidence on violation 
of property rights, fairness considerations in labour markets and impact of 
overconfidence on market entry decisions.  
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Chapter 1 
1 Negative Reciprocity and the House Money Effect 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Over the past two decades experimental economics research has provided ample 
evidence that people care not only about their own material payoffs but also that they are 
willing to forego significant income in order to influence the payoffs of others (e.g. Cox 
and Deck, 2005; Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj, 2008; Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2003; 
Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze, 1982). Much attention has been devoted particularly 
to reciprocity – a tendency to react to the kind actions of others with kind responses and 
to the hostile actions of others with retaliation.
1
 In the vast majority of laboratory 
experiments documenting the existence of reciprocity subjects are endowed with start-up 
windfall. This endowment serves as starting capital from which subjects draw when 
making decisions of interest to the experimenter, potentially creating a “house money 
effect.” The current chapter explores the implications of endowing subjects with windfall 
gains on their observed reciprocal behaviour. In particular, I study (1) whether earned 
income makes (negative) reciprocity more costly and thus leads to less retaliation than 
windfall and (2) whether appropriating another’s earned money is considered a stronger 
violation of property rights than appropriating windfall money and thus results in more 
retaliation.  
                                                        
1 For example Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992), Fehr and Gächter (2000), Ostrom and Walker (2005); see also Camerer 
(2003), Cox (2013) for surveys and (Rabin, 1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Falk and Fischbacher (2006), Cox, 
Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007) and Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008) for theoretical approaches to modeling reciprocity. 
Also, while not a model of reciprocity per se, inequity-aversion theory (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) is sometimes used to 
explain behaviour of fair-minded people who want to achieve more equitable final outcomes. 
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Since money is fungible, why should the source of endowment matter? According 
to mental accounting (Thaler, 1985), different sources of income might lead to different 
ways of spending. If the costs of obtaining an endowment vary, people may place such 
endowments in separate mental accounts, which might in turn lead to different choices. In 
particular, having to earn an endowment could increase the perceived cost of 
reciprocation and thus diminish its frequency and/or extent (Anderson and Putterman, 
2006; Carpenter, 2007). This conjecture is consistent with the results of previous studies, 
which show that having subjects earn money in another task prior to making decisions 
produced more self-serving behaviour both in the laboratory (for example, Bosman, 
Sutter, and van Winden, 2005; Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren, 2002; Oxoby and 
Spraggon, 2008) and in the field (Clingingsmith, 2013). Since reciprocation is costly, it is 
possible that the experiments in which subjects use windfall money to pay for retaliation 
overestimate the extent of reciprocal behaviour. Previous research conversely shows that 
generosity observed under laboratory conditions is often greater than one would observe 
in the field and that this might be partly due to the house money effect (Carlsson, He, and 
Martinsson, 2013). However, the existing literature does not permit a conclusion whether 
reciprocity observed in laboratory conditions is subject to the house money effect as well 
as this had not been tested previously.  
As highlighted above, there are two reasons why negative reciprocity might be 
sensitive to the source of the endowment. The first is that if money used to pay for 
retaliation is earned as opposed to received from the experimenter, one might perceive 
the retaliation to be more costly due to this money being in a different mental account. 
The second reason is related to property rights. If another person decreased the decision-
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maker’s endowment consisting of earned money rather than windfall money, the 
decision-maker might consider it to be a stronger violation of his property rights, which 
in turn could trigger stronger retaliation. To tackle the implications of the house money 
effect for reciprocal behaviour I present an experiment in which the source of the 
endowment varies. However, rather than focusing on the overall house money effect as 
most of the previous literature, the current experimental design allows to identify two 
reasons why endowing subjects with a windfall might impact the observed level of 
negative reciprocity. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
 Subjects in the current experiment interact in a two-player Taking Game in which 
the First Mover (henceforth FM) decides whether or not to take a sum of money from the 
Second Mover’s (henceforth SM) endowment. If the FM decides not to take, the game 
ends and both players keep their initial endowments. If the FM takes money from the 
SM, the SM can retaliate in return. To distinguish between the reasons that could lead to 
different retaliatory behaviour I implement a 2x2 experimental design, in which I vary 
whether the FM takes the earned or windfall part of the SM’s endowment and whether 
the SM then retaliates with his earned money or with windfall. In the first treatment, the 
SM’s endowment consists entirely of windfall received from the experimenter. Whatever 
is left of the endowment after the FM’s decision, the SM can use to purchase retaliation. 
In the second and third treatment, the SM’s endowment consists of funds earned in a real-
effort task as well as of windfall. In one case, the FM takes the windfall part of the 
endowment and the SM can retaliate using his earned money whereas in the other case 
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the FM takes the earned part and the SM can retaliate with windfall. In the fourth 
treatment, the SM’s endowment consists entirely of earned money. 
This study builds on earlier work of three types: research on negative reciprocity, 
the house money effect and mental accounting. I discuss each of them in some detail in 
relation to the research question. 
Reciprocity plays an important role in labour relationships as it has a potential to 
increase efficiency through enforcement of incomplete contracts. For example, Fehr, 
Gächter, and Kirchsteiger (1997)  experimentally investigate whether reciprocity motives 
are sufficiently strong to overcome contract enforcement problems. In a series of market 
experiments they isolate reciprocity effects on contract enforcement. Somebody who 
offers a generous contract, which the trading partner subsequently violated, might be 
willing to punish the trading partner. Yet, if the trading partner anticipates this 
willingness to punish, he has a reason not to violate the contract in the first instance. 
Punishing unfair behaviour is also a form of negatively reciprocal behaviour, i.e. people 
retaliate towards those who were unkind to them or even hurt them. Fehr, Gächter, and 
Kirchsteiger (1997) implement three experimental conditions. In the first treatment, 
labelled the no-reciprocity treatment, contract terms are exogenously enforced so that 
reciprocity cannot contribute to contract enforcement. Firms post employment contracts 
in a competitive market and once the contract is accepted the worker has to supply the 
effort level, which is fixed by the experimenter. In the second treatment, labelled the 
weak reciprocity treatment, only one side of the market can respond reciprocally to the 
previous action of the trading partner. In this treatment, firms post employment contracts 
and once the contract is accepted the worker has to decide whether to supply effort that is 
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demanded by the firm or whether to shirk.  And lastly, in the third treatment, labelled the 
strong reciprocity treatment, after workers’ effort decision firms have the opportunity to 
punish or reward the worker. Both reactions are costly to the firm. In all treatments, there 
is an exogenous excess supply of workers. Their results show that in the weak reciprocity 
treatment the strength of workers’ reciprocal responses depends on the details of the 
pecuniary incentives.
2
 In the strong reciprocity treatment, reciprocity is a powerful device 
for the enforcement of contracts, i.e. firms reciprocate, workers anticipate this and shirk 
less than in the weak reciprocity treatment and firms demand and enforce effort levels 
above incentive compatible levels. 
The notion of loyalty follows from reciprocity. Firms value loyal workers who are 
committed to the goals of the firm. Loyalty means that workers take into account the 
interests of their employers. If employers also take into account the interests of their 
workers, a positive valuation of the employer’s payoff can be created (Fehr and Falk, 
2002). In the same vein, workers have many opportunities to take advantage of 
employers. Poor treatment of workers could lead to negatively reciprocal behaviour such 
as low effort or even sabotage. Firms (and their managers) are well aware of potential 
repercussions from diminished morale and loyalty and try to circumvent them by 
implementing sensible strategies, such as not lowering wages following a demand shock, 
leading to downward wage rigidity (Bewley, 1999). A gift-exchange game has been the 
workhorse used to study various aspects of labour market relationships and incomplete 
contracts (see Charness and Kuhn, 2011 for a nice survey). While most laboratory gift-
exchange experiments induce costs of effort using the house money approach, there exist 
                                                        
2 An additional treatment where losses were possible was run in order to determine the sensitivity of reciprocal behaviour. 
In the original weak reciprocity treatment workers almost always choose the lowest effort level if they shirk, whereas in the 
additional weak reciprocity treatment partial shirking is frequent. 
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some experiments (both lab and field) that involve a real-effort task (e.g. Gneezy and 
List, 2006; Kube, Maréchal, and Puppe, 2012) and thus circumvent the potential house 
money effect.  
For example, Gneezy and List (2006) focus on real effort in labour markets using 
two field experiments. In the first one, they invited people who were not informed that 
they were taking part in an experiment, to computerize the holdings of a small library at a 
university. The first treatment paid a flat wage of $12 per hour, as promised. In the 
second treatment, once the task was explained to the participants, the participants were 
told that they would be paid $20 per hour, not the $12 that had been promised. The 
findings are in line with the gift exchange hypothesis, participants in the $20 treatment 
provided significantly higher effort in the first 90 minutes than participants in the $12 
treatment. After 90 minutes on the job, however, effort levels were the same across the 
two treatments. In their second field experiment the authors invited students to take part 
in a door-to-door fundraising drive to support a research centre at a university. The 
participants were told that they would be paid $10 per hour. An important difference 
from the previous experiment is that workers have a better idea about the surplus created, 
i.e. how many and how large the contributions were, and how much the employer valued 
the task. This is an important feature of the second field experiment, because if the 
contributions are known, the share of the contributions that the workers receive will 
determine whether they perceive their wage as fair. Alternatively, if workers know only 
the promised wage and not the contributions (how much the task is worth to the 
employer), as in the library task, only the promised wage can serve as a reference point. 
The first treatment was a flat wage of $10 per hour, as promised. In the second treatment, 
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students were told that they would be paid $20 per hour, not the $10 that had been 
advertised. The results are that students in the $20 treatment raised significantly more 
money in the first few hours of the task than students in the $10 treatment, but after a few 
hours the observed outcomes were the same.  
Also, Kube, Maréchal, and Puppe (2012) conducted a controlled field experiment 
to measure the extent to which monetary and non-monetary gifts affect workers’ 
performance. They recruited workers to catalogue books from a library. The job was 
announced with an hourly wage of 12 EUR. In the Baseline treatment the workers were 
paid 12 EUR. In the Money treatment, the workers received a monetary gift in the form 
of a 20% wage increase (7 EUR extra). In the Bottle treatment, instead of the pay raise, 
workers received a thermos bottle worth 7 EUR on the top of their wage. The results 
show that the nature of gifts determines the prevalence and strength of reciprocal 
behaviour. The cash gift (Money treatment) had no statistically significant impact on 
workers’ productivity compared to the Baseline. The bottle, however, resulted on average 
in a 25% higher work performance. They replicated the results from the Bottle treatment 
with a Price Tag treatment where they explicitly mentioned the bottle’s market price. 
Workers produced almost an equal output in the Price Tag and Bottle treatments. An 
additional treatment Choice was conducted, where the workers could choose between 
receiving cash or the bottle. More than 80% of workers opted for the cash gift, but 
workers’ output was statistically significantly higher in the Choice treatment than in the 
Baseline and Money treatments. To provide a more direct test of whether time and effort 
matter for workers’ output, they conducted an Origami treatment. In this treatment the 
employer gave the workers money in the form of an origami (i.e. the money was 
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artistically folded and wrapped). The origami was identical to the cash gift, except that 
the employer had invested more time and effort into the gift. The statistically significant 
results show that workers reciprocated the Origami cash gift by producing 30% more 
output relative to the Baseline and 23% more than in treatment Money. Non-monetary 
gifts have thus a much stronger impact than monetary gifts of equivalent value and when 
offered a choice, workers prefer receiving the money but reciprocate as if they received a 
non-monetary gift. Although these experiments involve a real effort task, I am unaware 
of any studies that compare behaviour in a gift-exchange game with windfall versus 
earned endowments. 
Another strand of literature on (negative) reciprocity studies the impact of 
punishment or sanctions on social norms. In a seminal paper, Ostrom, Walker, and 
Gardner (1992) show that introducing costly punishment in a common pool resource 
game can overcome strong self-interest of individual appropriators and lead to a mutually 
efficient outcome. Fehr and Gächter (2000) explain that many co-operators have an 
aversion to being exploited and are willing to punish free-riders in the voluntary 
contribution mechanism (e.g. Isaac, McCue, and Plott, 1985). These two papers started a 
whole new area of research dealing with various aspects of punishment (e.g. demand for 
punishment in Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007; fueds in Nikiforakis and 
Engelmann, 2011; punishment technology in Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008), anomalies 
such as counter-punishment (e.g. Nikiforakis, 2008) and anti-social punishment (e.g. 
Herrmann, Thöni, and Gächter, 2008).  
Results from several extensive-form game experiments also show that subjects 
frequently exercise the explicit or implicit option to punish non-cooperation or unfair 
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behaviour (moonlighting game in Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner, 2000; prisoner's 
dilemma in Clark and Sefton, 2001; Cox and Deck, 2005;  moonlighting game in Cox, 
Sadiraj, and Sadiraj, 2008; ultimatum game in Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2003;  and 
Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze, 1982). Even if punishment is costly to subjects, 
those who are perceived to be unkind or reveal malevolent or selfish intentions are often 
punished (Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Pereira and Silva, 2006).  
Experimental literature thus provides ample evidence of reciprocity under 
controlled laboratory conditions. In most of these experiments participants are endowed 
with start-up funds from the experimenter. Such funds might be treated as a windfall gain 
and thereby create the house money effect, meaning that people might spend or invest 
such money more recklessly than they would their own. The house money effect was first 
evidenced by Thaler and Johnson (1990) in a lottery choice experiment in which losses 
were subtracted from subjects’ initial endowments. Several studies point out that the 
observed behaviour might differ if subjects receive windfall endowments as opposed to 
when these endowments are earned. In the following I list some examples of ‘real-effort’ 
endowment earning tasks. Cox and Hall (2010) use a computerised “whack-a-mole 
game” as a real effort task to earn the endowments in their modification of an investment 
game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995).
3
 Harrison (2007) asked subjects to bring their 
own money in order to participate in a public goods game; Reinstein and Riener (2012) in 
their charitable giving experiment (dictator game with a charity acting as a recipient) 
asked subjects to earn their endowment by adding up five two-digit numbers; (Cherry, 
Frykblom, and Shogren, 2002; Cox and Hall, 2010; Harrison, 2007; Hoffman and 
                                                        
3 In the whack-a-mole game there is a 6 by 4 grid of moles and holes on the field. Each time the subject mouse-clicks a 
mole picture the picture box shows a hole picture. The object of the game is to mouse-click all of the moles until the field is 
clear of moles. 
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Spitzer, 1985; Reinstein and Riener, 2012; Rutström and Williams, 2000) elicit 
experimental subjects’ preferences for income redistribution using the task of the Tower 
of Hanoi puzzle. Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002) run a series of dictator game 
experiments in which the endowments were earned through solving GMAT questions. 
Such a design yielded significantly less generous dictator behaviour than a control 
treatment where the dictator’s endowment was randomly determined. Having to earn the 
endowment creates a property right entitlement and as a result leads to a more self-
regarding behaviour by the person who earned it.4  
 Cox, Servátka, and Vadovič (2014) also have their subjects earn endowments by 
solving GMAT questions in an experiment testing whether acts of commission that 
overturn the status quo generate stronger reciprocal responses than acts of omission that 
uphold it. Their design consists of two treatments that vary with respect to the size of 
initial endowments, thereby inducing different status quos. In their first treatment the FM 
can either give a part of his endowment to the SM (which is an act of commission) or do 
nothing (an act of omission). The SM then decides whether or not to reward the FM for 
giving him money and whether or not to punish him for not giving. In the second 
treatment, the FM can either take a part of the SM’s endowment (an act of commission) 
or do nothing (an act of omission). The SM then decides whether or not to punish the FM 
for taking his money and whether or not to reward him for not taking. Cox, Servátka, and 
Vadovič (2014) find that earning endowments significantly affected giving and taking 
behaviour by the FMs who gave less often to the SMs as well as took less frequently 
                                                        
4 This is contrasted with other participants respecting the established property rights to one’s endowment (Cox, Servátka, 
and Vadovič, 2014; Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985; Rutström and Williams, 2000). A similar pattern has been observed in 
experiments where the roles in a game are earned (e.g. Erkal, Gangadharan, and Nikiforakis, 2011; Hoffman et al., 1994). 
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from them when the endowments were earned, but had an insignificant effect on SMs’ 
reciprocal responses. 
 Clark (2002) finds no effect of windfall endowments in the voluntary 
contributions mechanism public goods game using unconditional nonparametric methods. 
Harrison (2007) shows that the same data display a significant effect when analysing 
responses at the individual level and accounting for the error structure of the panel data. 
According to Harrison, there were more free riders in the windfall treatment than in the 
own money treatment, but the windfall had no clear influence on the levels of positive 
contributions. Finally, Carlsson, He, and Martinsson (2013) used a 2x2 design combining 
laboratory and field experiments to examine the impact of windfall money on generosity. 
In both environments they found that subjects donate more when the endowment is a 
windfall.  
The most closely related studies to ours are by Bosman and van Winden (2002) 
and Bosman, Sutter, and van Winden (2005) who respectively examine the impact of 
emotions and real effort on behaviour in the Power-to-Take Game. In this two-player 
sequential-moves game one player (the take authority) can claim any fraction 𝑡 ∈ [0,1] of 
the endowment of the other player (the responder). The latter has an opportunity to 
diminish the claim by choosing a destruction rate 𝑑 ∈ [0,1]  and destroying his own 
endowment. This results in the payoff  for the take authority and 
 for the responder. In their experiment both players earn their 
endowments. In such an environment the intensity of negative emotions experienced by 
the responder is positively correlated with the taking rate and the probability of 
ETake + t 1- d( )EResp
1- t( ) 1- d( )EResp
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endowment destruction is positively correlated with both the intensity of experienced 
negative emotions and the taking rate.  
In a follow up paper Bosman, Sutter, and van Winden (2005) introduce a 
treatment, in which subjects are endowed with windfall money, to explore whether the 
behaviour of players is influenced by the fact that they have to earn their endowments. 
The results show that the taking behaviour does not depend on real effort, i.e. earning the 
endowment, and that responders destroy their endowment more often and in greater 
amount on aggregate with windfall endowment than with earned endowment, providing 
evidence of the house money effect. Also, without earning their own endowments, 
intermediate amounts of destruction are chosen more often whereas if effort is provided, 
the destruction is all or nothing. In our experiment I also study how earning endowments 
in a real-effort task influences the decision making of subjects, however, the main 
contribution lies in decomposition of the house money effect.  
From some of the previous studies it appears that if endowments are earned, 
subjects act in a more self-regarding manner. What causes such changes in behaviour? 
Mental accounting may shed some light on the issue. According to the principle of 
fungibility all money is the same regardless of its origin or intended use. However, 
people often treat money differently depending on its source and separate their funds into 
mental accounts based on subjective criteria (Thaler, 1985). Mental accounting is a 
cognitive process by which people keep track of the flow of their money and keep their 
spending under control. Thaler (1985) distinguished among three components of mental 
accounting. The first one captures how outcomes are perceived and experienced, and how 
decisions are made and subsequently evaluated. The second component involves the 
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assignment of activities to specific accounts. Both the sources and uses of funds are 
labelled in real as well as in mental accounting systems. The third component of mental 
accounting concerns the frequency with which accounts are evaluated. Thus according to 
mental accounting, money in one mental account is not a perfect substitute for money in 
another account, which might lead to violations of the normative economic principle of 
fungibility. Different sources of experimental endowment might therefore have 
implications for observed subject behaviour.  
  
1.3 Experimental Design And Procedures 
 The purpose of the current experiment is to test whether negative reciprocity is 
subject to the house money effect and to identify the driving reasons behind it as 
receiving a windfall endowment from the experimenter might impact the size and/or 
frequency of retaliation. The existing experimental economics literature describes (at 
least) three methods of controlling for the house money effect. Clark (2002) implemented 
a control for the house money effect by having subjects bring their own money to the 
experiment. While this is certainly a possibility, most experimental economics 
laboratories, including ours, advertise that subjects will on average earn a significant 
amount of cash from participation. Since in the current design – as described below – it is 
possible to suffer a loss, such a method could impact the reputation and credibility of the 
laboratory and discourage future participation. 
 A second method, used by Cárdenas et al. (2013), involves giving money to 
subjects in advance and requires them to bring it to the experiment. Such a method 
enables the participants to “bond” with the funds as after a period of time of being in 
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possession they might start considering them their own. However, this method bears a 
risk that subjects will not show up for the experiment or they will not bring the money 
with them.  
 A third method involves creating property right entitlements towards the initial 
endowments by having subjects earn them in a real-effort task as in Hoffman and Spitzer 
(1985) and Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002). Such a procedure serves as an 
analogue to everyday life where people exchange their time and effort for monetary 
payments. While it is possible that the three methods lead to different levels of 
entitlement, In my opinion the third method was quite natural while also being the most 
practical one and decided to implement it in the current experiment.  
 In my setup, there are two reasons why the source of endowment might matter. 
The first reason is that if a person had to earn the money he uses to pay for retaliation, as 
opposed to receiving it from the experimenter, he might perceive the retaliation to be 
more costly due to placing this money in a different mental account. He would therefore 
retaliate less. The second reason is that if earned money, as opposed to windfall, is taken 
from the person, he might consider it to be a stronger violation of his property rights, 
which in turn could trigger more retaliation.  
 In order to separate these two effects, I introduce a Taking Game played by two 
players, the FM and the SM. The experiment consists of four treatments (presented in 
Figure 1.1): Windfall/Windfall, Windfall/Earned, Earned/Windfall, and Earned/Earned, 
implemented in an across-subjects design. The treatments differ in the source of the SM’s 
endowment, which (1) could be taken by the FM (the first label) and (2) is used to 
retaliate (the second label).  
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 In the Windfall/Windfall treatment the FM receives $10 and the SM receives $18 
from the experimenter as initial endowments. There is no real-effort task performed by 
either player. Both players then proceed to playing the Taking Game, which is described 
below. 
 In the Windfall/Earned and Earned/Windfall treatments, the SM’s endowment 
consists of funds earned in a real-effort task as well as of windfall funds. In the 
Windfall/Earned treatment the FM and the SM are endowed with $10 each. The SM 
performs a real-effort task, in which he can earn an additional $8. The real-effort task 
consists of cutting posters inviting students to participate in economics experiments in 
our laboratory. This particular task does not require any specific skills and I decided to 
implement it because it represents a meaningful activity as subjects could later see the 
posters on notice boards around the university campus. I asked SMs to neatly cut the 
bottom part of 20 posters to create stubs that included a web page link of the database 
where interested students could register for experiments. For accomplishing the task, 
each SM earned $8. After the SMs finished the real-effort task, all subjects proceeded to 
playing the Taking Game.  
 In the Windfall/Earned treatment the FM can take the windfall part of the 
endowment (a weak violation of property rights) and the SM can retaliate using his 
earned money. In the Earned/Windfall treatment this is reversed – the FM can take the 
earned part of the endowment (a strong violation of property rights) and the SM can 
retaliate using windfall funds. Thus, in the Earned/Windfall treatment, the FM is 
endowed with $10 and the SM with $8. On the top of that, the SM can earn additional 
$10 for cutting posters.  
 
 
30 
 Finally, the $18 endowment of the SM in the Earned/Earned treatment consists 
entirely of funds earned in the real-effort task. The Taking Game that was played in all 
four treatments is presented in Figure 1.1.  
 
Figure 1.1 The Taking Game and the Implemented Treatments 
 
 
Take Windfall $10 
Retaliate w/ 
Earned 
Take Windfall $10 
Retaliate w/ 
Windfall 
Take Earned $10 
Retaliate w/ 
Earned 
Take Earned $10 
Retaliate w/ 
Windfall 
Windfall/Windfall Windfall/Earned
Earned/Windfall Earned/Earned 
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 The game was played only once thus all decisions are independent. In Stage 1 of 
the game the FM decides whether to Take or Not Take $10 from the SM. If the FM does 
Not Take $10, this yields a payoff of $10 to the FM and a payoff of $18 to the SM. If the 
FM Takes $10 from the SM, the game proceeds with Stage 2, where the SM decides 
whether to retaliate by decreasing the FM’s payoff. Every $1 the SM uses for retaliation 
reduces the FMs payout by $4. The SM can use up to $4 from his own endowment to 
decrease the FM’s payoff up to $16. If the SM does not wish to retaliate against the FM, 
he can do so by choosing the Decrease by $0 option.
5
  
 For this design it was crucial that subjects recognized that the SM’s endowment 
consisted of two parts – one that could be taken by the FM and the other that could be 
used to pay for retaliation. In order to highlight this I deliberately chose different (yet 
relatively close in value) amounts to represent these two parts: in all treatments $10 could 
be taken and $8 was used for retaliation. What differed between treatments was the 
source. The instructions were framed in a way to ensure that subjects understood which 
part of their total endowment was being taken and which was used for retaliation. Such 
framing might aid creating two separate mental accounts. The current design allows 
identifying the reasons why the source of endowment might matter for the frequency and/or 
extent of retaliation. I test the following hypotheses:  
 
                                                        
5 My Taking Game differs from Bosman, Sutter, and van Winden (2005) Power-to-Take Game in the following ways. In the 
Taking Game the FM has only two options, i.e. to Take $10 from the SM or Not Take $10, whereas in the Power-to-Take 
Game the FM chooses a taking rate from the interval [0, 1]. The action space for the SM differs as well. While in the Taking 
Game the SM chooses one of five available actions with a destruction technology 1:4, in the Power-to-Take Game he 
chooses a destruction rate from the [0, 1] interval. The Taking Game is more appropriate for my purposes because it allows 
me to separate the two reasons behind the house money effect. 
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Hypothesis 1: There will be less retaliation in the Windfall/Earned treatment than in the 
Windfall/Windfall treatment (the cost-of-reciprocity effect under a weak violation of property 
rights). 
 
Hypothesis 2: There will be more retaliation in the Earned/Windfall treatment than in the 
Windfall/Windfall treatment (the property-rights-violation effect under a low cost of 
reciprocity). 
 
By combining Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 together (conditional on taking), I expect to see 
more retaliation in the Earned/Windfall than in the Windfall/Earned treatment. This is due to 
the cost-of-reciprocity effect and the property-rights-violation effect going in the same direction 
when comparing these two treatments. 
 
Hypothesis 3: There will be more retaliation in the Earned/Windfall treatment than in the 
Windfall/Earned treatment (combined cost-of-reciprocity and property-rights-violation effects). 
 
Hypothesis 4: There will be less retaliation in the Earned/Earned treatment is than in the 
Earned/Windfall treatment (the cost-of-reciprocity effect under a strong violation of property 
rights). 
 
Hypothesis 5: There will be more retaliation in the Earned/Earned treatment than in the 
Windfall/Earned treatment (the property-rights-violation effect under a high cost of 
reciprocity). 
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 Note that I do not form an explicit hypothesis about the Windfall/Windfall vs. 
Earned/Earned treatment comparison due to the cost-of-reciprocity effect and the property-
rights-violation effect going in the opposite directions between these two treatments. 
 
 A total of 296 subjects participated in the experiment. The experimental sessions 
were conducted in the New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory (NZEEL) at the 
University of Canterbury. Subjects were recruited using the online database system 
ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Each subject only participated in a single session of the study. 
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007). 
 The number of subjects in a session varied from twenty to thirty-six. All sessions 
were run under a single-blind social distance protocol. On average, a session lasted 60 
minutes including the payment and subjects earned 15.55 NZD (New Zealand dollars).
6 
 Upon entering the laboratory, subjects were randomly assigned into Group A 
(FMs) and Group B (SMs) by drawing a letter (A or B) from a manila envelope and 
asked to sit in a cubicle in an appropriate row. At the beginning of the experiment 
instructions (provided in Appendix B) were handed out, as well as projected onto a 
screen. In the Windfall/Earned, Earned/Windfall and Earned/Earned treatment, Task 1 
instructions were first handed out to all Group A and Group B persons and read aloud. 
Group B persons were then given scissors and 20 NZEEL posters and asked to cut them 
along the perforated lines. Meanwhile, Group A persons were asked to sit quietly and not 
to use the lab computers. Once all Group B subjects completed the task, the posters and 
scissors were collected. Task 2 instructions were handed out, projected onto the screen 
                                                        
6 The minimum hourly wage in New Zealand at the time of the experiment was 13.50 NZD. 
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and read aloud to ensure common knowledge of the fact that Group B persons had to earn 
(a part of) their starting balance.
7 
 Any questions arising were answered in private. Subjects had to answer all control 
questions correctly before they could proceed to the decision making part of the 
experiment, which was run using the strategy method (Selten, 1967).
8
 After the control 
questions, subjects entered their decisions. Upon the completion of the experiment, they 
were also asked to fill out a questionnaire. Subjects were then called one by one to 
receive their payment in private in the payment room in the back of the laboratory. 
 
1.4 Results 
1.4.1 First Movers’ Behaviour 
 While the main focus of the current experiment is on the behaviour of SMs, I 
present the results in the order of play. The taking behaviour of self-regarding FMs will 
in part be indicative of their expectations of SMs’ reactions, meaning there should be an 
inverse relationship between the frequency of taking and the expected retaliation. I test 
                                                        
7 Since the Windfall/Windfall treatment did not involve cutting posters, Task 2 instructions were simply called Task 
instructions. 
8 In the strategy method the SM makes conditional decisions for each possible information set, rather than learning about 
the action of the FM and then choosing a response, as in the direct-response method. In our experiment this amounts to 
the SM making a retaliation decision without knowing whether the FM decided to take money or not. Brandts and Charness 
(2011), who survey experiments regarding whether the strategy method leads to different behaviour than the direct-
response method, argue that the strategy method may lead subjects to better insights into the motives and thought-
processes underlying their decisions through the analysis of a complete strategy. They find that in the majority of surveyed 
studies there is either no difference in behaviour between the two methods or that the evidence is mixed. Using the strategy 
method in our experiment could be considered a conservative approach, since if the “hot” direct-response method were to 
produce more retaliation than the “cold” strategy method I could reasonably expect my results to be even stronger. 
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predictions about the FMs’ behaviour derived from the hypotheses about their SM’s 
reciprocal reactions.
9
  
 In summary, the hypotheses predict more retaliation in the Earned/Windfall 
treatment than in any other treatment and more retaliation in both Earned/Earned and 
Windfall/Windfall treatments than in the Windfall/Earned treatment. This should result in 
less taking in the Earned/Windfall treatment than in any other treatment and less taking in 
both Earned/Earned and Windfall/Windfall treatments than in the Windfall/Earned 
treatment.  
 This is not what I find in the data as can be seen from Panel A of Table 1.1. The 
highest frequency of taking occurred in the Windfall/Windfall treatment where 31 out of 
34 (91.2%) FMs took $10 from the SMs. In the Earned/Earned treatment 30 out of 36 
(83.3%) FMs took $10 from the SMs; in the Windfall/Earned treatment 33 out of 41 
(80.5%); and in the Earned/Windfall treatment 28 out of 37 (75.7%). 
 I test for treatment differences in the frequency of taking behaviour using the 
Fisher’s exact test, reported in Panel B of Table 1.1. None of the comparisons is 
statistically significant when using a 2-sided test. However, if one were to use a 1-sided 
test (given that there exist ex ante predictions), the frequency of taking behaviour in 
Earned/Windfall would be mildly statistically significantly lower than in 
Windfall/Windfall (p = 0.076). The probit regression of the FMs’ taking behaviour on 
treatment dummies (presented in Panel C of Table 1.1; the regression coefficients 
                                                        
9 The taking behaviour of FMs might also depend on whether they consider the SMs’ endowments to be fungible. If the 
FMs expect different reactions from the SMs depending on whether earned or windfall money was taken, it should lead to 
higher taking rates in the Windfall/Windfall and Windfall/Earned treatments than in the Earned/Windfall and 
Earned/Earned treatments. The effect of FMs’ expectations could be amplified by potentially a different level of property 
rights – a FM might be willing to take the windfall part of the SM’s endowment, but respect the SM’s entitlement to the 
earned part. 
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represent differences from the Windfall/Windfall treatment) supports the results of the 
non-parametric tests.  
Table 1.1 First Mover Behaviour  
Panel A: Frequency of Taking 
 Windfall/Windfall Windfall/Earned Earned/Windfall Earned/Earned 
 31/34 (91.2%) 33/41 (80.5%) 28/37 (75.7%) 30/36 (83.3%) 
     
Panel B: Fisher’s Exact Test, P-values (2-sided)a 
 Windfall/Windfall Windfall/Earned Earned/Windfall 
Windfall/Earned 0.326 - - 
Earned/Windfall 0.115 0.784 - 
Earned/Earned 0.479 0.777 0.564 
 
   
Panel C: Probit Regression of the First Mover Taking Behaviour on Treatment Dummies 
a
 
 pseudo-R
2
 χ2 Prob> χ2 
 0.024 3.31 0.346 
Treatment Coefficient Marginal z P>z 
Windfall/Earned -0.493 -0.135 -1.30 0.192 
Earned/Windfall -0.656 -0.188 -1.73 0.083 
Earned/Earned -0.384 -0.105 -0.98 0.328 
Constant 1.352 0.831  4.45 0.001 
a
 Windfall/Windfall is the omitted control variable. 
 
1.4.2 Second Movers’ Behaviour 
 SMs’ behaviour is summarised in Table 1.2. The first column reports the number 
and frequency of SMs who decided to retaliate against their paired FM for taking $10. 
Recall that I used the strategy method and therefore have observations for all SMs who 
participated in the experiment. To my surprise, the highest frequency of retaliation 
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occurred in the Windfall/Earned treatment where 51.2% SMs retaliated spending on 
average $1.76, followed by the Earned/Earned (50% and $1.64), Earned/Windfall (46% 
and $1.38), and Windfall/Windfall (24.5% and $0.77) treatments. The last column of 
Table 1.2 presents the consequences of retaliation for the FMs’ earnings.  
Table 1.2 Second Mover Behaviour 
 Number of 
Retaliating 
Subjects 
Avg. Amount Spent 
on Retaliation($) 
Standard 
Deviation 
SMs Decreased FMs’ 
Earnings on Average 
by  ($) 
Windfall/Windfall  
(n=34) 
8/34 (24.5%) 0.77 1.47 3.08 
Windfall/Earned 
(n=41) 
21/41 (51.2%) 1.76 1.86 7.04 
Earned/Windfall 
(n=37) 
17/37 (46.0%) 1.38 1.69 5.52 
Earned/Earned 
(n=36) 
18/36 (50.0%) 1.64 1.81 6.56 
 
 The distribution of retaliation across the four treatments is presented in Figure 1.2 
and the resulting distribution of final payoffs in Table1.3. The largest difference in SM 
behaviour appears to be in the $0 and $4 spent on retaliation categories. While in the 
Windfall/Windfall treatment only 24.5% of SMs retaliated, in treatments where SMs 
earned at least a part of their endowment, the frequency of retaliation was much higher: 
51.2 % in Windfall/Earned, 46% in Earned/Windfall and 50% in Earned/Earned.  
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Figure 1.2 Distribution of Second Movers' Retaliation Decisions 
 
 
Table 1.3 Distribution of Final Payoffs 
FM’s 
Decision 
SM’s 
Decision 
Total $ 
Surplus 
Final $ Payoffs 
Windfall/
Windfall 
(# pairs) 
Windfall/
Earned 
(# pairs) 
Earned/
Windfall 
(# pairs) 
Earned/
Earned 
(# pairs) 
Not 
Take 
$10 
n/a 28 (10, 18) 
3 
(8.8%) 
8 
(19.5%) 
9 
(24.4%) 
6 
(16.7%) 
Take 
$10 
Spent $0 28 (20, 8) 
23 
(67.7%) 
15 
(36.6%) 
17 
(45.9%) 
12 
(33.3%) 
Take 
$10 
Spent $1 23 (16, 7) 
1 
(2.9%) 
2 
(4.9%) 
2 
(5.4%) 
2 
(5.6%) 
Take 
$10 
Spent $2 18 (12, 6) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(2.4%) 
1 
(2.7%) 
1 
(2.8%) 
Take 
$10 
Spent $3 13 (8, 5) 
3 
8.8%) 
3 
(7.3%) 
4 
(10.8%) 
5 
(13.9%) 
Take 
$10 
Spent $4 8 (4, 4) 
4 
(11.8%) 
12 
(29.3%) 
4 
(10.8%) 
10 
(27.8%) 
 
 Hypothesis 1 states that there will be less retaliation in the Windfall/Earned 
treatment than in the Windfall/Windfall treatment. This comparison tests for the cost-of-
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reciprocity effect while controlling for the FM taking the windfall part of the SM’s endowment, 
which is a weak violation of property rights. The hypothesis is based on a conjecture that if 
money used to pay for retaliation is earned as opposed to received from the experimenter 
as a windfall gain, one might perceive the retaliation to be more costly due to earned 
money being in a different mental account than windfall. Result 1 summarizes the 
finding.  
 
Result 1: Increasing the cost of reciprocity results in more retaliation under the weak violation 
of property rights. 
 
Support for Result 1: As can be seen from Table 1.2, the frequency and extent of retaliation is 
higher in the Windfall/Earned treatment than in the Windfall/Windfall treatment, i.e., subjects 
retaliated more with earned money than with windfall. The two-sided Fisher’s exact test, 
reported in the first row of Panel A in Table 1.4, supports this observation by detecting that the 
frequency of retaliation is statistically significantly higher (p = 0.018) in the Windfall/Earned 
treatment than in the Windfall/Windfall treatment. The Mann-Whitney test reported in the same 
row detects a statistically significant difference between the two treatments in the extent of 
retaliation (p = 0.012), thus leading to the rejection of Hypothesis 1. The ordered probit 
regression reported in Panel A of  Table1.5 supports this conclusion (p = 0.008). 10 
□ 
 
 
                                                        
10 Appendix A presents further analysis of the SM behaviour, namely a probit regression of a binary retaliation decision 
(Panel A) and an ordered probit regression of the level of retaliation conditional on retaliating (Panels B with marginal 
effects presented in Panel C). 
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Table 1.4 Tests for the Second Mover Behaviour 
Panel A: Tests for the Second Mover Behaviour with Treatment Data 
 
The Mann-Whitney Test Fisher’s Exact Test 
Windfall/Earned vs. 
Windfall/Windfall 
- 2.511 
(0.012) 
(0.018) 
Earned/Windfall vs. 
Windfall/Windfall 
-1.795 
(0.073) (0.080) 
Earned/Windfall vs. 
Windfall/Earned 
0.926 
(0.354) (0.658) 
Earned/Earned vs. 
Earned/Windfall 
-0.607 
(0.544) (0.455) 
Earned/Earned vs. 
Windfall/Earned 
0.316 
(0.752) (0.548) 
Earned/Earned vs. 
Windfall/Windfall 
-0.244 
(0.025) (0.020) 
   
Panel B: Tests for the Second Mover Behaviour with Earned Treatments Pooled Together 
a 
 The Mann-Whitney Test Fisher’s Exact Test 
Windfall/Windfall vs. 
Earned Treatments Pooled 
-2.555 
(0.011) 
(0.010) 
All tests are 2-sided. p-values in parentheses. 
a
 Data from all Earned treatments were pooled together and compared to Windfall/Windfall. 
 
 In light of the original conjecture that earning money increases the cost of negative 
reciprocity, the fact that SMs retaliated more with their earned money is somewhat surprising. 
While the increase in retaliation does not necessarily indicate that the SMs considered the two 
parts of their endowment to be fungible, it suggests that negative reciprocity and property rights 
are inherently related. From the current design it appears that negative reciprocity is stronger as 
long as some part of the endowment was earned through exerting real effort.  
 Hypothesis 2 states that there will be more retaliation in the Earned/Windfall treatment 
than in the Windfall/Windfall treatment. I conjectured that while controlling for the SM 
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retaliating with the windfall part of his endowment, taking the earned part of the SM’s 
endowment would be considered a stronger violation of property rights than taking the windfall 
part.  This would then lead to stronger retaliation by the SM. 
 
Result 2: When the cost of reciprocity is low, the strong violation of property rights results in 
more retaliation than the weak violation. 
 
Support for Result 2: The frequency of retaliation is weakly statistically significantly higher in 
the Earned/Windfall treatment than in the Windfall/Windfall treatment according to the Fisher’s 
exact test reported in the second row of Panel A in Table 1.4 (p = 0.080). The corresponding 
Mann-Whitney test detects that the extent of retaliation is also higher (p = 0.073), thus 
providing further support for Hypothesis 2. The ordered probit regression also supports this 
result. The regression coefficient of 0.507 for the Earned/Windfall treatment (reported in 
the second row of Panel A in Table 1.5) represents a weakly statistically significant 
difference from the Windfall/Windfall treatment (p = 0.089). 
□ 
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Table 1.5 Ordered Probit Regression of Amount Spent on Retaliation by Second 
Movers 
Panel A:  Ordered Probit Regression 
 pseudo-R
2
 χ2 Prob> χ2 
 0.024 8.06 0.045 
Treatment Coefficient Z P>z 
Windfall/Earned 0.771 2.64 0.008 
Earned/Windfall 0.507 1.70 0.089 
Earned/Earned 0.678 2.27 0.023 
Constant 0.687   
  
Panel B: Ordered Probit Amount Spent Marginal Effects 
Treatment  Amount Spent=1 Amount Spent=2 Amount Spent=3 Amount Spent=4 
Windfall/Earned 
 0.003 
(0.453) 
0.003 
(0.215) 
0.033 
(0.006) 
0.249 
(0.009) 
Earned/Windfall 
 0.003 
(0.261) 
0.002 
(0.188) 
0.023 
(0.032) 
0.159 
(0.095) 
Earned/Earned 
 0.003 
(0.472) 
0.002 
(0.218) 
0.029 
(0.009) 
0.218 
(0.026) 
Windfall/Windfall is the omitted control variable in both panels. Panel B presents the marginal effects of 
amount spent on retaliation across treatments. p-values in parentheses. 
 
 Combining Hypotheses 1 and 2 presents a prediction for the combined cost-of-
reciprocity and property-rights-violation effect between the Windfall/Earned and 
Earned/Windfall treatments. In particular, if the part of the SM’s endowment used for 
retaliation is earned, it becomes more costly to retaliate, which should in turn result in less 
retaliation. Similarly, if the FM takes the windfall part of the SM’s endowment, representing a 
weak property right violation, it should also lead to less retaliation than if he took the earned 
part. According to Hypothesis 3 I should therefore observe more retaliation in the 
Earned/Windfall treatment than in the Windfall/Earned treatment.  
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Result 3: I find no evidence of the combined cost-of-reciprocity and property-rights-violation 
effect. 
 
Support for Result 3: The Fisher’s exact test reported in the third row of Panel A in Table 1.4 
detects no difference in the frequency of SMs’ retaliation between these two treatments (p = 
0.658). The corresponding Mann-Whitney detects no difference in the extent of retaliation 
either (p = 0.354). 
□ 
 Result 3 thus suggests that earning a part of the endowment yields the same 
amount of negative reciprocity irrespectively of whether the earned part of the 
endowment was taken or used for retaliation. Result 3 combined with the fact that SMs 
retaliated more in both the Windfall/Earned and Earned/Windfall treatments than in the 
Windfall/Windfall treatment thus lead to a conclusion that property right entitlements might 
trigger a stronger negatively reciprocal response. However, subjects do not seem to distinguish 
between situations when they retaliate using earned money versus using windfall as long as a 
part of the initial endowment is earned.11  
 Hypothesis 4 concerns the cost-of-reciprocity effect again, but this time in a situation 
when the earned part of the SM’s endowment was taken. 
 
Result 4: Increasing the cost of reciprocity has no effect on retaliation under the strong 
violation of property rights. 
                                                        
11 It is acknowledged that there may be a non-trivial interaction between the property right entitlements and the actual 
amount earned in the real effort task. 
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Support for Result 4: The Fisher’s exact test reported in the fourth row of Panel A in Table 1.4 
detects no difference in the frequency of SMs’ retaliation between the Earned/Earned and 
Earned/Windfall treatments (p = 0.455). The corresponding Mann-Whitney detects no 
difference in the extent of retaliation (p = 0.544). 
□ 
 Finally, Hypothesis 5 states that there will be more retaliation in the Earned/Earned 
treatment than in the Windfall/Earned treatment as taking the earned part of the SM’s 
endowment would be considered a stronger violation of property rights than taking a windfall 
gain. Controlling for the SM retaliating with the earned part of his endowment, this would in 
turn lead to more retaliation.  
 
Result 5: When the cost of reciprocity is high, I find no evidence that the strong violation of 
property rights results in more retaliation than the weak violation. 
 
Support for Result 5: The Fisher’s exact test reported in the fifth row of Panel A in Table 1.4 
detects no difference in the frequency of SMs’ retaliation between the Earned/Earned and 
Windfall/Earned treatments (p = 0.548). The corresponding Mann-Whitney detects no 
difference in the extent of retaliation (p = 0.752). 
□ 
 I also report the comparison between the Windfall/Windfall and Earned/Earned 
treatments. Consistent with the previous results, the frequency and extent of retaliation in 
Earned/Earned is statistically significantly higher than in the Windfall/Windfall treatment (the 
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Fisher’s exact test p = 0.020 and the Mann-Whitney test p = 0.025, both presented in the sixth 
row of Panel A in Table 1.4).  
 Since I find no statistical difference in SMs’ behaviour in the three treatments in which 
at least a part of the initial endowment is earned (i.e., Windfall/Earned, Earned/Windfall, and 
Earned/Earned), I pool the data together and compare it to the Windfall/Windfall treatment.  
The frequency and extent of retaliation in the Pooled Earned treatments is statistically 
significantly higher than in the Windfall/Windfall treatment (the Fisher’s exact test p = 0.010 
and the Mann-Whitney test p = 0.011, both presented in Panel B of Table 1.4). The ordered 
probit regression reported in Panel A of Table 1.6 supports this result (p = 0.010). 
Table 1.6 Ordered Probit Regression of Amount Spent on Retaliation by Second 
Movers with Earned Treatments Pooled Together 
Panel A:  Ordered Probit Regression Amount Spent 
 pseudo-R
2
 χ2 Prob> χ2 
 0.021 7.03 0.008 
Retaliation decision Coefficient z P>z 
Pooled Earned 0.655 2.59 0.010 
Constant 0.688   
    
Panel B: Ordered Probit Amount Spent Marginal Effects 
Treatment Amount Spent=1 Amount Spent=2 Amount Spent=3 Amount Spent=4 
Pooled Earned 
0.014 
(0.120) 
0.006 
(0.184) 
0.051 
(0.034) 
0.170 
(0.002) 
Data from all Earned treatments were pooled together and compared to Windfall/Windfall. 
 
 The latter results thus provide further evidence that subjects retaliate more if they earn 
at least a part of their endowment but do not distinguish between retaliating with earned money 
or windfall (as long as a part of the initial endowment is earned). Furthermore, there is no 
change in negative reciprocity when only a part of the endowment is earned as opposed to 
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when the entire endowment is earned, suggesting a binary rather than increasing relationship 
between the earned fraction of the endowment and negative reciprocity. 
 Contrary to my first conjecture that there will be more retaliation with windfall 
than with earned money I find that subjects actually retaliate more with their earned 
money in cases where at least a part of their endowment is earned. I find support for my 
second conjecture that if earned money is taken from subjects, they retaliate more 
because of the violation of their stronger property rights established by performing a real-
effort task. My results thus points out that endowing subjects with windfall funds, absent of 
clearly established property rights, diminishes their negatively reciprocal responses. 
 To summarize, the current experiment provides evidence of the house money 
effect of the following kind: First, if at least a part of the endowment is earned, 
appropriating some of the endowment leads to more retaliation by the original owner, 
irrespectively of whether the appropriated part was earned or not. In such a case the 
earned and the windfall part of the endowment seem to be fungible. Second, if the entire 
endowment is earned, there is more retaliation than if the entire endowment is windfall, 
but earning both parts of the endowment (taken as well as used for retaliation) does not 
lead to more retaliation compared to earning only one part. 
 
1.5 Demographics 
1.5.1 The First Movers 
As demographic data were elicited in the post-experiment questionnaire it might 
be interesting to test if any of these are statistically significantly influencing the 
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independent variable TAKE. All variables that were potentially relevant were regressed 
and the results from an OLS regression are reported in Table 1.7 below. 
 
Table 1.7 Demographics Analysis, the First Movers 
 
 
 
 
OLS 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Dependent variable TAKE 
WINDFALL/EARNED -0.091 
(0.334) 
EARNED/WINDFALL -0.154 
(0.103) 
EARNED/EARNED -0.026 
(0.784) 
MALE 0.030 
(0.658) 
AGE -0.014** 
(0.036) 
SIBLINGS 0.018 
(0.486) 
ECON 0.044 
(0.518) 
NON NZ 0.084 
(0.260) 
RELATIVE INCOME -0.057 
(0.130) 
CITY SIZE 0.011 
(0.747) 
LIVE WITH OTHERS -0.005 
(0.816) 
MONEY 0.000 
(0.266) 
FINANCE STUDY -0.001 
(0.429) 
NO. OF PEOPLE KNOWN 0.026 
(0.190) 
CONSTANT 1.286 
(0.001) 
Run on StataSE 12.0. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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The WINDFALL/WINDFALL treatment is omitted from the regression to use it 
as the comparison basis for treatment effects, and to avoid perfect correlation. MALE is a 
dummy variable that is 1 when subject reported their gender as male and 0 if female. Non 
NZ is a dummy variable that is 1 when subjects nominated a nationality of a country that 
was not New Zealand, out of this group approximately 63% of FMs and 61.7% of SMs 
nominated Asian nationality, and approximately 13% of FMs and 23.4% of SMs 
nominated European nationality. ECON is a dummy variable that is 1 when subjects 
nominated an area of study that was ‘Economics’ or ‘Business Economics’. LIVE WITH 
OTHERS is the number of people that currently live in the subject’s household, MONEY 
is the amount of dollars that subjects nominated as their monthly non-accommodation 
budget, FINANCE STUDY is the proportion that subjects nominated as the fraction of 
their monthly budget that they fund themselves. NO. OF PEOPLE KNOWN is the 
number subject knows in the session. RELATIVE INCOME is the income of subjects’ 
parents in comparison to other families in New Zealand when subjects were 16 years of 
age. The larger the income of the family they state the larger the variable RELATIVE 
INCOME. Subjects had five possibilities to choose from, i.e. far below average, below 
average, average, above average, far above average.  CITY SIZE is the size of the 
community where the subject has lived the most time of their life. Subjects could choose 
from the following four options: up to 2 000 inhabitants, 2 000 to 10 000 inhabitants, 10 
000 to 100 000 inhabitants, more than 100 000 inhabitants. The more inhabitants they 
state the higher is the variable CITY SIZE. MONEY and FINANCE STUDY were 
included as the best measures available to control for income. The variable ECON was 
used to control for the behaviour of economics students.
12
 They are likely to have learnt 
                                                        
12 Marwell and Ames (1981)state in their article’s title “Economists free-ride, does anyone else?”  
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about concepts such as rationality and backwards induction, and therefore tend to be 
more likely to play strategies closer to what standard game theory would predict. In this 
game it would therefore be predicted that economics students will TAKE $10 at all times. 
The coefficients for the treatments in Table 1.7 confirm that there is no statistically 
significant difference in TAKE between the treatments, meaning that the source of the 
part of the endowment that was taken away did not matter for the FMs. The only 
statistically significant variable at 10% level is variable AGE suggesting that older 
subjects were taking less often. 
 
1.5.2 The Second Movers 
Demographic data from the second movers were elicited in the post-experiment 
questionnaire. By running an OLS regression I can test if any of the demographic data 
affected the second movers decision on how many dollars to spend on retaliation. The 
OLS regression (presented in Table 1.8) was run on any variables that could have an 
impact on the second movers’ behaviour. 
In contrary to the FMs OLS results, in this case the treatments had and effect on 
the amount spent on retaliation by SMs, in particular WINDFALL/EARNED and 
EARNED/EARNED treatments. In these two treatments SMs were spending significantly 
more on retaliation than in the WINDFALL/WINDFALL treatment, which confirms the 
results from the Mann-Whitney test.  Demographic data collected in the questionnaire did 
not have any effect on SMs’ decisions on the amount spent on retaliation. 
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Table 1.8 Demographics Analysis, The Second Movers 
 
OLS 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Dependent variable Amount Spent 
WINDFALL/EARNED 1.068** 
(0.012) 
EARNED/WINDFALL 0.663 
(0.134) 
EARNED/EARNED 0.948** 
(0.029) 
MALE 0.368 
(0.230) 
AGE 0.015 
(0.626) 
SIBLINGS 0.161 
(0.246) 
ECON -0.037 
(0.905) 
NON NZ 0.145 
(0.676) 
RELATIVE INCOME -0.163 
(0.345) 
CITY SIZE -0.172 
(0.288) 
LIVE WITH OTHERS 0.158 
(0.145) 
MONEY 0.000 
(0.336) 
FINANCE STUDY -0.001 
(0.867) 
NO. OF PEOPLE KNOWN -0.284 
(0.293) 
CONSTANT 0.251 
(0.843) 
Run on StataSE 12.0. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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1.6 Conclusion 
 This paper experimentally investigates the extent of reciprocal reactions to unkind 
behaviour when (a part of) the initial endowment is earned by performing a real-effort 
task. I contribute to the literature on reciprocity by developing a design that allows to 
identify two reasons why the source of the decision maker’s endowment might matter for 
his negatively reciprocal behaviour. Following from this notion there are two possible 
reasons for the house money effect:  (1) the perceived cost of reciprocity and (2) the 
perceived strength of the property rights violation. To identify these issues I implement 
four treatments that differ in the source of endowment being taken by another player 
and/or used for retaliation. The treatments are nested in the Taking Game in which the 
FM has an opportunity to take $10 from the SM who can then retaliate. Based on mental 
accounting (Thaler, 1985) I conjecture that SMs place their earned money and windfall 
funds in two different mental accounts and as a result retaliate less using their earned 
money because it increases the costs of negative reciprocity. Similarly, if it is earned 
money that is taken from them, I conjecture that they retaliate more because of the 
violation of their property rights, which are stronger for the account that stores earned 
funds.  
 While I find support for the latter conjecture, I also find that subjects actually 
retaliate more with their earned money than with windfall as long as at least a part of 
their endowment is earned. However, as long as a part of their endowment is earned, 
subjects do not seem to distinguish between situations when they retaliate using earned money 
versus using windfall, suggesting that their main motivation is the violation of property rights 
established by performing the real-effort task. 
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From the perspective of the existing models of reciprocity (Cox, Friedman, and 
Gjerstad, 2007;  Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008;  Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004;  
Falk and Fischbacher, 2006;  Rabin, 1993) and unconditional distributional preferences 
(Bolton, 1991; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999) the four treatments in the current experiment are isomorphic and the only 
difference between them is the theoretically irrelevant source of endowment. The 
distinctions implied by the design of the current experiment, however, are central to 
understanding reciprocal preferences.  
 Even though the above models of other-regarding preferences do not predict 
changes in behaviour, I find it useful to interpret the data against two of them in order to 
shed some light on the surprising results. In particular, in the context of Revealed 
Altruism theory (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008) the data suggest that if a part of the 
SM’s endowment is earned, the FM’s taking action decreases the SM’s ‘negative 
conditional altruism’ (i.e., increases the SM’s negative reciprocity)  by more than in a 
situation when the SM’s endowment is a windfall gain. In the context of inequality 
aversion (Bolton, 1991; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) an 
explanation used by a significant portion of experimental papers dealing with negative 
reciprocity and punishment, my findings suggest that the aversion to inequality increases 
when (a part of) the decision maker's endowment is earned by exerting real effort.  
 Based on the previous evidence that property right entitlements lead to more self-
regarding behaviour, one could expect that negative reciprocity would be less pronounced 
when earned wealth is at stake, which is indeed what Bosman, Sutter, and van Winden 
(2005) find. The results from the current experiment stand in contrast with their Power-
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to-Take Game findings. In particular, Bosman, Sutter, and van Winden observe that the 
taking rate does not depend on effort and the responders destroy their endowment more 
often and in greater amount when effort is not involved – providing evidence for the 
overall house money effect. I find the incidence of taking to be lower only when 
comparing the Earned/Windfall treatment and the Windfall/Windfall treatment. 
Furthermore, in Bosman, Sutter, and van Winden’s experiment negative reciprocity is 
higher in the no-effort treatment than in the real-effort treatment whereas I find negative 
reciprocity to be higher in the real-effort treatments. 
 While both the Taking Game and the Power-to-Take Game allow the FM to 
appropriate a part of the SM’s endowment and the SM to retaliate, there exist significant 
differences in the structure of the two games and experimental procedures that could have 
contributed to different behaviour.
13
  For example, different retaliation technologies 
combined with different action spaces could have resulted in varying strengths of 
incentives between the two experiments. Also the fact that in the current experiment only 
SMs exerted real effort by cutting posters, whereas in Bosman, Sutter, and van Winden’s 
experiment both types of players had to earn their endowment through solving two-task 
optimization problems, could have contributed to respecting property rights by the FMs 
and more aggressive retaliation by the SMs. Finally, subject pool differences (Dutch 
versus New Zealand students) are always a possibility. 
 The observation that earned endowments sometimes lead and sometimes do not 
lead to stronger reciprocal responses, raises an interesting question of how (various levels 
of) property rights interact with reciprocity. The current paper as well as Cox and Hall 
(2010) point out that stronger property rights might increase the intensity of 
                                                        
13 The differences between the Taking Game and the Power to Take Game are described in footnote 5 
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reciprocation, however, Cox, Servátka, and Vadovič (2014) do not find evidence of 
earned endowments affecting second movers reciprocal responses. It is therefore likely 
that the initial conditions (for example, modeled by the notion of status quo in the above 
mentioned Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008) as well as the process how they originate 
are likely to have implications for reciprocal behaviour. 
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Appendix A. Further Analysis of the Second Mover Behaviour 
 
Table A Additional Regressions Of The Second Mover Behaviour On Treatment 
Dummies 
Panel A: Probit Regression of the Second Mover Binary Retaliation Decision  
 pseudo-R
2
 χ2 Prob> χ2 
 0.038 7.59 0.055 
Treatment Coefficient Marginal z P>z 
Windfall/Earned 0.752 0.278 2.45 0.014 
Earned/Windfall 0.620 0.228 1.97 0.048 
Earned/Earned 0.722 0.266 2.29 0.022 
Constant -0.722 0.428  -3.05 0.002 
     
Panel B: Ordered Probit Regression of the Level of Retaliation Conditional on Retaliating 
 pseudo-R
2
 χ2 Prob> χ2 
 0.016 2.16 0.541 
Treatment Coefficient z P>z 
Windfall/Earned 0.304 0.63 0.530 
Earned/Windfall -0.250 -0.51 0.608 
Earned/Earned 0.071 0.15 0.884 
Constant -1.121   
    
Panel C: Ordered Probit Regression of the Level of Retaliation Marginal Effects Conditional on 
Retaliating
 
Treatment Amount Spent=2 Amount Spent=3 Amount Spent=4 
Windfall/Earned 
-0.015 
(0.547) 
-0.046 
(0.557) 
0.118 
(0.525) 
Earned/Windfall 
0.012 
(0.624) 
0.033 
(0.583) 
-0.098 
(0.610) 
Earned/Earned 
-0.003 
(0.884) 
-0.010 
(0.886) 
0.027 
(0.884) 
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Appendix B. Subject Instructions  
Windfall/Windfall Treatment 
 INSTRUCTIONS 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
Anonymity 
You have been randomly divided into two groups, called Group A and Group B. Each 
person in Group A will be randomly paired with a person in Group B. No one will learn 
the identity of the person (s)he is paired with. 
Structure of the Experiment  
Each Group A and Group B person will make only one decision in this experiment. The 
experiment is computerized. If you have any trouble entering your decisions on the 
computer, please raise your hand to alert the experimenter who will assist you.  
Starting Balance 
Each person in Group A will start with a starting balance of $10. Each person in Group B will 
start with a starting balance of $18. 
Group A Decision Task 
Each Group A person decides whether or not to take $10 from the starting balance of the 
paired Group B person. 
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If the Group A person decides not to take $10 then the Group A person receives final     
earnings of $10 and the Group B person receives final earnings of $18. 
If the Group A person decides to take $10, the paired Group B person then decides 
whether to decrease the Group A person’s earnings. Group B person’s decision is 
explained below. 
Group B Decision Task 
If the Group A person has decided to take $10 from the starting balance of the Group B 
person, the Group B person can decrease the Group A person’s final earnings. Decreasing 
a Group A person’s final earnings by $4 costs Group B person $1 which will be 
subtracted from his/her remaining $8. The following table shows five possible decisions 
that are available to a Group B person and the resulting final earnings for the pair. 
 
 Group B person decides to decrease 
 Group A 
person’s 
earnings by 
$0 
Group A 
person’s 
earnings by 
$4 
Group A 
person’s 
earnings by 
$8 
Group A 
person’s 
earnings by 
$12 
Group A 
person’s 
earnings by 
$16 
Group A 
person’s 
final 
earnings 
$20 $16 $12 $8 $4 
Group B 
person’s 
final 
earnings 
$8 $7 $6 $5 $4 
 
Note that the decision by the Group B person will only be relevant if the Group A person 
chose to take $10 from Group B person. 
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Payment of Experiment Earnings 
All participants are asked to sit patiently until the end of the experiment. Once all Group 
B persons have made their decisions, you will be presented with a summary screen of 
your earnings. Click OK after you have seen this screen, so other participants cannot see 
your decisions. You will then be prompted to complete a questionnaire. After the 
questionnaire, you will be asked one by one to approach the payment room at the back of 
the lab for the payment of your earnings. All the money will be paid to you in cash at the 
end of the experiment. Because your decision is private, we ask that you do not tell 
anyone your decision or your earnings either during or after the experiment. We also ask 
you to not gather near the lab after you receive your payment. 
Are there any questions? 
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Windfall/Earned Treatment 
TASK 1 INSTRUCTIONS 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
You have been randomly divided into two groups, called Group A and Group B. Each 
person in Group B will now have the opportunity to earn money. 
Group B Task 
In today’s experiment each person in Group B will participate in a task, where (s)he will 
get a chance to earn $8. Each participant will be given 20 posters promoting NZEEL 
experiments. These posters need to be cut in a way that people passing by can take a stub 
with web page link where they can register for the experiments. The posters will then be 
placed in different parts of the university in order to recruit subjects for future 
experiments. Please cut the posters individually so that the stubs are neat. You will be 
paid only if you finish cutting all 20 posters that will be given to you. 
Group A Has No Task 
While Group B persons perform their task, we ask all Group A persons to wait patiently 
and quietly. Please do not use the computer in front of you as it is set up for the 
experiment. 
Task 2 of the experiment will follow shortly. 
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TASK 2 INSTRUCTIONS 
Anonymity 
In Task 2 each person in Group A will be randomly paired with a person in Group B. No 
one will learn the identity of the person (s)he is paired with. 
Structure of Task 2 
Each Group A and Group B person will make only one decision in Task 2, which is the 
final part of the experiment. That is, after Task 2 there are no more tasks.  
Task 2 is computerized. If you have any trouble entering your decisions on the computer, 
please raise your hand to alert the experimenter who will assist you.  
Starting Balance 
Each person in Group A as well as in Group B will start with a starting balance of $10. In 
addition to his/her starting balance each person in Group B has participated in a task, 
where (s)he earned $8.  
Group A Decision Task 
Each Group A person decides whether or not to take the $10 starting balance from the 
paired Group B person. 
If the Group A person decides not to take $10 then the Group A person receives final 
earnings of $10 and the Group B person receives final earnings of $18 ($10 starting 
balance and $8 from Task 1). 
If the Group A person decides to take $10, the paired Group B person then decides 
whether to decrease the Group A person’s earnings. Group B person’s decision is 
explained below. 
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Group B Decision Task 
If the Group A person has decided to take the $10 starting balance from Group B person, 
the Group B person can decrease the Group A person’s final earnings using the money 
(s)he has earned in the Task 1. Decreasing a Group A person’s final earnings by $4 costs 
Group B person $1 which will be subtracted from his/her Task 1 earnings of $8. The 
following table shows five possible decisions that are available to a Group B person and 
the resulting final earnings for the pair. 
 
 Group B person decides to decrease 
 Group A 
person’s 
earnings by 
$0 
Group A 
person’s 
earnings by 
$4 
Group A 
person’s 
earnings by 
$8 
Group A 
person’s 
earnings by 
$12 
Group A 
person’s 
earnings by 
$16 
Group A 
person’s 
final 
earnings 
$20 $16 $12 $8 $4 
Group B 
person’s 
final 
earnings 
$8 $7 $6 $5 $4 
 
Note that the decision by the Group B person will only be relevant if the Group A person 
chose to take $10 from Group B person. 
Payment of Experiment Earnings 
All participants are asked to sit patiently until the end of the experiment. Once all Group 
B persons have made their decisions, you will be presented with a summary screen of 
your earnings. Click OK after you have seen this screen, so other participants cannot see 
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your decisions. You will then be prompted to complete a questionnaire. After the 
questionnaire, you will be asked one by one to approach the payment room at the back of 
the lab for the payment of your earnings. All the money will be paid to you in cash at the 
end of the experiment. Because your decision is private, we ask that you do not tell 
anyone your decision or your earnings either during or after the experiment. We also ask 
you to not gather near the lab after you receive your payment. 
Are there any questions? 
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Earned/Windfall Treatment 
TASK 1 INSTRUCTIONS 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
You have been randomly divided into two groups, called Group A and Group B. Each 
person in Group B will now have the opportunity to earn money. 
Group B Task 
In today’s experiment each person in Group B will participate in a task, where (s)he will 
get a chance to earn $10. Each participant will be given 20 posters promoting NZEEL 
experiments. These posters need to be cut in a way that people passing by can take a stub 
with web page link where they can register for the experiments. The posters will then be 
placed in different parts of the university in order to recruit subjects for future 
experiments. Please cut the posters individually so that the stubs are neat. You will be 
paid only if you finish cutting all 20 posters that will be given to you. 
Group A Has No Task 
While Group B persons perform their task, we ask all Group A persons to wait patiently 
and quietly. Please do not use the computer in front of you as it is set up for the 
experiment. 
Task 2 of the experiment will follow shortly. 
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TASK 2 INSTRUCTIONS 
Anonymity 
In Task 2 each person in Group A will be randomly paired with a person in Group B. No 
one will learn the identity of the person (s)he is paired with. 
Structure of Task 2 
Each Group A and Group B person will make only one decision in Task 2, which is the 
final part of the experiment. That is, after Task 2 there are no more tasks.  
Task 2 is computerized. If you have any trouble entering your decisions on the computer, 
please raise your hand to alert the experimenter who will assist you.  
Starting Balance 
Each person in Group A will start with a starting balance of $10. Each person in Group B will 
start with a starting balance of $8. In addition to his/her starting balance each person in 
Group B has participated in a task, where (s)he earned $10.  
Group A Decision Task 
Each Group A person decides whether or not to take the $10 which Group B person has 
earned in the previous task. 
If the Group A person decides not to take $10 then the Group A person receives final 
earnings of $10 and the Group B person receives final earnings of $18 ($8 starting 
balance and $10 from Task 1). 
  
If the Group A person decides to take $10, the paired Group B person then decides 
whether to decrease the Group A person’s earnings. Group B person’s decision is 
explained below. 
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Group B Decision Task  
If the Group A person has decided to take the earned $10 from Group B person, the 
Group B person can decrease the Group A person’s final earnings using the money from 
the starting balance. Decreasing a Group A person’s final earnings by $4 costs Group B 
person $1 which will be subtracted from his/her starting balance of $8. The following 
table shows five possible decisions that are available to a Group B person and the 
resulting final earnings for the pair. 
 
 Group B person decides to decrease 
 Group A 
person’s 
earnings by 
$0 
Group A 
person’s 
earnings by 
$4 
Group A 
person’s 
earnings by 
$8 
Group A 
person’s 
earnings by 
$12 
Group A 
person’s 
earnings by 
$16 
Group A 
person’s 
final 
earnings 
$20 $16 $12 $8 $4 
Group B 
person’s 
final 
earnings 
$8 $7 $6 $5 $4 
 
Note that the decision by the Group B person will only be relevant if the Group A person 
chose to take $10 from Group B person. 
Payment of Experiment Earnings 
All participants are asked to sit patiently until the end of the experiment. Once all Group 
B persons have made their decisions, you will be presented with a summary screen of 
your earnings. Click OK after you have seen this screen, so other participants cannot see 
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your decisions. You will then be prompted to complete a questionnaire. After the 
questionnaire, you will be asked one by one to approach the payment room at the back of 
the lab for the payment of your earnings. All the money will be paid to you in cash at the 
end of the experiment. Because your decision is private, we ask that you do not tell 
anyone your decision or your earnings either during or after the experiment. We also ask 
you to not gather near the lab after you receive your payment. 
Are there any questions? 
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Earned/Earned Treatment 
TASK 1 INSTRUCTIONS 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
You have been randomly divided into two groups, called Group A and Group B. Each 
person in Group B will now have the opportunity to earn money. 
Group B Task 
In today’s experiment each person in Group B will participate in a task, where (s)he will 
get a chance to earn his/her starting balance of $18. Each participant will be given 20 
posters promoting NZEEL experiments. These posters need to be cut in a way that people 
passing by can take a stub with web page link where they can register for the 
experiments. The posters will then be placed in different parts of the university in order to 
recruit subjects for future experiments. Please cut the posters individually so that the 
stubs are neat. You will be paid only if you finish cutting all 20 posters that will be given 
to you. 
Group A Has No Task 
While Group B persons perform their task, we ask all Group A persons to wait patiently 
and quietly. Please do not use the computer in front of you as it is set up for the 
experiment. 
 
Task 2 of the experiment will follow shortly. 
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TASK 2 INSTRUCTIONS 
Anonymity 
In Task 2 each person in Group A will be randomly paired with a person in Group B. No 
one will learn the identity of the person (s)he is paired with. 
Structure of Task 2 
Each Group A and Group B person will make only one decision in Task 2, which is the 
final part of the experiment. That is, after Task 2 there are no more tasks.  
Task 2 is computerized. If you have any trouble entering your decisions on the computer, 
please raise your hand to alert the experimenter who will assist you.  
Starting Balance 
Each person in Group A will start with a starting balance of $10. Each person in Group B 
will start with a starting balance of $18, which (s)he earned in Task 1.  
Group A Decision Task 
Each Group A person decides whether or not to take $10 which Group B person has 
earned in Task 1. 
If the Group A person decides not to take $10 then the Group A person receives final 
earnings of $10 and the Group B person receives final earnings of $18 which (s)he earned 
in Task 1. 
If the Group A person decides to take $10, the paired Group B person then decides 
whether to decrease the Group A person’s earnings. Group B person’s decision is 
explained below. 
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Group B Decision Task  
If the Group A person has decided to take $10 from Group B person’s earned starting 
balance, the Group B person can decrease the Group A person’s final earnings using the 
remaining money (s)he has earned in the Task 1. Decreasing a Group A person’s final 
earnings by $4 costs Group B person $1 which will be subtracted from his/her remaining 
Task 1 earnings of $8. The following table shows five possible decisions that are 
available to a Group B person and the resulting final earnings for the pair. 
 
 Group B person decides to decrease 
 Group A 
person’s 
earnings by 
$0 
Group A 
person’s 
earnings by 
$4 
Group A 
person’s 
earnings by 
$8 
Group A 
person’s 
earnings by 
$12 
Group A 
person’s 
earnings by 
$16 
Group A 
person’s final 
earnings 
$20 $16 $12 $8 $4 
Group B 
person’s final 
earnings 
$8 $7 $6 $5 $4 
 
Note that the decision by the Group B person will only be relevant if the Group A person 
chose to take $10 from Group B person. 
Payment of Experiment Earnings 
All participants are asked to sit patiently until the end of the experiment. Once all Group 
B persons have made their decisions, you will be presented with a summary screen of 
your earnings. Click OK after you have seen this screen, so other participants cannot see 
your decisions. You will then be prompted to complete a questionnaire. After the 
questionnaire, you will be asked one by one to approach the payment room at the back of 
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the lab for the payment of your earnings. All the money will be paid to you in cash at the 
end of the experiment. Because your decision is private, we ask that you do not tell 
anyone your decision or your earnings either during or after the experiment. We also ask 
you to not gather near the lab after you receive your payment. 
Are there any questions? 
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Appendix C. Control Questions 
1. What will be the Group A person’s final earnings if (s)he does not take $10? 
 
2. What will be the Group B person’s final earnings if the Group A person does not 
take $10? 
 
3. What will be the Group B person’s final earnings if the Group A person takes $10 
and the Group B person does not decrease the Group A person’s earnings? 
 
4. What will be the Group A person’s final earnings if (s)he takes $10 and the Group 
B person does not decrease the Group A person’s earnings? 
 
5. What will be the Group B person’s final earnings if the Group A person takes $10 
and the Group B person decreases the Group A person’s earnings by $16? 
 
6. What will be the Group A person’s final earnings if (s)he takes $10 and the Group 
B person spends $3 of his/her own earnings on such decrease? 
 
7. What is the cost to the Group B person of decreasing the paired Group A person’s 
earnings by $8?  
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Appendix D. The Questionnaire  
Earned/Earned Treatment 
The following questions were asked either Group A or Group B persons and their 
decision determined, which of these they were asked: 
 
Group A person: 
The money that you took from the Group B person was earned/not earned by them. 
Why did you decide to take $10 from Group B person? 
The money that you could have taken, but didn’t, from the Group B person was 
earned/not earned by them. 
Why did you decide not to take $10 from the Group B person? 
 
Group B person: 
The money that the Group A person took from you was: earned/not earned by you. 
Why do you think the Group A person took $10 from you? 
The money that the Group A person could have, but didn’t take from you was earned/not 
earned by you. 
Why do you think the Group A person didn’t take $10 from you? 
 
Questions asked to all the participants: 
Please state your gender. 
How old are you? 
What is your nationality? 
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How many siblings do you have? 
If you are a student, what is your subject? 
When you were 16 years of age, what was the income of your parents in comparison to 
other families in New Zealand? 
How large was the community where you have lived the most time of your life? 
How many people live in your household (including yourself)? 
How large is your monthly budget (without expenses for accommodation)? 
What share of your monthly expenses do you finance yourself? 
Can you state the percentage we can rely on the data you provided? 
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Appendix E. Screenshots from the software  
Earned/Windfall Treatment 
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Appendix F. Human Ethics Committee Approval 
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Chapter 2 
2 Job Assignment, Transparency and Social Comparisons 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Consider an organization with two agents and two job slots; one low-productivity 
job slot (henceforth low slot) and one high-productivity job slot (henceforth high slot). 
The principal has to assign one of the two agents to the low slot and the other to the high 
slot. Assuming the principal equates the marginal product of labour to wages, and that 
interpersonal concerns are absent, the principal would provide a higher wage to the agent 
in the high slot. Since agents’ perception of fairness may depend on the wage paid to the 
other agent (Frank, 1984) and on the intentions of the principal (Rabin, 1993), the agent 
in the low slot might feel that the wage disparity is unfair, perhaps because the principal 
favours his co-worker for reasons unrelated with the job, and he may withhold effort in 
response, thus reducing total output.  
In this chapter I explore whether and how agents’ concerns for equity depend on 
fairness of the assignment process to a slot in organizational setting. In particular, I am 
interested in (i) how agents respond to inequity in job assignments and (ii) whether 
principals selectively engage in wage compression to account for agents' responses to 
inequitable outcomes. These questions have implications for labour market, in particular 
a firm’s wage policy.  If an unfair assignment, e.g. assigning a more qualified agent to a 
lower paid job, elicits more wage rejections due to social comparisons, it can have 
detrimental effects on the performance of the firm. My main contribution lies in 
examining the impact of job assignment -- an important feature of labour relationships -- 
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in the presence of social comparisons (Bewley, 1999; Charness and Kuhn, 2007). 
Specifically, I compare agents' responses to random inequitable assignments, versus 
agents' responses to deliberate inequitable assignments by the principal. 
Laboratory experiments are suitable for testing employment theory because they 
allow for the extensive control of decision environments, which is often difficult in 
naturally occurring settings. Wage theories have important implications for the 
functioning of labour markets, and can explain phenomena such as rigid wages and 
involuntary unemployment. Workers in firms are confronted with a mix of different 
incentives, which makes interpretation of their decisions difficult. An observed variation 
in wages may not reflect generosity but may be due to firm size, self-selection of 
workers, or simply productivity differences. In the laboratory, the experimenter can rule 
out confounding effects such as multiple incentives, selection, productivity differences, 
or repeated interactions. The experimenter also controls for payoffs, the order in which 
the different parties can act, and the information they receive when making their choice. 
This control allows for the testing of precise predictions derived from game-theoretic 
models (Falk and Heckman, 2009). 
In the current experiment with one principal and two agents there are two 
different slots, which differ in the pie size. Each agent has to be assigned to one of the 
slots, in one treatment this is done randomly, in other two treatments it is done by the 
principal. Only after this assignment the principal decides on the wage for each agent. 
Prior to the assignment to slots the agents participate in a general knowledge quiz. The 
purpose of the quiz is to generate information, which can be used for comparisons of the 
two agents. I vary the process of assignment to a slot as well as the information the agents 
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receive about the principal knowing or not knowing the relative quiz performance. 
Through varying agents’ information I gain insights into the nature of fairness 
considerations underlying behaviour. Based on the findings from Charness (2004) I 
conjecture that if the agents care about the principal’s intentions, they will reject wages 
more often in the case where the principal is responsible for the assignment to a slot, as 
opposed to a random assignment. In the case when the principal knows the relative quiz 
performance and assigns the agents to the slots, it is likely that he will assign the higher 
performer to the high slot and the lower performer to the low slot. This would not enable 
to study agents’ reactions to unfair assignment, which might lead to stronger reciprocal 
responses such as rejecting wages more often than in the case of fair assignment. 
Therefore I add a scenario, in which the principal does not know the relative quiz 
performance and the agents do not receive the information about the principal not 
knowing the relative quiz performance. The agents, however, do receive information 
about the relative quiz performance. The principal thus decides on the assignment quasi 
randomly, as he has to assign the agents to the slots, but he does not know the relative 
quiz performance (or any other distinguishing information) to help him make his 
decision. This results in more agents with a higher relative quiz performance being 
assigned to low slots. Based on the literature on real effort and relative performance 
triggering strong entitlements (e.g. Bosman, Sutter, and van Winden, 2005; Cherry, 
Frykblom, and Shogren, 2002; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008) I posit that such a situation is 
likely to be perceived as unfair by agents and might trigger stronger reciprocal reactions, 
therefore allowing agent’s reactions to principal’s intentions to be studied.   
The current experiment is nested in a three-player ultimatum game with one 
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principal and two agents. The experiment consists of three treatments; in all of them the 
agents take part in a general knowledge quiz and are informed about the relative quiz 
performance. In the first treatment (the Random Assignment treatment) the assignment to 
the low and high slots is random. In both the second (the Principal Assignment treatment) 
and the third (the Quasi-Random Assignment treatment) treatments the principal decides 
on the assignment and he knows the relative quiz performance of the agents in the 
Principal Assignment treatment but has no such information in the Quasi-Random 
Assignment treatment. In both of these treatments the agents know that the principal 
makes the assignment. In the Principal Assignment treatment they are explicitly told that 
the principal knows the relative quiz performance, but in the Quasi-Random Assignment 
treatment this information is omitted. This design results in a quasi-random assignment. 
From the agents’ point of views, I test whether the agents compare their wages with the 
wages offered to the paired agents. From the principals’ point of view, I test whether the 
principal reacts to the rankings from the quiz and whether he adjusts wages based on his 
beliefs about agents’ perception of fairness. In other words, I test if there is “wage 
compression” in the Principal Assignment treatment relative to the Random Assignment 
treatment.  
 
2.2 Literature Review 
There is a great deal of literature on social comparisons, as they apply to the 
labour market, inspired by Bewley (1999) and surveyed by Charness and Kuhn (2007). 
Bewley (1999) points out that loyalty is highly valued among firms because hiring new 
workers is time-consuming and costly. To encourage loyalty firms often do not lower 
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wages or they avoid layoffs during the economic downturns, resulting in downward 
wage-rigidity. Besides payoff considerations loyalty is often enhanced when workers are 
being treated fairly compared to their co-workers. Firms have to pay attention to the fact 
that individuals tend to evaluate outcomes in comparison to a reference point they 
consider fair (Adams, 1965; Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal, 1976a). The formation of a 
reference point depends on a measure of similarity between persons, i.e. the workers tend 
to compare their wages, their workspace and other benefits with their co-workers 
(Festinger, 1954; Jones, 1985). If a worker differs significantly from his co-worker, he is 
less likely to compare himself to that person. In order to avoid the potentially detrimental 
effects of social comparisons, in particular wage comparisons, organizations often engage 
in wage secrecy (Lawler, 1990) and wage compression to reduce differences in wages 
between workers (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990).  
Economic experiments provide direct evidence that effort choices in a gift 
exchange game are affected by wage comparison (Güth et al., 2001; Requate, Waichman, 
and Siang, 2011). Clark, Masclet, and Villeval (2010) combine experimental evidence 
from a gift-exchange game and survey data from International Social Survey Program to 
test if individual effort depends on both one’s own income and an individual’s position in 
relative income distribution. The survey data analysis helps to check the external validity 
of experimental evidence. Their benchmark treatment consists of a gift-exchange game, 
in which a firm offers a wage to the worker and the worker then decides whether to 
accept or reject the wage. If the contract is rejected, both the firm and the worker receive 
nothing. Upon acceptance, the worker chooses his effort level, which is costly. The 
higher the effort level, the higher the profits of the firm and at the same time the higher 
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the costs to the worker. In the information treatment, information about wage offers to the 
other workers is added to the first stage of the game, i.e. workers can compare their own 
wage to wages offered to workers in different firms (participating in the same 
experimental session) before rejecting or accepting the wage offer and choosing effort. 
They find that effort depends on one’s own wages as well as on the wage of others. 
Another finding is that; (a) an individual’s rank in the income distribution determines 
effort more strongly than others’ average income, suggesting that comparisons are more 
ordinal than cardinal and (b) those who received a higher income or a higher income rank 
in the past exert less effort in the present. In my experiment, besides focusing on social 
comparisons between workers, I also test for the effect of intentions of the employer on 
workers’ decisions.  
Some studies find no evidence of social comparisons in the gift-exchange game. 
For example, Charness and Kuhn (2007) in experimentally test whether co-workers 
wages influence workers effort and find that while workers’ effort choices are highly 
sensitive to their own wages, effort is not affected by co-workers’ wages. 
Wage comparisons have also been studied in the ultimatum game. A typical 
finding in ultimatum games is that agents reject a substantial fraction of low offers (under 
20%) and proposers offer 40% of the pie on average (Camerer, 2003).
14
 These findings 
are robust to stake size (Slonim and Roth, 1998) and to culture differences (Costa-Gomes 
and Zauner, 2001; Henrich, 2000; Henrich et al., 2001). When pie sizes are unknown to 
agents, principals make lower offers and agents accept lower offers. For example, Güth, 
Huck, and Ockenfels (1996) find that when pies sizes differ and are unknown to the 
agents, principals with large pies were pretending that the pie was small and offer a fair 
                                                        
14 Hereafter „a proposer“ is called a principal in the text to stress the focus of the paper, which is on the labour relations. 
 
 
83 
division in view of a small pie. Kagel, Kim, and Moser (1996) find that agents accept less 
when uneven offers are generated by a random device than by a principal. Charness et al. 
(2013) in their experiment on wage delegation find that workers are concerned both with 
their own salaries and their relative wages with respect to their co-workers and make 
lower effort choices when they cannot choose their own wage while their co-workers can. 
In a three-player ultimatum game agents’ rejection rate increases with the 
difference between the offer to the agent and the offer to the other agent. Knez and 
Camerer (1995) introduced a three-player ultimatum game with outside options. They 
find that agents reject offers more frequently if they are offered less than the other agent 
but principals do not seem to take this into consideration and do not adjust the offers. Ho 
and Su (2009) analyse two independent ultimatum games played sequentially by a 
principal and two agents to test if agents look at the other agents as a reference to 
evaluate their wage. They introduce a term “peer induced fairness”, which means that the 
second agent is averse to receiving less than the first agent. The principal plays an 
ultimatum game with the first agent, and then the same principal plays an ultimatum 
game with the second agent. The second agent does not perfectly observe the offer the 
first agent receives, he only obtains an informative but imperfect public signal of the first 
offer, and can use this signal to infer the first agent’s payoff. The signal was constructed 
by drawing a number from a discrete uniform distribution over the set {-20, -10, 0, 10, 
20} and added to the first offer. Consequently, given a signal, second agents can infer 
what the first agent is likely to receive. The second agent is asked to make a guess of 
what the first offer is and is rewarded a sum of ten points for making a correct guess. This 
allows the second agent to have peer-induced fairness concerns and also allows for 
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analysing the equilibrium of the game under imperfect information. Without peer-
induced fairness, the second agent’s acceptance decision and the principal’s offer in the 
second game should not be influenced by the signal. The model predicts that the second 
agent's likelihood of accepting an offer decreases as the signal increases, suggesting that 
an identical offer can become less attractive as the second agent's expectations of the first 
agent’s payoff increases. In addition, the principal's offer to the second agent is 
contingent on the signal. The higher the signal, the more the principal will offer the 
second agent. Ho and Su (2009) find support for their predictions, i.e. they find that the 
second agent’s rate of rejection increases with the difference between the second offer 
and his expectations of the first agent’s payoff. The second agent rejects the offer more 
frequently as the received signal increases. They also find that the principal aligns the 
second offer close to the expectation of the first agent’s offer in order to avoid rejection 
by the second agent. The principal's offer is strategic in that he exploits the second agent 
when the signal is low and offers more when the signal is high. These results strongly 
suggest the existence of peer-induced fairness.  
Apart from social comparisons, the perception of fairness is has been shown to 
depend also on intentions. Rabin (1993) argues that people differentiate between an 
intentionally mean act, which they may punish, and an unintentionally mean act, which 
they may tolerate. This theoretically demonstrates that intentions might matter. An 
intentional act might trigger social comparisons among agents, they might feel that they 
are being treated unfairly and this might lead to lower output of the firm. Principals thus 
need to take into account that agents are sensitive to intentions. There exists experimental 
 
 
85 
evidence showing that agents attribute a different degree of intentionality to principal’s 
decisions (Charness, 2004; Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2008).  
Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2008) use a moonlighting game to provide 
experimental evidence for the behavioural relevance of fairness intentions. The 
moonlighting game is a two-player (A and B) game that consists of two stages. Both 
players are endowed with 12 points. In the first stage, player A chooses an action a ∈ {−6, 
−5,..., 5, 6}. If A chooses a >=0, he gives player B a tokens and the experimenter triples a 
so that B receives 3a. If A chooses a < 0, he takes |a| tokens away from B, A gain |a| and 
player B loses |a|. In the second stage, after player B observes a, he can choose an action 
b ∈ {−6, −5, . . . , 17, 18}, where b >=0 is a reward and b < 0 is a sanction. A reward 
transfers b points from B to A. A sanction costs B exactly |b| but reduces A’s income by 
3|b|. Since As can give and take while Bs can reward or sanction, this game allows for 
both positively and negatively reciprocal behaviour.  The experiment was run using the 
strategy method, i.e. player B had to give a response for each feasible action of player A, 
before B was informed about A’s actual choice. The treatments differ in whether A’s 
choice is under his full control. A determines a in the Intention treatment, if a is high, his 
action signals intentional kindness and if a is low, it signals intentional unkindness. In 
contrast, a random device (casting two dice) determines A’s move in the No-intention 
treatment. Consequently, A has no control over his action. His action therefore signals 
neither good nor bad intentions. The main result of the experiment indicates that the 
attribution of fairness intentions is important in both the cases of negatively and 
positively reciprocal behaviour. When the experimental design rules out the attribution of 
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fairness intentions, reciprocal responses are substantially weaker.  
When wages differ according to performance, the principal does not decide only 
on the wage level but also on the relative wages and whether or not the high performer is 
rewarded by a higher wage compared to his low performance co-worker. For example, 
Abeler et al. (2010) observe in a gift exchange game with a principal and two agents that 
agents who are paid equal wages exert significantly lower efforts than the agents who are 
paid individually. In Charness (2004), the wage in the gift-exchange game is either 
chosen by the principal or by external process (either a draw from a bingo cage or an 
assignment made by the experimenter). The game was played for ten rounds with random 
matching of the principal and agent to avoid reputation concerns. After the principal 
assigned the wage, the agents were asked to record their effort choices. Charness (2004) 
finds that the provided effort depends on both the wages and the mechanism for its 
determination. In the current experiment, however, the wage is always chosen by the 
principal and it is the process of assignment to a slot that varies across treatments. The 
principal decides on the wage for each agent. Each agent is informed which slot he has 
been assigned to and is also informed about the other agent’s wage. Agents can thus react 
to the assignment to the slot and to the other agent’s wage.  
Furthermore, if it is possible for agents to attribute a different degree of 
intentionality to principals’ wage choices, wages are significantly more likely to be 
rejected when principals intentionally offer unequal money splits compared to when 
comparable wages are clearly unintentional. For example, Kagel, Kim, and Moser (1996) 
try to gain insight into the nature of fairness considerations underlying behaviour, by 
varying players’ information and payoffs. In their ultimatum game, players bargain over 
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100 chips, where the chips have different monetary payoffs to the two players ($0.10 or 
$0.30 per chip). In addition, players have different information regarding chip payoffs: In 
some treatments only one player knows both payoffs and in others both players know 
both payoffs. In all cases, players know their own payoffs and it is “common knowledge” 
whether players know each other’s payoffs. Offers are significantly more likely to be 
rejected when first-movers intentionally offer unequal money splits compared to when 
comparable offers are clearly unintentional (due to lack of knowledge). When both 
players are fully informed and first-movers have higher exchange rates, conflicting 
fairness norms developed, resulting in unusually high rejection rates. 
 Gächter and Thöni (2010) present three experiments, all of them using a three-
person gift-exchange game, investigating the impact of wage comparisons for agent 
productivity. In the first experiment, the game is played in direct response mode, repeated 
eight times with randomly re-matched groups of three players in each round.
15
 They find 
that agents who face disadvantageous wage discrimination significantly reduce their 
effort relative to a situation with equal wages. In the second experiment the strategy 
method is used to allow focus on individual differences in wage comparisons. This has 
the advantage of increasing observations and allows for testing for individual 
heterogeneity. The result of this experiment also shows that there are significant wage 
comparison effects in the case of disadvantageous wage discrimination. Consistent with 
the fair wage-effort hypothesis agents tend to reduce their effort when they are paid less 
than the other agents but no equivalent effect is observed for overpayment. These average 
effects mask a surprisingly large variety of different patterns of wage comparison effects. 
                                                        
15 In a direct-response method, a second mover learns the action of the first mover and then chooses a response whereas in 
a strategy method, a second mover makes conditional decisions for each possible information set. 
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Some agents seem to reward the principal for a generous wage for the other agent, while 
others do the opposite. In their third experiment, which is the most relevant for the topic 
of this chapter, Gächter and Thöni (2010) test whether wage comparison effects are due 
to intentional wage discrimination or due to wage differences. The game is played using 
the strategy method and principals are not responsible for discriminatory wages, rather 
the wages are chosen randomly. They find that it is not the wage consequence that 
triggers the wage comparison effect but the procedure used to arrive at that wage. If 
intentions do not matter, the offered wages should lead to the same level of effort, 
regardless of the intentional/unintentional process behind it, which is not what is 
observed in Gächter and Thöni (2010) and in Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2008).   
While I combine the findings on intentions and social comparisons in the 
principal-agent relationship, I distinguish between two different levels of job slots, i.e. 
one that could possibly pay more and one that could pay less. I conjecture that an agent’s 
reaction to a specific slot assignment depends on the procedure used to arrive at that 
outcome. An ex-post assignment to a low slot will not be perceived as unfair if it arises 
from an ex-ante unbiased procedure, for example random assignment with equal 
probabilities, but will be perceived as unfair if agents believe that the procedure is biased; 
in particular, if the principal assigns the agent with a higher relative quiz performance to 
a low slot. To the best of my knowledge these questions have not yet been answered in 
the previous literature.  
I address these questions using a three-player ultimatum game, in which a 
principal and each agent divide a fixed pie. The principal moves first and offers a division 
of the pie to one agent, and a division of a separate pie to the other agent (wage). The 
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agents can accept or reject the wage. If the agent accepts, the pie is distributed according 
to the proposal. If an agent rejects, both the agent and the principal earn nothing.  
 
2.3 Experimental Design And Procedures 
This experimental design is nested in a three-player ultimatum game, presented in 
Figure 2.1, in which one principal (called proposer in the experiment in order to avoid 
framing effects) is paired with two ex-ante identical agents: agent A and agent B. The 
computer randomly determines who is the principal, agent A and agent B. Each 
participant has a 1/3 chance of becoming the principal, agent A, or agent B. All 
interactions are anonymous. In the first part of the experiment agents are asked to 
complete a general knowledge quiz. Each agent is asked to answer the same set of 20 
questions in the same order and each question has one correct answer. While agents 
complete the quiz, all principals are asked to wait patiently and quietly.  
 
Figure 2.1 Game Tree 
 
 
PrincipalPrincipal
R100 agent
R200 agent
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Within each group, the two agents are ranked based on their quiz scores. If both 
agents have the same score in the quiz, the agent who completes the quiz the fastest is 
ranked higher. After the completion of the quiz the agents are assigned to the low slot and 
the high slot (in the instructions represented by the R100 and R200 roles, respectively, to 
avoid framing effects). After the assignment, the agents are labelled the R100 agent if 
assigned to the low slot and the R200 agent if assigned to the high slot. The assignment 
varies depending on the experimental treatment and is always common knowledge. There 
are three treatments (see Table 2.1). In the Principal Assignment treatment the principal 
and both agents are informed about the relative quiz performance. The principal decides 
on the assignment to a slot and on the wages based on the relative quiz performance. In 
the Random Assignment treatment, the principal and both agents are also informed about 
the relative quiz performance but the assignment to a slot is random. The principal 
decides only on the wages based on the relative quiz performance. In the Quasi-Random 
Assignment treatment only the agents are informed about the relative quiz performance. 
The principal decides on the assignment to a slot and on the wages without being 
informed about the relative quiz performance. I posit that the principal will assign the 
agent who had a higher relative quiz performance to the high slot. In the Quasi-Random 
Assignment treatment the principal has to make the assignment without knowing the 
relative quiz performance. The fact that the principal does not know the relative 
performance is withheld from the agents in the Quasi-Random Assignment treatment in 
order to control for the change in the agents responses (to unfair assignment) compared to 
the Principal Assignment treatment. 
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The principal and the R200 agent receive a 200-franc pie to be divided between 
them.
16
 Separately, the principal and the R100 agent receive a 100-franc pie to be divided 
between them. The procedure for dividing each pie between the principal and each agent 
is as follows. The principal chooses how many francs out of 200 to offer to the R200 
agent and how many francs out of 100 to offer to the R100 agent. 
Agents’ responses are elicited using strategy method, hence each agent does not 
observe the wage that the principal offered him; however, he observes the wage that the 
principal offered the paired agent in order to generate social comparisons.
17
 After 
observing the wage that the principal offered to the paired agent, each agent states his 
minimum acceptable wage (hereafter minimum acceptable offer, MAO). Each agent 
chooses his MAO before he comes to know his actual wage. If the wage offered by the 
principal turns out to be greater or equal to the MAO, the wage is accepted. If the wage is 
accepted, the agent receives the number of francs stated in the wage, whereas the 
principal keeps the remainder. However, if the wage is less than MAO then the wage is 
rejected, the pie disappears and both the principal and the agent receive nothing.  
Each observation consists of two wages offered by the principal (to the R100 
agent and to the R200 agent) and a MAO stated by each of the two agents. Each decision 
is statistically independent because an agent’s decision on the MAO does not affect the 
paired agent’s decision or monetary payoff. This allows me to test whether social 
comparisons occur between the two paired agents.  
 
 
                                                        
16 1 franc = 0.1 NZD 
17 Armantier (2006) did not find differences in MAOs in an ultimatum game using strategy method versus direct response 
method (listed in Brandts and Charness (2011)). 
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Table 2.1 Overview Of The Treatment Differences 
  
Random Assignment Principal 
Assignment 
Quasi-Random 
Assignment 
Assignment to the high 
and low slots 
 Random Principal Principal 
The principal knows 
about the relative quiz 
performance  
 Yes Yes No 
 
I conjecture that the sensitivity to the paired agent’s wage will be greater if the 
assignment to the slots is done by the principal as opposed to random assignment. In the 
Principal Assignment treatment the principal is responsible for the wage and also for the 
assignment of the agents to the slots. The agents might thus attribute intentions to the 
principal’s decisions, compare themselves with their paired agent and state MAOs that 
are closer to the wage of the paired agent than in the Random Assignment treatment. I 
expect the wage the principal offers to the R100 agent to be lower than the wage offered 
to the R200 agent, because of differing pie sizes (100 francs and 200 francs). I also 
expect larger differences in wages to the R100 and R200 agents in the Random 
Assignment treatment (offering more to the R200 agent and offering less to the R100 
agent) whereas in the Principal Assignment treatment I expect the principal to offer the 
wage to both agents. In the Random Assignment treatment the principal is not responsible 
for assigning the agents to the slots, the only thing he can do is to decide on wage given 
the fact that the agents have already been assigned to their slots. I would thus expect the 
agents to be more tolerant to the wage offered by the principal, thus the agents’ MAO and 
the paired agents’ wage differentials will be higher than in the Principal Assignment 
treatment. The principal anticipating this will offer different wages to the R100 agent and 
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R200 agent. In the Principal Assignment treatment, however, the principal has to assign 
the agents to the slots as well as choose the wage. The size of the pie, which is available 
for each agent and the principal, thus depends on the principal’s decision, to which the 
agents might attribute intentions. I expect the principal to expect the R100 agent to state 
his MAO closer to the R200 agent’s wage than in the Random Assignment treatment 
resulting in offering similar wages to both agents, i.e. compressing the wages.  I test the 
following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The R100 agents’ MAO and the R200 agents’ wage differentials are 
smaller in the Principal Assignment treatment than in the Random Assignment treatment. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The R100 agents’ MAO and the R200 agents’ wage differentials are 
smaller in the Quasi-Random Assignment treatment than in the Random Assignment 
treatment. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The R200 agents’ MAO and the R100 agents’ wage differentials are 
smaller in the Principal Assignment treatment than in the Random Assignment treatment. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The R200 agents’ MAO and the R100 agents’ differentials are smaller in 
the Quasi-Random Assignment treatment than in the Random Assignment treatment. 
 
These hypotheses test whether the agents’ MAO approximates to the paired 
agents’ wage, suggesting that the paired agents’ wage serves as a reference point. In the 
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Random Assignment treatment, the assignment to the slots is random; the principal only 
decides on the wages. Based on previous literature I posit that the MAOs are more likely 
to be closer to the paired agents’ wages in the Principal Assignment treatment than in the 
Random Assignment treatment (Charness, 2004; Kagel, Kim, and Moser, 1996). I thus 
expect the agent’s MAO and the paired agent’s wage differentials to be smaller in the 
Principal Assignment treatment. In the Quasi-Random Assignment treatment there is a 
higher possibility of agents whose relative quiz performance was higher, to be assigned to 
a low slot, which might trigger stronger responses in the form of smaller differentials 
between the agent’s MAO and the paired agent’s wage than in the Random Assignment 
treatment. Since agents in the Quasi-Random Assignment treatment are not informed 
about the principal not knowing the relative quiz performance, they might perceive that 
the assignment to the low and high slots as well as the wages are intentionally unfair. 
Thus, agents might not be as “forgiving” as in the Random Assignment treatment and 
might expect higher wages and state higher MAOs, which in turn leads to more rejections 
– similarly as in the Principal Assignment treatment.  
 
Hypothesis 5: The R100 agents’ wage and the R200 agents’ wage differentials will be 
smaller in the Principal Assignment treatment than in the Random Assignment treatment. 
 
If agents’ behaviour depends on the assignment procedure and agents are 
sensitive to the other agent’s wage, the principal reacts by compressing wages in the 
Principal Assignment treatment. The assignment to slots in the Principal Assignment 
treatment is done by the principal, who knows the relative quiz performance and the 
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agents are aware of it. If the wages differ significantly, the agents might feel this is unfair 
and reject the wages more often. In order to avoid the rejections, the principal will offer 
the same or similar wages to both agents.  
 
A total of 288 participants took part in the experiment. The experimental sessions 
were conducted in the New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory (NZEEL) at the 
University of Canterbury. The participants were recruited using the online database 
system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The number of participants in a session varied from 27 
to 36. All sessions were run under a single-blind social distance protocol.  The treatments 
were implemented in an across-subject design.
18
  The experiment was programmed and 
conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).  
Upon entering the laboratory, participants were asked to sit in a cubicle. At the 
beginning of each session instructions were handed out, as well as projected onto a screen 
and read aloud. Any questions arising were answered in private. Each participant was 
randomly paired with two other participants in the laboratory to form an anonymous 
group of three persons, i.e. a principal, agent A and agent B, later assigned to slots. All 
agents then completed the quiz, which consisted of 20 questions; each question had one 
correct answer. The agents had 10 minutes to complete the quiz. After the quiz, all 
participants proceeded to the decision-making part of the experiment, which was run 
using the strategy method (Brandts and Charness, 2011; Selten, 1967). The participants 
entered their decisions and upon the completion of the experiment, were asked to 
complete a questionnaire for which they were paid 5 NZD. The earnings were converted 
                                                        
18 One participant accidently participated two times in this experiment; so his group’s observations were excluded from the 
data. 
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from francs into New Zealand Dollars at exchange rate 1 franc = 0.1 NZD. The 
participants played the game only once as opposed to repeatedly, in order to avoid 
different learning and information updating possibilities. The participants were then 
called one by one to receive their payment in private in the payment room in the back of 
the laboratory. On average, a session lasted 50 minutes including the payment and 
participants earned on average 12.80 NZD.
19
 
 
   
                                                        
19 For reference, at the time of the experiment this was approximately 11 USD and the adult minimum wage in New 
Zealand was 14.25 NZD per hour. 
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2.4 Experimental Results 
2.4.1 The Agents 
The relatively high MAOs observed in the data indicate that agents are concerned 
with their wage relative to the principals. The strength of the principal-agent comparison 
may divert agents’ attention away from comparisons with the paired agents or limit how 
large the between-agent effect could be (Knez and Camerer, 1995). Table 2.2 summarizes 
the averages and standard deviations of the R100 and R200 agents’ MAO as well as 
number of observations in each treatment.  
 
Table 2.2 The R100 and R200 Agents’ MAO 
Treatment Role  Avg. min 
acceptable offer 
[francs] 
 Std. deviation 
[francs] 
 Number of 
observations 
1 
R100  34.258  16.452  31 
R200  65.355  34.889  31 
2 
R100  36.906  21.349  32 
R200  57.656  38.333  32 
3 
R100  41.938  21.268  32 
R200  66.438  37.431  32 
 
I test for the differences in the agent’s MAO and the paired agent’s wage 
differentials between the treatments.  Table 2.3 summarizes the results of the Mann-
Whitney tests. Since the only information the agents get is the relative quiz performance 
and the paired agents’ wage, it is interesting to test for the agents’ MAO and the paired 
agents’ wage differentials.  
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Table 2.3 Statistical Tests for the Agents’ MAO and the Paired Agents’ Wage 
Differentials 
 The R100s’ MAO and the 
R200s’ wage differentials 
(Mann-Whitney p-value) 
The R200s’ MAO and the 
R100s’ wage differentials 
(Mann-Whitney p-value) 
Random assignment vs. 
Principal assignment 
0.855 
(0.393) 
1.137 
(0.256) 
 
Random assignment vs. 
Quasi-random assignment 
-0.312 
(0.755) 
-0.276 
(0.783) 
 
Principal assignment vs. 
Quasi-random assignment 
-1.677 
(0.094)* 
-1.495 
(0.135) 
 
Hypothesis 1 states that the R100 agents’ MAO and the R200 agents’ wage 
differentials are smaller in the Principal Assignment treatment than in the Random 
Assignment treatment. This hypothesis is based on a conjecture that intentions and social 
comparisons matter and agents will state MAOs closer to the paired agents’ wages when 
the principal does the assignment. 
 
Result 1: The R100 agents’ MAO and the R200 agents’ wage differentials are not 
smaller in the Principal Assignment treatment than in the Random Assignment treatment. 
 
Support for Result 1: As can be seen from Table 2.3, the Mann-Whitney test does not 
detect a statistically significant difference in the agents’ MAO and the paired agents’ 
wage differentials between the Random Assignment treatment and the Principal 
Assignment treatment (p-value=0.393). This suggests that the differentials between the 
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R100 agents’ MAO and the R200 agent’s wage are the same in the Principal Assignment 
treatment and in Random Assignment treatment (differentials depicted in Figure 2.2). 
 
Hypothesis 2 states that the differentials between the R100 agents’ MAO and the 
R200 agents’ wage are smaller in Quasi-Random Assignment treatment than in Random 
Assignment treatment. 
 
Result 2: The differentials between the R100 agents’ MAO and the R200 agents’ wage 
are not smaller in the Quasi-Random Assignment treatment than in the Random 
Assignment treatment.  
 
Support for Result 2: There is no statistically significant difference in the R100 agents’ 
MAO and the R200 agents’ wage differentials between the Quasi-Random Assignment 
treatment and the Random Assignment treatment (p-value=0.755). There is, however, a 
statistically significant difference in the R100 agents’ MAO and the R200 agents’ wage 
differentials between the Quasi-Random Assignment treatment and the Principal 
Assignment treatment (p-value=0.094). In the Principal Assignment treatment this 
differentials are smaller suggesting that agents compare their wages with the paired 
agents’ wages. 
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Figure 2.2 The R100 Agents’ MAO and the R200 Agents’ Wage Differentials 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 states that the R200 agents’ MAO and the R100 agents’ wage 
differentials are smaller in the Principal Assignment treatment than in the Random 
Assignment treatment. This hypothesis, again, is based on a conjecture that agents 
compare their wages with their paired agents’ wages. 
 
Result 3: The R200 agents’ MAO and the R100 agents’ wage differentials are not 
smaller in the Principal Assignment treatment than in the Random Assignment treatment. 
 
Support for Result 3: The Mann-Whitney test does not detect a statistically significant 
difference in the R200 agents’ MAO and the R100 agents’ wage differentials between the 
Random Assignment treatment and the Principal Assignment treatment (p-value=0.256). 
The R200 agents’ MAO and the R100 agents’ wage differentials are depicted in Figure 
2.3.  
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Hypothesis 4 states that the differentials between R200 agents’ MAO and the 
R100 agents’ wage are smaller in the Quasi-Random Assignment treatment than in the 
Random Assignment treatment. 
 
Result 4: The differentials between the R200 agents’ MAO and the R100 agents’ wage 
are not smaller in the Quasi-Random Assignment treatment than in the Random 
Assignment treatment. 
 
Support for Result 4:  According to the Mann-Whitney test there is no statistically 
significant difference in the R200 agents’ MAO and the R100 agents’ wage differentials 
between the Quasi-Random Assignment treatment and the Random Assignment 
treatment (p-value=0.783).  
 
Figure 2.3 The R200 Agent’s MAO and the R100 Agent’s Wage Differential 
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For completeness, I test for the differences in the R200 and R100 agents’ MAO 
differentials as well as the R200 agents’ MAO and the R100 agents’ MAO between the 
treatments using the Mann-Whitney test (see Table 2.4). Based on previous literature I 
posit that the MAOs will be higher when the principal intentionally assigns the agents to 
the slots as opposed to the agents being randomly assigned to the slots (Charness, 2004; 
Kagel, Kim, and Moser, 1996).  
 
Table 2.4 Statistical Tests, the MAOs 
Treatment MAO differentials 
 
(Mann-Whitney p-
value) 
MAOs of the R200 
agents 
(Mann-Whitney p-
value) 
MAOs of the R100 
agents 
(Mann-Whitney p-
value) 
Random Assignment vs. 
Principal Assignment 
1.055 
(0.291) 
1.106 
(0.269) 
-0.552 
(0.581) 
Random Assignment vs. Quasi-
Random Assignment 
0.296 
(0.767) 
-0.194 
(0.847) 
-1.214 
(0.225) 
Principal Assignment vs. Quasi-
Random Assignment 
-0.720 
(0.472) 
-1.331 
(0.183) 
-0.521 
(0.603) 
 
The R200 agents’ MAO and the R100 agents’ MAO differentials are depicted in 
Figure 2.4. If intentions and social comparisons play a role the differentials between 
R200 agents’ MAO and R100 agents’ MAO will be higher in the Quasi-Random 
Assignment treatment as opposed to the Random Assignment treatment. In the Quasi-
Random treatment the principals do not know the relative quiz performance and so the 
assignment to the slot is random from the principals’ point of view and might result to 
more “unfair” assignments. The agents might thus react to this unfair assignment by 
stating higher MAOs in the Quasi-Random Assignment treatment than in the Random 
Assignment treatment. As can be seen from Table 2.4, the Mann-Whitney test does not 
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detect a statistically significant difference in the R200 agents’ MAO and R100 agents’ 
MAO differentials between the Random Assignment treatment and the Principal 
Assignment treatment (p-value=0.291). I find no evidence of the R200 agents’ MAO and 
R100 agents’ MAO differentials to be statistically significantly different between the 
Quasi-Random Assignment treatment and the Random Assignment treatment (p-
value=0.767). The Mann-Whitney test also does not detect a statistically significant 
difference in the R200 agents’ MAO and R100 agents’ MAO differentials between the 
Principal Assignment treatment and the Quasi-Random Assignment treatment (p-
value=0.472). 
I also tested for the differences in the R200 agents’ MAO across the treatments. 
The Mann-Whitney test does not detect a statistically significant difference in the R200 
agents’ MAO between the Random Assignment treatment and the Principal Assignment 
treatment (p-value=0.269) or between the Random Assignment treatment and Quasi-
Random Assignment treatment (p-value=0.847) or between the Principal Assignment and 
the Quasi-Random Assignment treatment (p-value=0.183).  
The test results for the differences in the R100 agents’ MAO are also reported in 
Table 2.4. As in the previous case, the Mann-Whitney test does not detect a statistically 
significant difference between the Random Assignment treatment and the Principal 
Assignment treatment (p-values 0.581) or the Random Assignment treatment and the 
Quasi-Random Assignment treatment (p-value=0.225) or the Principal Assignment 
treatments and the Quasi-Random treatment (p-value=0.603). 
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Figure 2.4 The R200 Agents’ MAO And The R100 Agents’ MAO Differentials 
 
 
In the Random Assignment treatment, 13 out of 62 wages were rejected (21%), in 
the Principal Assignment treatment 13 out of 64 wages were rejected (20%) and in the 
Quasi-Random Assignment treatment, in total eleven out of 64 wages were rejected 
(17%), which can be seen in Table 2.6. The Mann-Whitney test does not detect a 
statistically significant difference in the rejection rate of the R200 agents (p-value= 
0.716) and of the R100 agents (0.786) between the Random Assignment treatment and 
the Principal Assignment treatment.
20
 
 
                                                        
20 The Mann-Whitney test shows that there is no statistically significant difference in the rejection rate of R200 agents (p-
value= 0.716) and of R100 agents (0.683) between the Random Assignment treatment and the Quasi-Random Assignment 
treatment and also no statistically significant difference in the rejection rate of R200 agents (p-value= 1.000) and of R100 
agents (0.495) between the Principal Assignment treatment and the Quasi-Random Assignment treatment. 
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2.4.2 The Principals  
The summary of wages offered to the R200 and R100 agents is presented in Table 
2.5. In the Random Assignment treatment the maximum wage offered to the R100 agent 
is 100 francs (there were 4 wage offers of 100 francs) and to the R200 agent 200 francs. 
On average, in the Random Assignment treatment the principals offered wages of 51.97 
and 87.06 francs to the R100 agent and the R200 agent, respectively. In the Principal 
Assignment treatment the principals offered wages of 55.00 and 90.47 francs to the R100 
agent and the R200 agent, respectively. In the Quasi-Random Assignment treatment the 
principals offered wages of 52.03 and 86.88 francs to the R100 agent and the R200 agent, 
respectively. Five out of 31 principals (16%) offered an equal split of the relevant pie (i.e. 
offering the R100 agent 50 and the R200 agent 100) to both agents in the Random 
Assignment treatment, 10 out of 32 principals (31%) in the Principal Assignment 
treatments and 11 out of 32 principals (34%) in the Quasi-Random Assignment 
treatment. 
 
Table 2.5 Principals' Behaviour, Wages 
 Random Assignment  Principal Assignment  Quasi-Random 
Assignment 
To the 
R100 
agent  
 To the 
R200 
agent  
 To the 
R100 
agent 
 To the 
R200 
agent 
 To the 
R100 
agent 
 To the 
R200 
agent 
            
Mean 51.97  87.06  55.00  90.47  52.03  86.88 
Median 50.00  90.00  50.00  100.00  50.00  90.00 
Std. 
deviation 
22.76  30.64  15.43  18.32  14.91  18.22 
Minimum  2  20  25  30  10  10 
Maximum 100  200 
(120*) 
 100  115  90  100 
*The second highest wage in parentheses 
 
 
106 
The distribution of the wages and the rejection rates are shown in Table 2.6. The modal 
wage of the R200 agents as well as of the R100 agents is between 41-50% for all three 
treatments. No more than 4.8% of the wages are below 20% of the pie. This is in line 
with general observation made by Camerer (2003). Hence, the sub-game perfect 
equilibrium of very low wages is strongly rejected, consistent with previous literature. 
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Table 2.6 Wage Distributions and the Rejection Rates 
 
The Random Assignment Treatment The Principal Assignment Treatment The Quasi-Random Assignment Treatment 
Wage 
range 
Wages (percent) Rejected (percent) Wages (percent) Rejected (percent) Wages (percent) Rejected (percent) 
R200 R100 R200 R100 R200 R100 R200 R100 R200 R100 R200 R100 
0-10% 1 
(3.2%) 
1 
(3.2%) 
1 
(100%) 
1 
(100%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(3.1%) 
1 
(3.1%) 
1 
(100%) 
0 
(0%) 
11-20% 1 
(3.2%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(100%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(3.1%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(100%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
21-30% 3 
(9.7%) 
5 
(16.1%) 
1 
(33.3%) 
2 
(40%) 
2 
(6.3%) 
2 
(6.3%) 
1 
(50%) 
1 
(50%) 
2 
(6.3%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(50%) 
0 
(0%) 
31-40% 8 
(25.8%) 
2 
(6.5%) 
3 
(37.5%) 
1 
(50%) 
4 
(12.5%) 
1 
(3.1%) 
3 
(75%) 
1 
(100%) 
6 
(18.8%) 
4 
(12.5%) 
3 
(50%) 
2 
(50%) 
41-50% 15 
(48.4%) 
16 
(51.6%) 
2 
(13.3%) 
1 
(6.3%) 
22 
(68.8%) 
19 
(59.4%) 
2 
(9.1%) 
4 
(18.2%) 
23 
(71.9%) 
19 
(59.4%) 
2 
(8.7%) 
2 
(10.5%) 
51-60% 2 
(6.5%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
3 
(9.4%) 
3 
(9.4%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
4 
(12.5%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
61-70% 0 
(0%) 
3 
(9.7%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
2 
(6.3%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(3.1%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
71-80% 0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
3 
(9.4%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(3.1%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
81-90% 0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(3.1%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
2 
(6.3%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
91-
100% 
1 
(3.2%) 
4 
(12.9%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(3.1%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
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There is a clear pattern of a higher rate of rejection as the wage decreases. The 
R200 agents rejected eight wages in Random Assignment; seven in the Principal 
Assignment treatment and seven in the Quasi-Random Assignment treatment with 
average rejected wage of 63.13; 71.14 and 70.00 francs, respectively. R100 agents 
rejected five, six and four wages with average rejected wage of 29.40; 44.17 and 43.75 
francs in the Random Assignment treatment, the Principal Assignment treatment and the 
Quasi-Random Assignment treatment, respectively. There were five observations in 
which the principal offered a wage of 100 francs (the entire pie) to the R100 agent 
(Figure 2.5) and one observation where the principal offered a wage of 200 francs to the 
R200 agent (Figure 2.6). Since there is a total amount of 300 francs to be divided among 
three people, offering 100 francs to both agents, results in an equal wage for all three 
participants. 
 
Figure 2.5 Wage As A Percentage Of The Pie Offered To The R200 Agents 
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Figure 2.6 Wage As A Percentage Of The Pie Offered To The R100 Agents 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 states that the R100 agents’ wage and the R200 agents’ wage 
differentials will be higher in the Random Assignment treatment than in the Principal 
Assignment treatment. If the agents are sensitive to the assignment made by the principal, 
they will be more sensitive to wages (they will report higher MAOs) in the treatment 
where agents are assigned to slots by the principal. On one hand, the principals, who 
anticipate this and want to maximize their payoff, might want to offer similar wages to 
the agents to avoid their rejections when the agents compare their own wage to that of the 
paired agents. As a result the principal will offer similar wages to the R100 and R200 
agents. On the other hand, I expect the principal to anticipate that the agent is less 
sensitive to the paired agent’s wage when the assignment to the slots is random as 
opposed to the principal making the assignment. The principal will thus offer higher 
wages to the R200 agents than to the R100 agents. 
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Result 5: I find no evidence of wage compression in the Principal Assignment treatment 
as opposed to Random Assignment. 
 
Support for Result 5: I find no statistically significant difference in the R200 and R100 
agents’ wage differentials between Random Assignment and the Principal Assignment 
treatment (Mann-Whitney p-value=0.494). I also do not find a statistically significant 
result when it comes to wage differentials between the Random Assignment Treatment 
and the Quasi-Random Assignment Treatment (p-value=0.731) and the Principal 
Assignment Treatment and Quasi-Random Assignment Treatment (p-value=0.694).
21
 
 
Figure 2.7 shows the wages as a percentage of the pie from the principal’s point 
of view. If the principal offered 50% of the pie to the R100 agents and also 50% of the 
pie to the R200 agents, the wages would be lying on a 45-degree line (projected as red 
line in the picture). It can be seen from the Figure 2.7 that there was only one wage to the 
R200 agent that exceeded 60% of the pie. However, there are a few wages ranging from 
60-100% among the wages to the R100 agents. It appears that the principals are willing to 
offer bigger share of the pie to the R100 agents than to the R200 agents. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
21 Since the wage of 200 francs to the R200 agent in the Random Assignment treatment can be considered an outlier, I ran 
the tests excluding this observation as well. There is still no statistical difference in the wages offered to the R100 and the 
R200 agents between the Random Assignment treatment and Principal Assignment treatment (Mann-Whitney p-
value=0.276); the Random Assignment treatment and the Quasi-Random Assignment treatment (p-value=0.560); and the 
Principal Assignment treatment and the Quasi-Random Assignment treatment (p-value=0.615). 
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Figure 2.7 Wages offered to both agents [%] 
 
 
Table 2.7 The Mann-Whitney Test Result after Discarding Unfair Assignments 
from the Principal Assignment Treatment 
Treatment Wage differentials 
(Mann-Whitney p-value) 
Random Assignment vs. Principal Assignment 
-0.863 
(0.388) 
Random Assignment vs. Quasi-Random 
Assignment 
- 
Principal Assignment vs. Quasi-Random 
Assignment 
0.586 
(0.558) 
 
After discarding the wages in which the principal assigned the agent with higher 
relative quiz performance to the low slots, I tested if there is a statistically significant 
difference in the R100 agents’ and R200 agents’ wage differentials between treatments 
Random Assignment and the Principal Assignment treatment; and the Principal 
Assignment treatment and the Quasi-Random Assignment treatment. Notice that only in 
the Principal Assignment treatment the principal knew the relative quiz performance and 
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decided on the assignment of the agents to the slots. The Mann-Whitney test does not 
detect a statistically significant difference in the R100 and R200 agents’ wage 
differentials (see Table 2.7). 
 
2.5 Demographics 
2.5.1 The Principals 
As demographic data were elicited in the post-experiment questionnaire I can test 
if any of these are influencing the principal’s decision on wage offered to the R200 agent 
and the R100 agent. All variables that were potentially relevant were regressed and the 
results from an OLS regression are reported in Table 2.8 below. 
THE RANDOM ASSIGNMENT TREATMENT is omitted from the regression to 
use it as the comparison basis for treatment effects, and to avoid perfect correlation. THE 
PAIRED AGENT’S WAGE is the wage offered to the R100 agent if the dependent 
variable is the R200 agent’s wage and to the R200 agent if the dependent variable is the 
R100 agent’s wage. This variable is statistically significant in both regressions. MALE is 
a dummy variable that is 1 when a subject reported their gender as male and 0 if female. 
NON NZ is a dummy variable that is 1 when subjects nominated a nationality of a 
country that was not New Zealand, out of this group approximately 55.6% of the 
principals and 61% of the agents nominated an Asian nationality, and approximately 
16.7% of the principals and 15.3% of the agents nominated a European nationality. 
ECON is a dummy variable that is 1 when subjects nominated an area of study that was 
‘Economics’, or ‘Business Economics’. 
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Table 2.8 Demographics Analysis, The Principals 
 
OLS 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Dependent variable the R200 
agent’s wage 
Dependent variable the R100 
agent’s wage 
THE PRINCIPAL ASSIGNMENT 
TREATMENT 
3.229 
(0.554) 
2.562 
(0.554) 
THE QUASI-RANDOM 
ASSIGNMENT TREATMENT 
2.234 
(0.673) 
0.046 
(0.991) 
THE PAIRED AGENT’S WAGE 0.502*** 
(0.001) 
0.316*** 
(0.001) 
MALE -8.969** 
(0.043) 
1.440 
(0.686) 
AGE 1.281** 
(0.013) 
-0.157 
(0.707) 
SIBLINGS 1.507 
(0.315) 
-0.478 
(0.689) 
ECON -4.439 
(0.313) 
-0.805 
(0.818) 
NON NZ 0.000 
 (1.000) 
-2.057 
(0.585) 
RELATIVE INCOME 1.404 
(0.548) 
1.495 
(0.419) 
CITY SIZE 0.147 
(0.952) 
-2.210 
(0.249) 
LIVE WITH OTHERS 0.050 
(0.831) 
0.429** 
(0.018) 
MONEY 0.002 
(0.682) 
0.001 
(0.865) 
FINANCE STUDY -0.045 
(0.488) 
-0.083 
(0.101) 
NO. OF PEOPLE KNOWN 3.004 
(0.301) 
-2.802 
(0.223) 
CONSTANT 30.839 
(0.056) 
35.109 
(0.005) 
Run on StataSE 12.0. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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LIVE WITH OTHERS is the number of people that currently live in the subject’s 
household, MONEY is the amount of dollars that subjects nominated as their monthly 
non-accommodation budget, FINANCE STUDY is the proportion that subjects 
nominated as the fraction of their monthly budget that they fund themselves. NO. OF 
PEOPLE KNOWN is the number subject knows in the session. RELATIVE INCOME is 
the income of subjects’ parents in comparison to other families in New Zealand when 
subjects were 16 years of age. The larger the income of the family they state the larger 
the variable RELATIVE INCOME. Subjects had five possibilities to choose from, i.e. far 
below average, below average, average, above average, far above average.  CITY SIZE is 
the size of the community where the subject has lived the most time of their life. Subjects 
could choose from the following four options: up to 2 000 inhabitants, 2 000 to 10 000 
inhabitants, 10 000 to 100 000 inhabitants, more than 100 000 inhabitants. The more 
inhabitants they state the higher is the variable CITY SIZE. MONEY and FINANCE 
STUDY were included as measures to control for income.  
The coefficients for THE PRINCIPAL ASSIGNMENT TREATMENT and THE 
QUASI-RANDOM ASSIGNMENT TREATMENT confirm that there is no statistically 
significant difference in the R200 and R100 agents’ wage differentials compared to THE 
RANDOM ASSIGNMENT TREATMENT. Interestingly, the variable MALE and AGE 
are statistically significant at 5% level in the R200 agent’s wage but not in the R100 
agent’s wage. The variable ECON was used to control for the behaviour of economics 
students. In this game it would be predicted that economics students will offer a wage of 
0. Even though the coefficient is not statistically significant, the sign is in the correct 
direction.  
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An interesting result of this analysis of demographics is the statistically significant 
coefficient (the R100 agent’s wage) related to the variable LIVE WITH OTHERS. This 
suggests that the more people that live in the same household the higher wage the 
subjects tend to offer to the R100 agents.  
2.5.2 The Agents 
Demographic data were also elicited from the agents. Therefore, I can test if any 
of the demographic data affected the agents’ decision on their minimum acceptable offer. 
The OLS regression (presented in Table 2.9) was run on any variables that could have an 
impact on the agents’ behaviour. 
As previously, with the demographics that were elicited for the principals, the 
treatments do not have an effect on the minimum acceptable offers. The variable THE 
PAIRED AGENT’S WAGE is not statistically significant, which confirms the result that 
the paired agent’s wage does not influence the agent’s minimum acceptable offer. The 
only statistically significant variable in the regression is R200 AGENT, meaning that the 
agents assigned to the high slot stated higher minimum acceptable offers than the agents 
assigned to the low slots. It appears from the results that demographics are not 
significantly biasing results in this experiment. 
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Table 2.9 Demographics Analysis, The Agents 
 
OLS 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Minimum Acceptable Offer 
THE PRINCIPAL ASSIGNMENT TREATMENT -4.092 
(0.492) 
THE QUASI-RANDOM ASSIGNMENT 
TREATMENT 
2.855 
(0.633) 
R200 AGENT 14.355** 
(0.033) 
THE PAIRED AGENT’S WAGE 0.117 
(0.356) 
MALE 2.391 
(0.632) 
AGE 0.316 
(0.510) 
SIBLINGS -0.760 
(0.645) 
ECON -1.178 
(0.815) 
NON NZ -2.074 
(0.710) 
RELATIVE INCOME -2.688 
(0.301) 
CITY SIZE -0.806 
(0.748) 
LIVE WITH OTHERS 0.147 
(0.669) 
MONEY 0.006 
(0.273) 
FINANCE STUDY 0.051 
(0.447) 
NO. OF PEOPLE KNOWN 3.421 
(0.213) 
CONSTANT 32.057 
(0.149) 
Run on StataSE 12.0. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
Previous literature provides evidence that agents care about their own wages, the 
wages of other workers, and about the intentions of the principal. In the current 
experiment I test whether agents are sensitive to the paired agents’ wage, to the process 
of the assignment to slots, and whether the principal compresses wages in treatments 
where the assignment might seem less fair. The results from the current experiment cast 
doubt on the notion that agents’ concerns with the paired agents’ wages might explain 
pay policies such as wage compression or wage secrecy. The managers of the firms 
decide to compress wages (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990) when there is evidence of wage 
comparisons among the agents, which can jeopardize firms’ monetary performance. The 
current experiment does not provide evidence on principals compressing wages in a 
treatment with unfair assignment to slots.  
Fairness norms are highly relevant for work-related decisions in organizations and 
on the labour market (e.g. Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Gächter 
and Fehr, 2002; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1986; Konow, 1996; Rabin, 1993; 
Scott, 2003). Some theories of fairness, in particular inequity aversion by Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999)  and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), can be used to help explain subject 
behaviour. According to inequity aversion people resist inequitable outcomes; i.e., they 
are willing to give up some material payoff to move in the direction of more equitable 
outcomes. In a game with more than two players Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume that a 
player compares himself to each of the other players separately. This implies that his 
behaviour towards another player depends on the income difference towards this player. 
Behaviour of some subjects can be explained by the Fehr and Schmidt theory of inequity 
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as 25.3% (24 out of 95 principals) behaved consistently with this theory (offering exactly 
50 to the R100 agents and exactly 100 to the R200 agents). Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), 
on the other hand, assume that the decision maker is not concerned about each individual 
opponent but only about the average income of all players.22 Based on this theory it is 
possible that the principals were trying to be fair by offering a “fair share”, i.e. exactly 
100 francs for each of the agents and 100 francs to keep for themselves. As can be seen 
from the data 5% (5 out of 95 principals) behaved consistently with this theory.  
The complex settings of firms, such as multiple hierarchies and relationships, 
make it hard to understand aspects of fairness behaviour as multiple reference points 
might be behind the decisions of people (Alewell and Nicklisch, 2006). Firms are usually 
structured into a hierarchy where many agents belong to the same hierarchical layer and 
are concerned about horizontal fairness (Güth, Königstein, Kovács, and Zala-Mezõ, 
2001). Several recent papers provide laboratory evidence on the role of horizontal social 
comparisons for agents’ effort choices in a gift exchange environment (e.g. Clark, 
Masclet, and Villeval, 2006; Gächter and Thöni, 2010). However, between-agent 
comparisons are not the only comparisons being made in a workplace environment. 
Another important fairness aspect to have in mind is vertical fairness, i.e. the relationship 
between the outcome distributions among principals and agents, and agents’ acceptance 
thresholds (Güth, Königstein, Kovács, and Zala-Mezõ, 2001). Agents might consider 
their principals’ earnings as a reference point, based on which they judge if they have 
been treated fairly (Adams, 1965; Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal, 1976b). Vertical fairness 
concerns may lead firms to pay more generous wages, leading to particular wage 
                                                        
22 Their model assumes that subjects like the average earnings to be as close as possible to their own earnings (Engelmann 
and Strobel, 2000). 
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dynamics and possibly explaining inter-industry wage differentials (Krueger and 
Summers, 1988). Economic experiments have also provided evidence of the importance 
of vertical fairness. Croson (1996) and Straub and Murnighan (1995) found that agents 
accepted lower wages when they did not know how much the principal earned. Cabrales 
and Charness (2000) find that the principal’s payoff was important for agent behaviour. 
Charness and Kuhn (2007) did not find that agents’ effort is affected by other agent’s 
wage, questioning why firms adopt policies of wage secrecy and wage compression.   
The introduction of multiple possible reference points for fairness judgements 
results in a self-serving bias (Babcock, Wang, and Loewenstein, 1996) or egocentric 
selections between these different points of fairness judgements for each player. In the 
ultimatum game with more than two players, for example, principals select a fairness 
standard which leads to relatively low wages, agents focus on reference points which lead 
to high wages, and therefore reject lower wages more frequently than in the simple 
ultimatum game. Moreover, even for those agents who apply social comparisons between 
agents, the strength of this motive seems to somewhat depend on the size of the wage 
received by the principal and the other agent (Alewell and Nicklisch, 2006). This could 
limit how large the between-agent effect could be (Knez and Camerer, 1995).  In the 
current experiment there is no statistically significant difference in the agents’ MAO and 
the paired agents’ wage differentials across treatments (except for the R100 agents’ MAO 
and the R200 agents’ wage differentials being statistically significantly smaller in the 
Principal Assignment treatment than in the Quasi-Random Assignment treatment).  The 
original conjecture that these differentials will be smaller in the Principal Assignment 
treatment and the Quasi-Random Assignment treatment than in the Random Assignment 
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treatment is not supported. There are relatively high MAOs observed in the current 
experiment, which indicates that agents might be concerned with their wages relative to 
the principal’s wage. Agents’ comparisons of their earnings with the principals’ earnings 
thus cause rejection of low wages (by agents stating higher MAOs). Instead of horizontal 
fairness, vertical fairness could be the main consideration. This suggests that horizontal 
fairness may only matter when fairness on the vertical level is satisfied. Further research 
on separating principal-agent comparisons from agent-agent comparisons is therefore 
needed to address social comparisons. 
  Another reason why there was no evidence of social comparisons in the current 
experiment might be that even though the agents were comparing their wages with the 
paired agents’ wages, they were reluctant to take an action in response because of loss 
aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). Even though they were comparing themselves 
with the paired agents and it made them feel unfair, it was not unfair enough for them to 
risk losing their wage. In other words, even if an agent felt he has been treated unfairly, 
he did not necessarily reject the wage by stating a higher minimum acceptable offer. This 
is despite the fact that there is a large body of experimental evidence on importance of the 
social comparisons (e.g. Clark and Senik, 2010; Falk and Knell, 2004; Gächter and 
Thöni, 2010). The data from the current experiment suggests that social comparisons 
might be of secondary importance in labour relationships or cannot be generalised, i.e. it 
has different implications in different industries. Social comparisons might be more 
easily detectable in bargaining, where they are often used as a bargaining strategy to 
justify one’s entitlement, which might be another fruitful avenue for further research.  
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Previous research on social comparisons has implications for the world outside of 
the laboratory. It suggests that there is a reason why wages are a secret in most 
companies (Danziger and Katz, 1997; Lawler, 1990) and most of the time the principal’s 
earnings (or in real world terms, the firm’s earnings) are not publicly available.23 From 
the current experiment it appears that horizontal fairness doesn’t matter when vertical 
fairness isn’t satisfied.  Vertical fairness can be satisfied by wage (profit) secrecy, which 
then can lead to the importance of horizontal fairness as observed in the field. If vertical 
fairness is not satisfied, principals do not need to worry about social comparisons 
between agents and can offer different wages to different agents. It also appears that the 
fairness of job assignments does not matter. This would mean that agents with marginally 
different skills do not consider the intentions of their principal when choosing whether to 
provide effort, shirk or quit the job when treated unfairly. Future research is needed to 
determine the relationship of vertical and horizontal fairness and its potential link to 
social comparisons if one of these is satisfied and the other is not. 
 
 
  
                                                        
23 If the firm is a publicly traded company their financial information is made available, however, it is done in a complicated 
manner and they average person doesn’t really understand these.  
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Appendix A. Subject Instructions 
The Random Assignment Treatment 
INSTRUCTIONS  
No talking allowed  
Thank you for coming.  The purpose of this session is to study how people make 
decisions in a particular situation.  From now until the end of the session, unauthorized 
communication of any nature with other participants is prohibited.  If you violate this rule 
we will have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments.  If you have a 
question after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter 
will approach you and answer your question in private.  
 
Earnings 
Every participant will have an opportunity to earn money in the experiment. Your final 
experimental earnings will depend on your decisions and on the decisions of others.  It is 
therefore very important that you read these instructions carefully. The payoffs will be 
denoted in experimental currency referred to as francs. Upon completion of the 
experiment, all francs will be exchanged into dollars using the following exchange rate:  
 
1 franc = $0.1 
 
Notice that the more francs you earn, the more dollars you will receive.  All the money 
will be paid to you privately in cash at the end of the experiment. 
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Group Assignments 
You will be randomly paired with two other participants to form a group of three persons.  
No one will learn the identity of the persons (s)he is paired with. Each person in the 
group will be assigned to serve as either “a Proposer” or “a Recipient”. Each group 
consists of one Proposer and two Recipients: Recipient A and Recipient B. The computer 
randomly determines whether you will be a Proposer, Recipient A or Recipient B and 
will inform you about your assignment at the beginning of the experiment. You have a 
1/3 chance of becoming a Proposer, a 1/3 chance of becoming Recipient A, and a 1/3 
chance of becoming Recipient B.  
 
General Knowledge Quiz 
In the first part of the experiment the Recipients will be asked to complete a general 
knowledge quiz. Each Recipient will be asked to answer the same set of 20 questions in 
the same order. Each question has one correct answer. The Recipients will have 10 
minutes to answer all 20 questions. Remaining unanswered questions count as incorrect 
answers. 
Within each group, the two Recipients will be ranked based on their quiz scores. If both 
Recipients have the same score in the quiz, the Recipient who completed the quiz more 
quickly will be ranked higher. The Proposer and both Recipients will be informed about 
which of the Recipients ranked higher. 
While Recipients complete the quiz, we ask all Proposers to wait patiently and quietly. 
Please do not use the computer in front of you as it is set up for the experiment. 
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Decision-Making Part  
Within each group, one randomly selected Recipient will be assigned the R-200 role, and 
the other Recipient will be assigned the R-100 role. Each Recipient has a 1in 2 (i.e. 50%) 
chance of being assigned the R-200 role, and also 1 in 2 (i.e. 50%) chance of being 
assigned the R-100 role. 
 
The Proposer and the R-200 Recipient will receive a sum of 200 francs to be divided 
between themselves. Separately, the Proposer and the R-100 Recipient will receive a sum 
of 100 francs to be divided between themselves. 
 
The procedure for dividing each sum of money between the Proposer and each Recipient 
is as follows. The Proposer will choose how many francs out of 200 to offer to the R-200 
Recipient and how many francs out of 100 to offer to the R-100 Recipient. 
 
If the R-200 Recipient accepts the offer made to him/her, (s)he will receive the number of 
francs stated in the offer, whereas the Proposer will keep the remainder, (200 – the offer). 
If the R-200 Recipient rejects the offer, the 200 francs disappears and both the Proposer 
and the R-200 Recipient will receive nothing. 
 
Similarly, if the R-100 Recipient accepts the offer made to him/her, (s)he will receive the 
number of francs stated in the offer, whereas the Proposer will keep the remainder, (100 – 
the offer). If the R-100 Recipient rejects the offer, the 100 francs disappears and both the 
Proposer and the R-100 Recipient will receive nothing. 
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Each Recipient will not observe the offer that the Proposer made to him/her; however, 
(s)he observes the offer that the Proposer made to the other Recipient. After observing 
the offer that the Proposer made to the other Recipient, each Recipient chooses a number 
(an integer between zero and the total sum, which is 200 francs for the R-200 Recipient 
and 100 francs for the R-100 Recipient). This number represents the minimum offer that 
(s)he is willing to accept from the Proposer, so we call this number the Minimum 
Acceptable Offer. That is, if the offer made by the Proposer turns out to be greater or 
equal to this number, the offer is accepted. However, if the offer is less than this number 
then the offer is rejected. It is important to understand that each Recipient chooses the 
minimum acceptable offer before (s)he comes to know  his/her actual offer. The decision 
procedure described above will be conducted only once. 
 
Calculation of Experimental Payoffs  
If the Proposer’s offer to a Recipient turns out to be greater than or equal to that 
Recipient’s Minimum Acceptable Offer, then the offer is accepted. This means the 
Recipient receives the amount of the offer and the Proposer receives the remainder (i.e. 
the total sum minus the offer made to the Recipient). 
 
If the Proposer’s offer to a Recipient turns out to be less than that Recipient’s Minimum 
Acceptable Offer, then the offer is rejected and the Proposer and the Recipient both 
receive zero francs. 
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Notice that each Recipient’s payoff is not affected by the Proposer’s offer to the other 
Recipient, or by whether that offer (to the other Recipient) is accepted. 
 
A hypothetical example for demonstration purposes 
Suppose that: 
 Recipient A is randomly assigned the R-200 role. Recipient B is randomly assigned 
the R-100 role.  
 The Proposer offers Recipient A 80 francs (out of 200) 
 The Proposer offers Recipient B 40 francs (out of 100) 
 Recipient A chooses a Minimum Acceptable Offer of 60 francs 
 Recipient B chooses a Minimum Acceptable Offer of 50 francs  
 
This example results in the following payoffs: 
 Recipient A: 
In this case, the Proposer offered 80 francs, which is more than 60 francs, the minimum 
amount Recipient A would accept. 
Payoffs: The Proposer receives 200-80= 120 francs and Recipient A receives 80 francs. 
 Recipient B: 
In this case, the Proposer offered 40 francs, which is less than 50 francs, the minimum 
amount Recipient B would accept.  
Payoffs: The Proposer receives 0 francs and Recipient B receives 0 francs. 
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 Proposer: 
From above, the Proposer receives 120 francs from his/her interaction with Recipient A 
(the remainder of the 200 francs), and receives 0 francs from his/her interaction with 
Recipient B (as the Proposer’s offer was rejected). Thus in total the Proposer receives 
0+120=120 francs.  
 
Summary 
If you are randomly selected to be the Proposer, you will have to choose an offer for each 
of the two Recipients. If you are randomly selected to be a Recipient, you will learn about 
the other Recipient’s offer and will then have to state the minimum offer you are willing 
to accept. 
Are there any questions? 
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The Principal Assignment Treatment 
INSTRUCTIONS 
No talking allowed  
Thank you for coming.  The purpose of this session is to study how people make 
decisions in a particular situation.  From now until the end of the session, unauthorized 
communication of any nature with other participants is prohibited.  If you violate this rule 
we will have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments.  If you have a 
question after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter 
will approach you and answer your question in private.  
 
Earnings 
Every participant will have an opportunity to earn money in the experiment. Your final 
experimental earnings will depend on your decisions and on the decisions of others.  It is 
therefore very important that you read these instructions carefully. The payoffs will be 
denoted in experimental currency referred to as francs. Upon completion of the 
experiment, all francs will be exchanged into dollars using the following exchange rate:  
 
1 franc = $0.1 
 
Notice that the more francs you earn, the more dollars you will receive.  All the money 
will be paid to you privately in cash at the end of the experiment. 
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Group Assignments 
You will be randomly paired with two other participants to form a group of three persons.  
No one will learn the identity of the persons (s)he is paired with. Each person in the 
group will be assigned to serve as either “a Proposer” or “a Recipient”. Each group 
consists of one Proposer and two Recipients: Recipient A and Recipient B. The computer 
randomly determines whether you will be a Proposer, Recipient A or Recipient B and 
will inform you about your assignment at the beginning of the experiment. You have a 
1/3 chance of becoming a Proposer, a 1/3 chance of becoming Recipient A, and a 1/3 
chance of becoming Recipient B. 
 
General Knowledge Quiz 
In the first part of the experiment the Recipients will be asked to complete a general 
knowledge quiz. Each Recipient will be asked to answer the same set of 20 questions in 
the same order. Each question has one correct answer. The Recipients will have 10 
minutes to answer all 20 questions. Remaining unanswered questions count as incorrect 
answers. 
 
Within each group, the two Recipients will be ranked based on their quiz scores. If both 
Recipients have the same score in the quiz, the Recipient who completed the quiz more 
quickly will be ranked higher. The Proposer and both Recipients will be informed about 
which of the Recipients ranked higher. 
While Recipients complete the quiz, we ask all Proposers to wait patiently and quietly. 
Please do not use the computer in front of you as it is set up for the experiment. 
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Decision-Making Part 
Within each group, one Recipient will be assigned the R-200 role and the other Recipient 
will be assigned the R-100 role. The Proposer decides which Recipient is assigned the R-
200 role and which the R-100 role.  
 
The Proposer and the R-200 Recipient will receive a sum of 200 francs to be divided 
between themselves. Separately, the Proposer and the R-100 Recipient will receive a sum 
of 100 francs to be divided between themselves.  
 
The procedure for dividing each sum of money between the Proposer and each Recipient 
is as follows. The Proposer will choose how many francs out of 200 to offer to the R-200 
Recipient and how many francs out of 100 to offer to the R-100 Recipient. 
 
If the R-200 Recipient accepts the offer made to him/her, (s)he will receive the number of 
francs stated in the offer, whereas the Proposer will keep the reminder, (200 – the offer). 
If the R-200 Recipient rejects the offer, the 200 francs disappears and both the Proposer 
and the R-200 Recipient will receive nothing.  
 
Similarly, if the R-100 Recipient accepts the offer made to him/her, (s)he will receive the 
number of francs stated in the offer, whereas the Proposer will keep the remainder, (100 – 
the offer). If the R-100 Recipient rejects the offer, the 100 francs disappears and both the 
Proposer and the R-100 Recipient receive nothing. 
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Each Recipient will not observe the offer that the Proposer made to him/her; however, 
(s)he observes the offer that the Proposer made to the other Recipient. After observing 
the offer that the Proposer made to the other Recipient, each Recipient chooses a number 
(an integer between zero and the total sum, which is 200 francs for the R-200 Recipient 
and 100 francs for the R-100 Recipient). This number represents the minimum offer that 
(s)he is willing to accept from the Proposer, so we call this number the Minimum 
Acceptable Offer. That is, if the offer made by the Proposer turns out to be greater or 
equal to this number, the offer is accepted. However, if the offer is less than this number 
then the offer is rejected. It is important to understand that each Recipient chooses the 
minimum acceptable offer before (s)he comes to know his/her actual offer.  The decision 
procedure described above will be conducted only once. 
 
Calculation of Experimental Payoffs  
If the Proposer’s offer to a Recipient turns out to be greater than or equal to that 
Recipient’s Minimum Acceptable Offer, then the offer is accepted. This means the 
Recipient receives the amount of the offer and the Proposer receives the remainder (i.e. 
the total sum minus the offer made to the Recipient). 
If the Proposer’s offer to a Recipient turns out to be less than that Recipient’s Minimum 
Acceptable Offer, then the offer is rejected and the Proposer and the Recipient both 
receive zero francs. 
Notice that each Recipient’s payoff is not affected by the Proposer’s offer to the other 
Recipient, or by whether that offer (to the other Recipient) is accepted. 
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A hypothetical example for demonstration purposes 
Suppose that: 
 Recipient A is assigned by the Proposer the R-200 role. Recipient B is assigned by 
the Proposer the R-100 role.  
 The Proposer offers Recipient A 80 francs (out of 200) 
 The Proposer offers Recipient B 40 francs (out of 100) 
 Recipient A chooses a Minimum Acceptable Offer of 60 francs 
 Recipient B chooses a Minimum Acceptable Offer of 50 francs  
 
This example results in the following payoffs: 
 Recipient A: 
In this case, the Proposer offered 80 francs, which is more than 60 francs, the minimum 
amount Recipient A would accept.  
Payoffs: The Proposer receives 200-80=120 francs and Recipient A receives 80 francs. 
 Recipient B: 
In this case, the Proposer offered 40 francs, which is less than 50 francs, the minimum 
amount Recipient B would accept. 
Payoffs: The Proposer receives 0 francs and Recipient B receives 0 francs. 
 Proposer: 
From above, the Proposer receives 120 francs from his/her interaction with Recipient 
A(the remainder of 200 francs), and receives 0 francs from his/her interaction with 
Recipient B(as the Proposer’s offer was rejected). Thus in total the Proposer receives 
0+120=120 francs.  
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Summary 
If you are randomly selected to be the Proposer you will first have to assign the R-200 
role and the R-100 role to the Recipients. Then you will have to choose an offer for each 
of the two Recipients. If you are randomly selected to be a Recipient, you will learn about 
the other Recipient’s offer and will then have to state the minimum offer you are willing 
to accept. 
Are there any questions? 
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The Quasi-Random Assignment Treatment 
INSTRUCTIONS 
No talking allowed  
Thank you for coming.  The purpose of this session is to study how people make 
decisions in a particular situation.  From now until the end of the session, unauthorized 
communication of any nature with other participants is prohibited.  If you violate this rule 
we will have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments.  If you have a 
question after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter 
will approach you and answer your question in private.  
 
Earnings 
Every participant will have an opportunity to earn money in the experiment. Your final 
experimental earnings will depend on your decisions and on the decisions of others.  It is 
therefore very important that you read these instructions carefully. The payoffs will be 
denoted in experimental currency referred to as francs. Upon completion of the 
experiment, all francs will be exchanged into dollars using the following exchange rate:  
 
1 franc = $0.1 
 
Notice that the more francs you earn, the more dollars you will receive.  All the money 
will be paid to you privately in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
 
 
 
135 
Group Assignments 
You will be randomly paired with two other participants to form a group of three persons.  
No one will learn the identity of the persons (s)he is paired with. Each person in the 
group will be assigned to serve as either “a Proposer” or “a Recipient”. Each group 
consists of one Proposer and two Recipients: Recipient A and Recipient B. The computer 
randomly determines whether you will be a Proposer, Recipient A or Recipient B and 
will inform you about your assignment at the beginning of the experiment. You have a 
1/3 chance of becoming a Proposer, a 1/3 chance of becoming Recipient A, and a 1/3 
chance of becoming Recipient B. 
 
General Knowledge Quiz 
In the first part of the experiment the Recipients will be asked to complete a general 
knowledge quiz. Each Recipient will be asked to answer the same set of 20 questions in 
the same order. Each question has one correct answer. The Recipients will have 10 
minutes to answer all 20 questions. Remaining unanswered questions count as incorrect 
answers. 
 
Within each group, the two Recipients will be ranked based on their quiz scores. If both 
Recipients have the same score in the quiz, the Recipient who completed the quiz more 
quickly will be ranked higher.  
While Recipients complete the quiz, we ask all Proposers to wait patiently and quietly. 
Please do not use the computer in front of you as it is set up for the experiment. 
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Decision-Making Part 
Within each group, one Recipient will be assigned the R-200 role and the other Recipient 
will be assigned the R-100 role. The Proposer decides which Recipient is assigned the R-
200 role and which the R-100 role.  
 
The Proposer and the R-200 Recipient will receive a sum of 200 francs to be divided 
between themselves. Separately, the Proposer and the R-100 Recipient will receive a sum 
of 100 francs to be divided between themselves.  
 
The procedure for dividing each sum of money between the Proposer and each Recipient 
is as follows. The Proposer will choose how many francs out of 200 to offer to the R-200 
Recipient and how many francs out of 100 to offer to the R-100 Recipient. 
 
If the R-200 Recipient accepts the offer made to him/her, (s)he will receive the number of 
francs stated in the offer, whereas the Proposer will keep the reminder, (200 – the offer). 
If the R-200 Recipient rejects the offer, the 200 francs disappears and both the Proposer 
and the R-200 Recipient will receive nothing.  
 
Similarly, if the R-100 Recipient accepts the offer made to him/her, (s)he will receive the 
number of francs stated in the offer, whereas the Proposer will keep the remainder, (100 – 
the offer). If the R-100 Recipient rejects the offer, the 100 francs disappears and both the 
Proposer and the R-100 Recipient receive nothing. 
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Each Recipient will not observe the offer that the Proposer made to him/her; however, 
(s)he observes the offer that the Proposer made to the other Recipient. After observing 
the offer that the Proposer made to the other Recipient, each Recipient chooses a number 
(an integer between zero and the total sum, which is 200 francs for the R-200 Recipient 
and 100 francs for the R-100 Recipient). This number represents the minimum offer that 
(s)he is willing to accept from the Proposer, so we call this number the Minimum 
Acceptable Offer. That is, if the offer made by the Proposer turns out to be greater or 
equal to this number, the offer is accepted. However, if the offer is less than this number 
then the offer is rejected. It is important to understand that each Recipient chooses the 
minimum acceptable offer before (s)he comes to know his/her actual offer.  The decision 
procedure described above will be conducted only once. 
 
Calculation of Experimental Payoffs  
If the Proposer’s offer to a Recipient turns out to be greater than or equal to that 
Recipient’s Minimum Acceptable Offer, then the offer is accepted. This means the 
Recipient receives the amount of the offer and the Proposer receives the remainder (i.e. 
the total sum minus the offer made to the Recipient). 
If the Proposer’s offer to a Recipient turns out to be less than that Recipient’s Minimum 
Acceptable Offer, then the offer is rejected and the Proposer and the Recipient both 
receive zero francs. 
Notice that each Recipient’s payoff is not affected by the Proposer’s offer to the other 
Recipient, or by whether that offer (to the other Recipient) is accepted. 
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A hypothetical example for demonstration purposes 
Suppose that: 
 Recipient A is assigned by the Proposer the R-200 role. Recipient B is assigned by 
the Proposer the R-100 role.  
 The Proposer offers Recipient A 80 francs (out of 200) 
 The Proposer offers Recipient B 40 francs (out of 100) 
 Recipient A chooses a Minimum Acceptable Offer of 60 francs 
 Recipient B chooses a Minimum Acceptable Offer of 50 francs  
 
This example results in the following payoffs: 
 Recipient A: 
In this case, the Proposer offered 80 francs, which is more than 60 francs, the minimum 
amount Recipient A would accept.  
Payoffs: The Proposer receives 200-80=120 francs and Recipient A receives 80 francs. 
 Recipient B: 
In this case, the Proposer offered 40 francs, which is less than 50 francs, the minimum 
amount Recipient B would accept. 
Payoffs: The Proposer receives 0 francs and Recipient B receives 0 francs. 
 Proposer: 
From above, the Proposer receives 120 francs from his/her interaction with Recipient 
A(the remainder of 200 francs), and receives 0 francs from his/her interaction with 
Recipient B(as the Proposer’s offer was rejected). Thus in total the Proposer receives 
0+120=120 francs.  
 
 
139 
Summary 
If you are randomly selected to be the Proposer you will first have to assign the R-200 
role and the R-100 role to the Recipients. Then you will have to choose an offer for each 
of the two Recipients. If you are randomly selected to be a Recipient, you will learn about 
the other Recipient’s offer and will then have to state the minimum offer you are willing 
to accept. 
Are there any questions? 
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Appendix B. The Quiz 
1. Who was the first man in space? 
A. Neil Armstrong 
B. Yuri Gagarin 
C. Alan Shepard 
D. Dennis Tito 
 
2. If the symbol of your profession is a “caduceus”, you are a: 
A. Dentist 
B. Detective 
C. Doctor 
D. Dog trainer 
 
3. When did New Zealand move from pounds and shillings to dollars and cents 
A. 1967 
B. 1961 
C. 1971 
D. 1973 
 
4. What message did Benito Mussolini famously send to the Italian soccer team 
before the 1938 World Cup? 
A. We shall overcome 
B. You've come, you've seen, now conquer! 
C. To victory, for the blood of your forefathers 
D. Win, or die 
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5. Which chemist, engineer, and armaments manufacturer invented dynamite and a 
detonator for it and then founded a longstanding series of world prizes for, among 
other things, promoting peace? 
A. Alfred North Whitehead 
B. Alfred Russel Wallace 
C. Alfred, Lord Tennyson 
D. Alfred Nobel 
 
6. Which of these is a prefix that means "false"? 
A. Pseudo 
B. Rhino 
C. Midi 
D. Mega 
 
7. Who lived in the Lateran Palace from the fourth to the fourteenth centuries? 
A. Bavarian Kings 
B. Roman emperors 
C. Popes 
D. Prisoners 
 
8. Which of these is not a prime number? 
A. 59 
B. 69 
C. 79 
D. 89 
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9. These are the first lines from what song: "The falling leaves drift by my window, 
The falling leaves of red and gold, I see your lips, the summer kisses, The 
sunburned hands I used to hold"? 
A. The Girls of Summer 
B. California 
C. Monday Monday 
D. Autumn Leaves 
 
10. How are coffee beans harvested? 
A. Plucked from a tree like apples 
B. Dug up from the ground like potatoes 
C. Threshed from stalks like wheat 
D. Picked up from the ground like cabbages 
 
11. What was the largest cruise liner ever constructed when it was completed in 
2003? 
A. Queen Victoria 
B. Queen Elizabeth II 
C. Queen Anne II 
D. Queen Mary II 
 
12. In the Godfather, what is the surname of the characters Vito and Sonny? 
A. Nobilio 
B. Neri 
C. Pasquloni 
D. Corleone 
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13. What is a balalaika? 
A. An instrument 
B. A shellfish 
C. A garment 
D. A dish 
 
14. What is Williams and Kate’s newborn royal baby called? 
A. George Alexander Louis 
B. George Louis David 
C. George Henry James 
D. George Albert James 
 
15. Which company has bought Nokia’s mobile phone business? 
A. Apple 
B. Vodafone 
C. Microsoft 
D. Verizon 
 
16. Who was the Greek goddess of the hunt? 
A. Minerva 
B. Artemis 
C. Hera 
D. Venus 
 
17. In what year was the United Nations established? 
A. 1947 
B. 1945 
C. 1941 
D. 1950 
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18. In which city would you find the Taronga Zoo? 
A. Chicago 
B. Sydney 
C. Taronga 
D. London 
 
19. What is the name of Simba’s mother in “the Lion King”? 
A. Sarabi 
B. Nala 
C. Sarafina 
D. Nobami 
 
20. Arthur Guinness is famous for founding what? 
A. The Guiness World Records 
B. Guiness Brewery 
C. Guiness Cake 
D. Guiness Park 
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Appendix C. The Questionnaire 
Please state your gender. 
 
How old are you? 
 
What is your nationality? 
 
How many siblings do you have? 
 
If you are a student, what is your subject? 
 
When you were 16 years of age, what was the income of your parents in comparison to 
other families in New Zealand? 
 
How large was the community where you have lived the most time of your life? 
 
How many people live in your household (including yourself)? 
 
How large is your monthly budget (without expenses for accommodation)? 
 
What share of your monthly expenses do you finance yourself? 
 
Can you state the percentage we can rely on the data you provided? 
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Did you decide on the wage offer based on the quiz score?  
(only Principals, Treatment T1 and T3) 
 
Do you think the principal’s decision was fair?  
(Recipient A, Recipient B, Treatment T1, T2 and T3) 
 
Do you think the principal assigned roles based on quiz scores of the two agents? 
(Recipient A, Recipient B, Treatment T1 and T3) 
 
Do you find an allocation using the test scores as a fair way to make allocation? 
 
Did you assign the low productivity role and the high productivity role based on the quiz 
score?  
(only Principals, T2) 
 
Do you think the principal assigned roles based on quiz scores of the two agents? 
(Recipient A, Recipient B, Treatment T2) 
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Appendix D. Screenshots From the Software  
The Principal Assignment Treatment 
The Principal (called The Proposer in the experiment) 
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Recipient A: 
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Recipient B: 
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Appendix E. Human Ethics Committee Approval
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Chapter 3 
3 Overconfidence and Excess Entry 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to replicate a study by Camerer and Lovallo (1999) (henceforth 
CL) on “Overconfidence and Excess Entry”. CL explore overconfidence from a 
behavioural economics point of view. They test whether optimistic biases could 
predictably influence economic behaviour of firms when entering into markets. 
Widespread overconfidence would have important consequences on economic behaviour. 
Overconfidence in one's skills or relative ability can, in financial markets, lead to 
excessive trading and lower returns (Barber and Odean, 2001), distortions in corporate 
investment decisions (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), value-reducing mergers (Roll, 1986) 
and to various security market anomalies (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 
1998).  
Overconfidence of entrepreneurs is possibly crucial for understanding business 
failures. In general, the business failure rate varies according to industry. The US Bureau 
of Labor Statistics reports the business survival rate of companies established in 2006 
was 49.3% in 2011.
24
 The survival rate decreases with the number of years of the 
company existence. For example, only 24.6% of companies established in 1994 were still 
in the market in 2011. CL offer three possible explanations for entrant failure. The first 
one states that failures are hit-and-run entries that are profitable but brief. Profits are 
                                                        
24 The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics collects data on the nation’s labour market, i.e. new businesses and job creation, 
Business Employment Dynamics, http://www.bls.gov/bdm/entrepreneurship/bdm_chart3.htm. 
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made if entering the market during the high peak, i.e. when profitability is high and then 
leaving (or ‘failing’) when profitability reduces. Because of the fleeting nature of many 
business opportunities, a failure within a year of setup is probable and expected (Forbes, 
2009). In the second explanation CL compare business entries to lottery tickets, i.e. most 
firms expect to lose money and fail, but if they become successful, the payoff is very 
large and worth the risk. The third explanation states that many entry decisions are 
simply mistakes, due to either underestimating the competitors or overconfidence about 
own abilities. It can be challenging to distinguish which one of the three mentioned 
explanations influences business failure and to what extent. CL designed an economics 
experiment testing for the effect of overconfidence in one’s skill on market entry 
decisions, i.e. if overconfidence amplifies the entry rate.  
Menkhoff, Schmidt, and Brozynski (2006) used a survey to investigate 
overconfidence. They conducted a questionnaire survey regarding the impact of 
experience on risk taking, in particular whether inexperienced fund managers tend to take 
higher risks than their experienced colleagues. Higher risk taking may be explained by a 
higher degree of overconfidence, a lower degree of risk aversion, or less herding 
behaviour.
25
 They find that herding decreases with experience, whereas overconfidence 
decreases with experience for some tasks and increases for others. Also, Ben-David, 
Graham, and Harvey (2007), based on their survey, tested whether top corporate 
executives are overconfident (their measure of overconfidence is based on miscalibration 
of beliefs) and whether their overconfidence impacts investment behaviour.  
                                                        
25 Herding can be defined as the phenomenon of individuals deciding to follow the choices others and imitating group 
behaviour rather than deciding independently on the basis of private information (Baddeley, 2010). 
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To test for overconfidence in market entry CL employ experimental economics 
methods, which by motivating people financially result in salient choices rather than non-
salient answers and thus offer better control over the data generating process than 
surveys. Economics experiments differ from psychology experiments and surveys in that 
Economics experiments pay performance-based incentives, which reduces response 
noise, e.g. extreme outliers probably caused by thoughtless, unmotivated subjects (see 
Smith and Walker, 1993). Economists presume that experimental subjects do not work 
for free. They work harder, more persistently, and more effectively, if they can earn more 
money for better performance. On the other hand, psychologists believe that intrinsic 
motivation is usually high enough to produce steady effort even in the absence of 
financial rewards; and while more money might induce more effort, the effort does not 
always improve performance, especially if good performance requires subjects to induce 
spontaneously a principle of rational choice or judgment, like Bayes’ theorem, where 
subjects update their probabilities (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999). In addition, Economics 
experiments prohibit deceiving subjects. In experiments, the experimenter has to be able 
to control what the subjects’ expectations are when testing theoretical equilibria. For 
example, there is a 1 in 6 chance of rolling any number using a fair die and this is a 
common knowledge. With deception control of expectations is weakened. Avoiding 
deception is often believed to be a hallmark of Experimental Economics (Davis and Holt, 
1993) and is duly enforced by editors and reviewers (Roth, 2001). All deception in 
Experimental Economics is forbidden (Wilson and Isaac, 2007) and experiments with 
deception are normally not publishable in any economics journals (Gächter, 2009). In 
addition, it is widely believed that such a ban is to avoid reputational spillover effects, 
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meaning that deception might compromise the reputation of the experimental laboratory 
if the participants expect to be deceived (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001). There is no 
deception in my experiment, i.e. the subjects receive true information about the payoffs, 
the market capacity, their ranks and are not deceived at any point during the experiment. 
The idea that overconfidence causes business entry mistakes has been suggested 
before (e.g. Roll, 1986), but CL were first to directly test it by measuring economic 
decisions and personal overconfidence at the same time. CL in their study extend the 
market entry game described in Kahneman (1988), in which subjects decide 
simultaneously and without communication whether they want to enter the market or 
not.
26
 In Kahneman’s market entry game, the payoffs depend on the pre-announced 
market capacity and the number of entrants.
27
 Only if the number of entrants is lower or 
equal to the market capacity, entrants are making money. After a few rounds, the number 
of entrants in each round approximates to the market capacity even if entrants are not 
communicating. In order to test for overconfidence, CL add more features to Kahneman’s 
market entry experiment. In CL entrant’s payoff depends on the market capacity, the 
number or entrants as well as on an entrant’s rank relative to other entrants. The ranks are 
assigned both randomly and according to the entrant’s skill, which is determined by his 
relative performance on a quiz. The only decision the subjects make is whether they wish 
to enter a market or not.  
I ask the two same main questions as CL: 1. Is there more entry when people are 
betting on their own relative skill? 2. Are subjects neglecting the reference group, when 
                                                        
26 The market entry game, originally called N*game, was invented by Kahneman, Brander and Thaler. This game was never 
officially published, it is only informally described in Kahneman (1988). Since then it has been used by others, e.g. Erev and 
Rapoport (1998).  
27 The payoffs in Kahneman’s experiment are calculated according to a following formula: $0.25(capacity - number of 
entrants). 
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they volunteer to participate in the experiment knowing that their payoffs will depend on 
their skill? The answers to these questions can help us obtain the performance feedback 
necessary to correct optimistic overentry.  
CL find that when payoffs depend on skills, overconfidence and excess entry are 
higher than in situations when payoffs are determined randomly. Furthermore, excess 
entry is highest when the subjects were told in advance that their payoffs will depend on 
their skill, suggesting that subjects were neglecting consideration of the reference group 
with which they would be competing.
28
 In my experiment I obtained the same results as 
CL only to some extent using different and more suitable econometric tests. I have 
implemented CL’s experiment, with some modifications reflecting the technological 
progress of Economic experiments over the past 15 years. My experiment is 
computerized as opposed to CL’s pen and paper. I also made a change to the subject 
pool; my experiment studies the effect of overconfidence of both genders, making it a 
more conservative test. CL used exclusively male subjects in some sessions in order to 
control for gender confound as are usually less overconfident than men. I have, however, 
preserved the same order of sessions with the same number of participants and same 
parameters. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
28 This is also known in the literature as egocentrism (Kruger, 1999; Windschitl and Chambers, 2004). 
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3.2 Replications In Experimental Economics 
The seventh commandment of Croson and Gächter (2010) “ten commandments” 
of economic science states: “Experimentalists shall replicate and encourage replications, 
including making their data, instructions and software publically available.”  
What does replication in the context of economic research mean? Hunter (2001) 
distinguishes between pure and scientific replication. Pure replication is based on running 
the test using the same data as previous papers. Pure replication depends on the 
availability of all the information from the project that is to be replicated. Making pure 
replications possible allows important findings to be verified or refuted directly using the 
particular data set used to generate them, rather than examined later on a different and 
perhaps less appropriate set of data. Technology has diminished the costs of providing the 
materials necessary for pure replication. Most of what economists view as replication 
represents scientific replication, i.e. re-examining an idea in some published research by 
studying it using a different data set chosen from a different population from that used in 
the original paper (Hamermesh, 2007). The purpose of replications is proving that an 
experimental phenomenon is robust to small or large changes in the experimental setup. 
A result is robust when it does not depend on some detail of the situation or on the 
assumptions used to derive it. A “good” scientific result is always robust to some kind of 
variation or change (Guala, 2005). Kuhn (1962) noticed that for long periods of time 
scientific research was characterized by the accumulation of results that contribute to the 
growth of knowledge without challenging the basic tenets of the received view. In 
Experimental Economics, replication is the capacity to create an entirely new set of 
observations. The availability of detailed design description, thorough procedures and 
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software is important in order gain insights into data generating process, which is to be 
preserved when replicating a study. Public goods experiments are among the most widely 
replicated in economics, experimental psychology, sociology and political science 
(Guala, 2005). 
In natural sciences replication is a crucial activity and contributes to quality of the 
research. In economics, even though replication of data has been discussed thoroughly, 
publication of replication studies has been slow. In many cases replications do not 
confirm the results of the original studies. The journals might thus be afraid of the 
disagreements between replicator and the original authors. Ragnar Frisch in the first issue 
of Econometrica in 1933 noted the importance of making data available to researchers in 
order to enable replication. Substantial progress with data sharing and replications has 
been made over recent years. Journals such as the American Economic Review, 
Econometrica, Experimental Economics and the Journal of Applied Econometrics now 
have official data sharing and replication policies in effect. Similarly, Public Finance 
Review and the new Journal of the Economics Science Association promote economic 
replications. In these as well as in an increasing number of other journals, authors are 
expected to state in which public archive they will deposit the information necessary to 
replicate their numerical results. This archive should include original data, specialized 
computer programs, extracts of existing data files and explanatory files describing how to 
reproduce the exact numerical results in the published work. The changes in the 
publication process in economics have increased the benefits to authors of maintaining 
the records that might make replication possible. Replications in economics are required 
and promoted, however, they are still quite rare because the incentives are low (Dewald, 
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Thursby, and Anderson, 1986). The lack of publishing outlets is perhaps the most serious 
obstacle to researchers interested in undertaking replication research (Duvendack, 
Palmer-Jones, and Reed, 2015).  
It is important to mention the difference between a replication and a robustness 
check as these terms are often blurred. In econometrics, a replication test estimates 
parameters drawn from the same sampling distribution as those in the original study 
(Clemens, 2015). A replication test can take two forms: a verification test and a 
reproduction test. A verification test ensures that the exact statistical analysis using the 
original dataset. A reproduction test resamples the same population but otherwise using 
identical methods to the original study (Clemens, 2015). A robustness test, as opposed to 
replication, estimates parameters drawn from a different sampling distribution from those 
in the original study. A robustness test can take two forms: a reanalysis and an extension. 
A reanalysis test alters the computer code from the original study. An extension test uses 
new data gathered from a different population sample, or gathered on the same sample at 
a substantially different time.  
Replication is Experimental Economics is different to the one in Econometrics. 
When one group tries to replicate an experimental result reported by another, it does not 
usually replicate every detail of the original design. Instead, it adapts that design to its 
own methods of recruitment, instructions, display format, methods of payments, etc. 
(Bardsley, 2010). Reproducibility of the experimental results is related to the control over 
the relevant variables. Replicating an experiment can serve to test the robustness of past 
results or to test the effects of additional parameters. The fact that the results are easily 
replicable contributes to the expansion of the Experimental Economics field (Roth, 
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1994). When a carefully conducted experiment is repeated the likelihood of data being 
similar is high. Roth (1994) distinguishes between precise replication and a replication 
with variation of experimental parameters and conditions. The second gives us best 
indication of the robustness of the experimental results. 
To my knowledge the paper by CL has not been replicated previously. For the 
purposes of my thesis I have chosen to replicate their experiment using computers, and a 
mixed-gender subject pool as there is little evidence that gender influences trading 
activity (Deaves, Luders, and Luo, 2009). I find this approach contributes to the literature 
by adding an example of comparing a pen and paper experiment to a computerized one. 
Also, programming what was originally a pen and paper experiment and making the 
software available, provides accountability and ease of replication.   
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3.3 Literature Review 
Overconfidence has been studied in psychology for many years, though less so in 
economics. Yet in the past, microeconomics was closely linked to psychology. For 
example, Adam Smith, who is considered as being one of the pioneers of economics, in 
his book The Theory of Moral Sentiments, mentions that we suffer more when we fall 
from a better to a worse situation than we enjoy when we rise from worse to a better. 
Even though the exact term is not stated in the book, this is what we know today as loss 
aversion. In this book he proposed psychological explanations of individual behaviour, 
including concerns about fairness and justice. There is a long history of economists 
seeking alternatives partially in psychology because the classic economic assumptions of 
unbounded rationality, unbounded willpower, and unbounded selfishness have been 
violated (e.g. the effects of cognitive biases on markets in Arrow, 1982; and Camerer, 
1992; fairness and the acceptability of the business transactions in Kahneman, Knetsch, 
and Thaler, 1986; differences between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept in 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1990; violations of description invariance in Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1986). Behavioural economics increases the explanatory power of 
economics by providing it with more realistic psychological foundations (Camerer, 
Loewenstein, and Prelec, 2004). 
Overconfidence occurs when an individual's certainty that his predictions are 
correct exceeds the accuracy of those predictions (Klayman et al., 1999). Participants in 
psychology surveys often report that they expect to have higher starting salaries, job 
satisfaction, more enduring marriages, more gifted children and other positive life events 
compared to the average population (Hoorens and Buunk, 1993; Perloff and Fetzer, 1986; 
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Weinstein, 1980). Conversely, participants report a below-average risk of being robbed or 
assaulted, or experiencing unemployment, job loss or health problems (Miller et al., 
1990; Weinstein, 1980; Weinstein, 1982; Weinstein, 1984; Weinstein, 1987; Weinstein, 
1989; Weinstein, 1998; Weinstein and Klein, 1995). Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) state 
that people may be overconfident in many different ways: they may overestimate their 
abilities, perceive themselves more favourably than others perceive them, or finally, 
perceive themselves more favourably than they perceive others.  There is a large body of 
evidence in psychology and social psychology showing that people are overconfident 
about their relative abilities or unreasonably optimistic about their future (Alicke, 1985; 
Dunning, Meyerowitz, and Holzberg, 1989; Messick et al., 1985; Taylor and Brown, 
1988). The effect has been labeled “better than average”. A popular example of 
overconfidence is asking a group of average people about their driving ability. Most of 
them will say they are above average even though only about half can be better than 
average (Svenson, 1981). 
 The literature in economics and finance on theories, implications and practical 
effects of overconfidence is growing to be large and influential as it can explain 
economic behaviour.
29
 For example, De Long, Summers, and Waldmann (1991) show 
that overconfident investors, by taking more risky positions with higher returns, may 
come to dominate asset markets. The economic literature has emerged from 
psychological studies over the past thirty years. Odean in his theory (Odean, 1998; 
Odean, 1999) states that investors are too confident about their own ability and will trade 
too much because they give too much credence to their own private signal about value, 
                                                        
29 For instance, see Bénabou and Tirole (2002); Bénabou and Tirole (2003); Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998); 
Gervais and Odean (2001); Weinberg (2009). 
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while failing to recognize other investors’ private signals. He tested this hypothesis on 
10,000 clients of a major US brokerage service from 1987 to 1993 and found that the 
investors do indeed trade too much (Odean, 1999). De Bondt and Thaler (1995), in their 
detailed summary of the micro foundation of behavioural finance, express that the finding 
that people are overconfident might be one of the most robust in the psychology of 
judgement. One of the first experiments testing overconfidence in the market entry was 
designed and ran by CL. They find that when payoffs depend on skill, more subjects 
enter the market (thus are more overconfident) than in a situation when payoffs are 
determined randomly. Furthermore, excess entry is highest in sessions for which it was 
common knowledge that subjects’ payoff will depend on their skill, suggesting that 
subjects were neglecting consideration of the reference group with which they would be 
competing. 
 Theoretical models distinguish between optimistic managers who overestimate 
the mean of their firms’ cashflows (Hackbarth, 2008; Heaton, 2002; Shefrin, 2001) and 
overconfident managers who either underestimate the volatility of their firm’s future cash 
flows or overweight their private signals relative to public information (Gervais and 
Goldstein, 2007; Gervais, Heaton, and Odean, 2011). Heaton (2002) in his model on an 
optimism bias, that might be affecting the decisions of managers, explains two trends that 
are often observed in investment policy. First, optimistic managers believe that financial 
markets undervalue their firm and second, managers overestimate their own ability to 
manage new projects. Barber and Odean (2000) document that losses are attributable to 
overconfidence, finding that those trading the most earn the least on a risk-adjusted basis.  
Overconfidence is also studied with regard to a firm’s optimal wage policy. CL 
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find that subjects are more overconfident when betting on their own skill rather than 
relying on a random device. How does this fact influence workers’ behaviour in a firm? 
Fang and Moscarini (2005), for example, provide a theoretical link between workers’ 
overconfidence and wage-setting practices of the firm. The firm can either offer a wage 
based on a worker’s performance (differentiation policy), or offer the same wage to all 
workers (non-differentiation policy). Workers’ confidence in their own skills is 
interpreted as their morale, i.e. a worker has a high morale when he believes that his 
effort is meaningful and has impact on output of the firm. On the other hand, a worker is 
demoralized when he believes that his costly effort is useless. In their model, wages 
provide incentives and affect worker morale, by revealing private information of the firm 
about worker skills. Their model provides conditions for the non-differentiation wage 
policy to be profit maximizing. In many examples, worker overconfidence is a necessary 
condition for the firm to prefer the non-differentiation wage policy, so as to preserve 
some workers’ morale. The non-differentiation wage policy itself triggers more workers’ 
overconfidence, i.e. stronger belief that one’s effort is meaningful. This result thus serves 
as a base for firms’ wage secrecy as documented by Bewley (1999).  
 Apart from theoretical evidence of the importance of overconfidence, there are 
also numerous economics experiments testing for the presence of overconfidence. The 
closest to CL is the study by Simon and Houghton (2003). They conducted a field study 
examining the role of overconfidence in actual entry decisions, such as product 
introductions in the computer industry. They test whether managers introducing 
pioneering (i.e. risky) products express extreme certainty more or less frequently than 
managers introducing fewer pioneering products. Using the Georgia Technology 
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Sourcebook they identified 135 small computer companies that anticipated launching a 
new product within 30 days or had just launched a product within the past three months. 
They interviewed the managers, who were asked to describe what factors they believed 
were important in order for their product introduction to succeed. The questions about the 
production introduction decision were disaggregated into discrete components rather than 
asking about the overall success of the product introduction. They first collected data 
from each participating firm around the time the company launched its product to assess 
the extent to which the product was pioneering, the success factors the manager was 
focusing on, and the manager’s level of certainty in achieving each success factor. 
Eighteen months later they collected data to determine whether the new product 
introduction had achieved the specified success factors. Pioneering products are riskier 
than incremental product introductions, because pioneering introductions are unique, 
lacking prior similar actions to help calibrate judgment (Golder and Tellis, 1993). 
Managers use a diagnostic cue when attempting to forecast the success of their strategic 
actions.
30
 A diagnostic cue is an indicator that is present the majority of the time given 
one outcome and absent the majority of the time given the alternative outcome (Soll, 
1996). A diagnostic cue may be a stronger predictor of success in common decision 
contexts but weaker in uncommon decision contexts. Overconfidence occurs when 
managers overestimate the predictive validity of the cue. On the one hand, managers in 
pioneering decision contexts might be less likely to express extreme certainty than 
managers in other decision contexts, because diagnostic cues are weaker predictors of 
success in pioneering contexts. On the other hand, managers in pioneering decision 
contexts may be relying on a few salient examples of past situations when the diagnostic 
                                                        
30 A diagnostic cue can be, for example, positive customer feedback prior to the introduction of a product. 
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cue was associated with success in order to determine their level of certainty about their 
own prediction. Subsequently, they found that overconfidence is associated with 
introducing products that are more pioneering than incremental. They also found that 
managers who were extremely certain that they would achieve success were more likely 
to introduce pioneering rather than incremental products. Yet in outcomes, success was 
associated less with pioneering product introductions than with incremental introductions, 
which provides evidence of overconfidence similarly as in CL where subjects are 
overconfident when betting on their own skill rather than on a random device. 
The link between overconfidence and trading activity on an individual level was 
experimentally tested by Deaves, Luders, and Luo (2009). They have three variants of 
their computerized double auction market: the calibration based variant, the better than 
average effect variant and the illusion of control variant. Deaves, Luders, and Luo (2009) 
use a pre-experimental questionnaire including general knowledge questions, which are 
designed to influence behaviour and serve as a measure for calibration-based 
overconfidence. In addition to obtaining demographics subjects had to answer twenty 
general knowledge questions, which had objectively known numerical answers. The main 
purpose was to find out how well calibrated subjects were. Afterwards, they were 
assessed both on their level of knowledge and on their degree of calibration-based 
overconfidence. Knowledge was measured by summing up absolute differences between 
midpoints of confidence intervals and correct answers (scaled by correct answers). 
Calibration-based overconfidence was assessed by calculating the percentage of times 
that confidence intervals contained correct answers. Deaves, Luders, and Luo (2009) find 
(similarly to Camerer and Lovallo (1999)) that greater overconfidence is likely to lead to 
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aggressive behaviour in the pursuit of higher wealth. They also tested for gender effect as 
there are findings showing that men are more predisposed to overconfidence (Lundeberg, 
Fox, and Puncochar, 1994). The tendency to ascribe success to personal effort and failure 
to external forces is less pronounced from women (Beyer, 1990). They find little 
evidence that gender influences trading activity. 
Although CL in their additional analysis outline the difference between 
overconfidence about one’s skill and underestimating the performance of the other 
entrants, a detailed decomposition of overconfidence is provided by Hoelzl and 
Rustichini (2005). They recognize overconfidence resulting from three different types of 
behaviour: people overestimating their abilities; they perceiving themselves more 
favourably than others perceive them; or finally, they perceiving themselves more 
favourably than they perceive others. Since most of the evidence on overconfidence is 
based on verbal statements of subjective estimates, Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) 
designed an experiment in which subjects have to choose among options, not statements. 
Subjects who are simply asked to evaluate their ranking have no incentive to be accurate 
and also might have an imprecise idea of concepts like percentile and median, or 
average.
31
 The authors investigate how perceived relative skill influences verbal and 
choice behaviour. The revelation of the relative position that a subject thinks to have with 
respect to others is deduced from the choice itself. The study was a 2 x 2 between-
subjects design. The treatment varied in payment, money vs. no money, and task 
difficulty, easy vs. difficult. In the money condition, participants could win 150 ATS.
32
 In 
                                                        
31 For example, Libby and Lipe (1992) studied recall and recognition of “controls”, which accountants look for when 
auditing a firm. Subjects then had to recall as many of the controls as they could or recognize a control seen earlier. They 
found that incentives caused subjects to work harder and recall more items correctly. 
32 Austrian Schilling: 150 ATS were worth approximately 10 USD at the time. 
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the no money condition, they were asked to imagine that they could win the same 
amount. Before performing the task, subjects had to choose by a majority vote the 
procedure to determine their payment: either performance test or lottery condition. In the 
condition performance test a subject wins if his result were in the upper half of the results 
of all subjects. In the lottery condition he wins with 50% probability, with the outcome 
determined by an individual toss of a die. The vote determining the condition was 
confidential. Then the task of explaining easy or difficult words by completing sentences 
with gaps followed. What is relevant in subjects’ choices is the estimated relative ability 
to solve the task. Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) find that there is a sharp difference 
between the vote (measure of the degree of confidence) in the easy and difficult 
treatment. This difference is particularly strong when payment is offered. Choice 
behaviour changes from overconfidence to underconfidence when the task changes from 
easy to difficult. 
Resulting from evidence on skill being important for overconfidence, Moore and 
Cain (2007) test whether the degree of difficulty of the task leads to overconfident 
choices. They show in their two experiments that people believe that they are below 
average on skill-based tasks that are difficult. Their design builds on that of CL’s (1999) 
coordination game in which, in each round, N players decide whether to enter a market or 
not. Each entrant's payoffs depended on his or her rank within the market, such that more 
money is earned by better performance relative to other entrants. Each market had a pre-
announced capacity, c. Entrants ranked below c lose money, entrants ranked c or above 
earned money, while non-entrants neither earned nor lost any money. The distinguishing 
feature of Moore and Cain’s design is that skill-dependent payoffs are based on either an 
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easy or a difficult trivia game. Contrary to the notion that overconfidence tends to be 
pervasive on all skill-based competitions, they predict that subjects will only believe they 
are better than others on simple tasks, on which they expect excess entry. They also test 
CL’s explanation that people focus on themselves and simply neglect consideration of 
others (rather than miscalculating others’ performance) when making comparative 
judgements. CL called this "reference group neglect". The reference group neglect 
explanation states that, for example, students neglect to consider the fact that other 
students are also likely to find the test difficult. The differential regression explanation 
used by Moore and Cain (2007), on the other hand, hypothesizes that people generally 
have better information about themselves than about others, so their beliefs about others' 
performances tend to be more regressive (thus less extreme) than their beliefs about their 
own performances. In other words, when your absolute performance is better (or worse) 
than your prior expectations, sensible Bayesian inference will lead you to make 
predictions of others' performances that are between these priors and your current beliefs 
about your performance. Reference group neglect refers to errors in the weight one puts 
on estimates of others' performance, while differential regression refers to errors in the 
estimate that is weighed. In the second experiment they test which interventions might be 
useful for reducing errors and which interventions are unlikely to be effective. Subjects 
were first told that they would be taking either a difficult or simple quiz and were then 
asked to predict the outcome. After taking the quiz, participants were invited to revise 
their answers to their prior estimates of absolute and relative scores. Finally, subjects 
were given full information about how others scored on the same quiz they took, and they 
were asked to report the same comparative judgements. Previous research has shown that 
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information about others can reduce better than average effects (Alicke et al., 1995).  
Accuracy of forecasting one’s own performance, relative or absolute, was tested 
by Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, and Vredenburg (1995). In one task subjects 
were searching over a spreadsheet for the maximum value of a function, in the other 
subjects were decoding five-letter words. Participants were asked to predict how many 
rounds of a task contest they will win, an intuitive frequency-based method for eliciting a 
forecast of an unambiguous outcome. They find that underconfidence is more prevalent 
than overconfidence in forecasts of relative or absolute performance, which is in contrary 
to CL. CL find that subjects enter more often when betting on their own skill meaning 
that they expect to perform better than other subjects. 
CL have triggered a new series of experiments testing overconfidence in different 
setups, and testing numerous causes leading to overconfidence, varying degrees of task 
difficulty that leads to overconfidence. The results from these experiments, for example, 
provide evidence that overconfidence is associated with introducing risky products to the 
market (Simon and Houghton, 2003), that greater overconfidence leads to aggressive 
behaviour in the pursuit of higher wealth (Deaves, Luders, and Luo, 2009) and that the 
difficulty of the task matters for overconfidence (Hoelzl and Rustichini, 2005; Moore and 
Cain, 2007). From economics point of view is inevitable that we understand how 
overconfidence influence choices and behaviour in order to avoid unnecessary business 
failures, to understand managers’ decisions about investment policy and firms’ optimal 
wage policies. 
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3.4 Experimental Design And Procedures 
CL used for their design the market entry game described in Kahneman (1988). 
The game is played by a group of N people. In each round, the market capacity “c” is 
announced, where 0< c <15. The participants then make simultaneous choices of whether 
or not to enter the market. The payoff to the entrants depends on their number, according 
to the following formula: $0.25(c – number of entrants). Within very few trials, a pattern 
emerged in which the number of entrants, was within 1 or 2 of c, with no obvious 
systematic tendency to be higher or lower than c. 
In CL as well as in my experiment 12 to 16 subjects (depending on a session) also 
decide in each of 24 rounds whether to enter a market or not. Each entrant starts with an 
initial endowment of  $10. Each entrant's payoffs depend not only on the pre-announced 
market capacity “c”, but also on his rank. Entrants ranked below c lose their initial 
endowment, while entrants ranked c or above earn money (see Table 3.1). The top “c” 
entrants share $50 proportionally, with higher-ranking entrants earning more relative to 
other entrants.
33
 Non-entrants do not earn or lose any money; they keep their initial 
endowment. If the number of entrants is exactly c+5, then the total payoff to all entering 
subjects is zero and if there are more than c+5 entrants, then on average entrants lose 
money. The ranks are assigned both randomly and according to the subject’s skill, which 
is determined by his relative performance in a quiz. Skill-ranks are determined by how 
fast the subjects finish five mazes (session 1 and 2) or how many trivia questions about 
sports or current events the subjects answer correctly (sessions 3-8). Subjects’ ranks are 
not revealed until the end of the experiment, i.e. after all have made their decisions.  
                                                        
33 If the number of entrants is lower than c, the entrants share $50 proportionally, i.e. the entrant with the lowest rank 
receives the smallest $ amount, the entrant with the second lowest rank receives twice as much as the previous one etc.  
 
 
174 
Table 3.1 Rank-Based Payoffs* 
Market Capacity 
Rank 2 4 6 8 
1 33 20 14 11 
2 17 15 12 10 
3  10 10 8 
4  5 7 7 
5   5 6 
6   2 4 
7    3 
8    2 
* Payoff for successful entrants as a function of “c” 
 
The session details are described in Table 3.2.
34
 In this experiment, there are eight 
sessions. In each session there are two blocks of twelve rounds. In one of the two blocks 
the rank is determined randomly, in the other block the rank depends on the skill, which 
is consistent with CL. This design feature is implemented in a within-subject design, i.e. 
the same subjects participate in both blocks of rounds. Subjects are told in advance in 
which block of rounds the rank is assigned randomly and in which it depends on their 
skill. In half of the sessions the block of rounds with random rank is run first, followed by 
the block of rounds with skill dependent rank. In the other half of the sessions the order is 
reversed, i.e. the block of rounds with skill dependent rank is run first to control for the 
order effect.  
The recruitment procedure differed in information provided to the subjects before 
participating in the experiment. In the sessions one to four the subjects were recruited the 
usual way by saying that they were invited to participate in the experiment with an 
opportunity to make money. In sessions five to eight the subjects were also told before 
their participation (when recruited) that the payoff of the experiment would depend on 
                                                        
34 These are identical to CL’s experiment. 
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skill, especially knowledge about current events and sports.
35
 In these sessions it was 
possible for subjects, who were confident of their abilities, to self-select themselves into 
the experiment. 
Table 3.2 Description Of The Sessions 
Session # n Recruitment Procedure Block Order Skill 
1 12 No self-selection R/S Maze 
2 14 No self-selection S/R Maze 
3 16 No self-selection R/S Quiz 
4 16 No self-selection S/R Quiz 
5 16 Self-selection R/S Quiz 
6 16 Self-selection S/R Quiz 
7 14 Self-selection R/S Quiz 
8 14 Self-selection S/R Quiz 
R= random-rank, S=skill-rank 
 
Table 3.3 shows the capacities used in each round. These are in the same 
sequence as in CL’s experiment in order to maintain the procedures as close to the 
original experiment as possible. Along with their entry decision, subjects forecasted how 
many entrants they expect in that round. For each correct forecast they earned $1. CL 
used these forecasts to distinguish between subjects who entered because they 
underestimated the number of competitors from the subjects who entered because they 
thought they were above average, i.e. overconfident about their skills. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
35 The information included in the invitation email was as follows: “Earn money in an experiment in which performance on 
sports or current events trivia will determine your payoff. If you are very good you might earn a considerable sum of 
money.“ 
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Table 3.3 Market Capacity "c" Values 
Round Session 1 Session 2 Session 3-6 Session 7 and 8 
1 2 8 2 4 
2 4 4 6 2 
3 8 2 4 6 
4 6 6 4 8 
5 4 4 2 6 
6 2 2 6 4 
7 8 8 4 2 
8 6 6 6 8 
9 4 4 2 6 
10 6 2 6 4 
11 8 8 4 2 
12 2 6 2 8 
 
I want to ask the same questions as CL but using data from my experiment. I thus test the 
following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is lower industry profit in skill-rank rounds than in random-rank 
rounds. 
 
If subjects are overconfident, they will enter the market more often in skill-rank 
rounds, which will result in lower industry profits, i.e. if the number of entrants is higher 
than the c, the industry profit will be negative. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The profit differentials between skill-rank and random-rank rounds in four 
sessions with self-selection are larger than in the remaining four sessions with no self-
selection.  
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The larger the skill-random profit differential the more entry in the skill-rank 
rounds. If the entrants neglect the reference group, i.e. enter more because of the 
overconfidence in their skill but ignore that all the other entrants are doing the same 
thing, the differential between the skill-rank and random-rank will be larger in sessions 
with self-selection than in session with no self-selection.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Expected average profit is smaller in skill-rank rounds than in random-
rank rounds. 
 
Expected average profit is calculated based on the forecasts of the subjects. If 
subjects decide to enter because they think fewer people will enter, then the expected 
average profit will be higher in skill-rank rounds than in random-rank rounds. If, 
however, subjects enter more often because they are more overconfident about their 
relative skills, the expected average profit will be lower in skill-rank rounds than in 
random-rank rounds (based on Equation 1 in Section 3.5.3 below). 
 
A total of 118 subjects participated in the experiment. The experimental sessions 
were conducted in the New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory (NZEEL) at the 
University of Canterbury. Subjects were recruited using the online database system 
ORSEE(Greiner, 2004). Each subject only participated in a single session of the study, 
and had not participated in any similar market entry experiment at NZEEL. The 
experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007). The number of subjects in a session varied from 12 to 16. All sessions were run 
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under a single-blind social distance protocol.
36
 On average, a session lasted 50 minutes 
including the payment and subjects earned 13.80 NZD.
37
  
Upon entering the laboratory, subjects were asked to sit in a cubicle of their 
choice. At the beginning of the experiment instructions (provided in Appendix A) were 
handed out, as well as projected onto a screen and read aloud. Afterward subjects had a 
few minutes to go through the instructions again, this time in their own pace. Any 
questions arising were answered in private. All subjects had to answer control questions 
(provided in Appendix B) correctly, assessing their understanding of the instructions, 
before they could proceed to the decision making part of the experiment. After the 
control questions, subjects entered their decisions on market entry in each of 24 rounds 
and only after these decisions the subjects were asked to participate in a task, which 
determined their rank for the skill based rounds. Upon the completion of the experiment, 
they were also asked to fill out a questionnaire. Subjects were then called one by one to 
receive their payment in private in a payment room.  
 
 
  
                                                        
36  In a single-blind treatment, decisions and payoffs are anonymous with respect to other subjects, but not to the 
experimenters. 
37 For reference, at the time of the experiment this was approximately 10.30 USD and the adult minimum wage in New 
Zealand was 14.25 NZD per hour. 
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3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Skill-Rank Versus Random-Rank Rounds 
A game theoretic concept with a set of strategies, one for each player, such that 
each player’s strategy is best for her, given that all other players are playing their 
equilibrium strategies is called Nash equilibrium.
38
 Nash Equilibrium exists when there is 
no unilateral profitable deviation from any of the players involved. In other words, no 
player in the game would take a different action as long as every other player sticks to her 
strategy. The pure equilibrium of the market entry game is (c+5). With c=8, for example, 
a Nash equilibrium occurs when 13 players enter, with c=6, when 11 enter, with c=4, 
when 9 and with c=2 when 7 players enter. For example, if c=6 and 11 subjects enter, 
then an entrant has 1/11 probability of receiving $14, 1/11 probability of receiving $12, 
1/11 probability of receiving $10, 1/11 probability of receiving $7, 1/11 probability of 
receiving $5 and 1/11 probability of receiving $2, because the top c entrants share $50 
proportionally, and a 5/11 probability of losing $10. The expected payoff with 11 entrants 
thus is (1/11)*14+(1/11)*12+(1/11)*10+(1/11)*7+(1/11)*5+(1/11)*2+(5/11)*(-
10)=$0.002. If one more player entered, the expected payoff would be 
(1/12)*14+(1/12)*12+(1/12)*10+(1/12)*7+(1/12)*5+(1/12)*2+(6/12)*(-10)=$-0.833. 
The player who entered could have avoided expected loss by staying out. If fewer than 11 
players entered a player who stayed out could have received a positive payoff by 
entering, the expected payoff with 10 entrants is $1. For the mixed strategies (games in 
which players randomize), the expected payoff must be at least as large as that obtainable 
by any other strategy. There is a unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of the 
                                                        
38 In 1950, John Nash’s 28-page dissertation contained the definition and properties of Nash equilibrium. 
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market entry game in which (risk-neutral) players enter with a probability close to 
(c+5)/no of entrants (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999). 
CL control for “risk attitude” by having subjects participate in both random- and 
skill-rank rounds, which gives an empirical estimate of observed equilibrium without 
having to impose any a priori assumptions about risk preferences. That is, since subjects 
participate in both random- and skill-rank rounds, their decisions in the random-rank 
rounds act as a within subject control for risk preference. 
Figure 3.1 Industry Profits in Random-Rank and Skill-Rank Rounds 
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Moving onto the results from my experiment, Table 3.4 lists the total amount of 
money earned by subjects (depicted in Figure 3.1), i.e. the industry profit per round in 
each experimental session, by rank condition. Industry profit is calculated by adding the 
payoffs of successful entrants and payoffs (losses) of unsuccessful entrants in each round. 
In the majority of random-rank rounds (81/96 or 84%) industry profit is strictly positive. 
It is negative in 5 rounds (5% of the random-rank rounds). Average industry profit across 
rounds is $29.28. In the skill-rank rounds industry profit is strictly positive in 76/96 or 
79% of rounds and negative in 9 rounds. Average profit across the skill-rank round is 
$26.14. 
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Table 3.4 Industry Profits by Rounds 
Profit for random-rank rounds 
Rounds 
Session # n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
1 12 10 10 50 50 10 20 50 50 20 50 50 0 370 
2 14 50 30 0 10 20 10 50 40 40 0 50 30 330 
3 16 -20 50 20 0 -40 40 20 50 0 50 20 -10 180 
4 16 10 50 30 30 0 50 50 50 0 50 20 -10 330 
5 16 20 50 20 20 10 50 40 50 10 50 40 40 400 
6 16 20 50 10 20 20 50 30 50 -10 50 10 30 330 
7 14 20 0 20 50 40 0 40 50 50 20 0 50 340 
8 14 50 20 50 50 50 30 40 50 50 50 40 50 530 
Profit for skill-rank rounds 
Rounds 
Session # n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
1 12 -10 50 50 50 40 10 50 50 50 50 50 10 450 
2 14 50 0 0 20 -10 20 50 40 10 0 50 30 260 
3 16 0 40 10 0 10 20 0 30 -20 30 10 -10 120 
4 16 -10 50 50 20 -10 20 40 50 20 50 20 10 310 
5 16 20 40 40 20 0 40 30 50 20 40 40 30 370 
6 16 -10 10 -10 10 0 30 10 50 -10 50 20 10 160 
7 14 0 0 40 50 50 10 0 50 30 30 20 50 330 
8 14 50 40 50 50 50 40 30 50 50 40 10 50 510 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts lower industry profit (resulting from more entry) in skill-
rank rounds than in random-rank rounds. The hypothesis is based on a conjecture that 
when subjects are betting on their own skill they will enter more often, which will in turn 
lower the total industry profit. Result 1 summarizes the finding. 
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Result 1: The industry profit is lower in skill-rank compared to random-rank rounds. 
 
Support for Result 1: Following the original paper by CL, I also test for industry profit 
differences between skill-rank and random-rank rounds using a matched pair t-test in the 
following way. Recall that each experimental session consists of twelve random-rank and 
twelve skill-rank rounds. The order of ranks alternates between the sessions, i.e. in 
session one subject ranks were determined randomly in rounds 1-12 and by skill in 
rounds 13-24, whereas in session two subject ranks were determined by skill in rounds 1-
12 and randomly in rounds 13-24. Industry profits by round in all sessions are depicted in 
Figure 3.1. I took the industry profit from the first twelve random-rank rounds in session 
one and matched them with industry profits from the first twelve skill-rank rounds in 
session two. Similarly, I took the industry profits from skill-rank rounds in session three 
and matched them with the industry profits from random-rank rounds in session four. In 
the same way I matched session five with six and seven with eight.  Each pair of rounds 
being compared has the same value of c, takes place at the same experimental time and 
has the same history or path of previous values of c and differs only in how the rank was 
determined. Sessions one and two are exceptions, because of a different order of c. That 
is, subjects in session one face a different order of c than subjects in session two and thus 
these sessions are not directly comparable. I did this in order to replicate the original 
design by CL and so preserved the order of c’s in sessions one and two. However, I 
exclude these two sessions from the matched pairs t-test (Table 3.4 reports industry 
profits for all sessions for completeness).
39 A matched pair two tailed t-test with these 
                                                        
39 I do this because it is not appropriate to pair sessions one and two, as subjects face different capacities in the rounds to 
be paired. 
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comparisons suggests that there is more entry in the skill-rank rounds (i.e. overconfidence 
about one’s skill) as the industry profits are lower in skill-rank than in random-rank 
rounds (p-value=0.084).  
I also ran a matched pairs t-test with the total profits per session, as these are 
independent variables, which does not necessarily hold for the profits in individual 
rounds. In this case, there is no difference between the profits in random-rank and skill-
rank rounds (p-value=0.527). 
Attempting to replicate the study by CL I have used the same tests with 
preserving the same observation units. I recognize, however, that CL used their test 
assuming the independence of observations. A decision of a subject in round one, 
however, is not independent of a decision of a subject in round two since it is still the 
same subject making their decision about entering the market for 24 rounds. In order to 
eliminate this problem I ran a separate t-test for each round in sessions three to eight 
(again, excluding sessions one and two because of the different values of capacities). 
These observations are truly independent. The setback of this approach is a very small 
number of observations (n=3) and less statistical power but it does not violate the 
independency assumption. For this, I used the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test the 
results of which are presented in Table 3.5 for each round.  
Table 3.5 Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test for Differences in Industry Profits by Round  
Round Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
(p-value) 
1, 5 0.786 
2, 4, 6, 9, 11, 17 0.166 
3, 8, 20, 22 0.103 
7, 10, 13-16, 18, 19, 23 0.109 
12, 24 0.285 
21 0.782 
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In order to be able to use the data from sessions one and two (which do not have 
the same order and history path of c) I have calculated a normalised entry rate. The 
normalised entry rate is the ratio of the number of entrants and the actual capacity c in the 
respective round (presented in Table 3.6), where 100% means that the number of entering 
subjects was exactly the same as the c for a specific round. If the normalised entry rate is 
higher than 100%, it means that there were more people entering than c and if this is less 
than 100%, the market was not saturated and it was possible for more participants to enter 
the market and be profitable. 
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Table 3.6 The Normalised Entry Rates for Random-Rank and Skill-Rank Rounds 
Normalised entry rate (%) for random-rank rounds 
Rounds 
Session # n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Avg. 
1 12 300 200 13 33 200 250 38 50 175 33 38 350 140.0 
2 14 100 150 350 167 175 300 75 117 125 350 75 133 176.4 
3 16 450 83 175 225 550 117 175 100 350 100 175 400 241.7 
4 16 300 67 150 150 350 50 100 100 350 100 175 400 191.0 
5 16 250 67 175 175 300 83 125 83 300 67 125 150 158.3 
6 16 250 100 200 175 250 100 150 83 400 100 200 200 184.0 
7 14 175 350 150 88 117 225 150 75 83 175 350 50 165.7 
8 14 100 250 33 38 50 150 150 13 67 100 150 38 94.9 
               
Normalised entry rate (%) for skill-rank rounds  
Rounds 
Session # n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Avg. 
1 12 400 75 38 33 125 300 38 67 100 67 38 300 131.8 
2 14 63 225 350 150 250 250 88 117 200 350 100 133 189.7 
3 16 350 117 200 225 300 150 225 133 450 133 200 400 240.3 
4 16 400 100 100 175 400 150 125 83 250 83 175 300 195.1 
5 16 250 117 125 175 350 117 150 100 250 117 125 200 173.0 
6 16 400 167 250 200 350 133 200 100 400 100 175 300 231.3 
7 14 225 350 117 63 100 200 350 75 133 150 250 50 171.9 
8 14 75 150 67 63 83 125 200 13 67 125 300 38 108.8 
 
By calculating the normalised entry rate I am able to control for different c’s. The 
hypothesis tested is that there will be more entry (a higher normalised entry rate) in the 
skill-rank rounds than in the random-rank rounds. To test for differences in normalised 
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entry rates between the skill-rank and random-rank rounds, I use a t-test, which does not 
detect a statistically significant difference (p-value=0.482) 
I also tested for the difference in the normalised entry rate in skill-rank rounds and 
random-rank rounds both in self-selection sessions and no self-selection sessions. The 
Mann-Whitney test does not detect statistically significant differences in the normalised 
entry rate between skill- and random-rank rounds in sessions with self-selection (p-
value=0.296) and with no self-selection (p-value=0.939). The result from these tests 
suggests that there is no higher entry in skill-rank rounds either in self-selection or in no 
self-selection sessions, i.e. subjects are not overconfident about their relative skills. 
Again, I ran an additional test with the average normalised entry rates, which control for 
the independence of observations. I decided to use a non-parametric Mann-Whitney test 
because of the small number of observations. The Mann-Whitney test does not detect a 
statistically significant difference in the average normalised entry rate between skill-rank 
and random-rank rounds in no self-selection sessions (8 observations, p-value=1.000) and 
or in the average normalised entry rates between skill-rank and random-rank rounds in 
sessions with self-selection (8 observations, p-value=0.387).  This is in line with the 
previous tests on normalised entry rates with no difference between skill and random-
rank rounds in self-selection sessions and in no self-selection sessions. 
Similarly as with the industry profit, because of the independence of the 
observations, I ran the Mann-Whitney test (see Table 3.7) for each round in all eight 
sessions to test for differences in the normalised entry rate.
40
 The drawback of this 
approach is small number of observations (n=4), but the advantage is that the 
independence assumption is not violated. 
                                                        
40 There is no need to use Wilcoxon sign rank test as the c’s are controlled for by using the normalized entry rate. 
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Table 3.7 The Mann-Whitney Test For Differences In The Normalised Entry Rates 
By Round 
Round The Mann-Whitney Test 
 (p-value) 
1,3 0.561 
2, 21 0.773 
4, 16, 17, 20, 23 0.885 
5, 9 1.000 
6 0.663 
7 0.465 
8, 24 0.559 
10 0.309 
11, 22 0.767 
12 0.384 
13 0.189 
14 0.772 
15 0.468 
18 0.381 
19 0.375 
 
 This complicated design allows me to test for within-subject comparisons as each 
subject participated both in random-rank and skill-rank rounds. Random-rank rounds 
have the exact same order of c’s as skill-rank rounds, thus are directly comparable. To 
test if there is a difference in industry profit as well as in normalised entry rates between 
random-rank rounds and skill-rank rounds within a session I used the Mann-Whitney test; 
p-values for each session are reported in Table 3.8 below. Except for the industry profit 
in session 6, none of the results suggest that industry profits are different in random-rank 
rounds than in skill-rank round. 
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Table 3.8 The Mann-Whitney Test For The Difference In Industry Profits And 
Normalised Entry Rate Between Random-Rank And Skill-Rank Rounds 
Session 
# 
Industry profit 
(p-value) 
Normalised entry rate 
(p-value) 
1 0.476 0.771 
2 0.500 0.728 
3 0.560 0.602 
4 0.788 0.794 
5 0.592 0.622 
6 0.077 0.307 
7 0.953 0.954 
8 0.713 0.643 
 
 
3.5.2 Self-Selection Versus No Self-Selection Treatments 
The average per-round industry profits reported in the first and second row of 
Table 3.9 are $25.21 and $23.75 for random- and skill-rank rounds respectively the no 
self-selection sessions (1-4), (no statistically significant difference, t-test, p-
value=0.757).
41
 In sessions with self-selection (5-8) average profit is $33.33 and $28.54 
for random- and skill-rank rounds, respectively (no statistically significant difference, t-
test, p-value=0.218). 
 
Table 3.9 The Average per Round Industry Profit 
Session Rank Order Avg Industry profit 
1-4 
 
Random-rank $25.21 
Skill-rank $23.75 
5-8 
 
 
Random-rank $33.33 
Skill-rank $28.54 
 
                                                        
41  When sessions one and two are excluded from the test, the result still remains insignificant, t(46)=0.478 and p-
value=0.635. 
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Hypothesis 2 states that the profit difference between skill-rank and random-rank 
rounds in the treatments with self-selection are larger than in the treatments with no self-
selection. This hypothesis is based on a conjecture that reference group neglect produces 
larger profit differentials between skill-rank rounds and random-rank rounds in the 
sessions with self-selected subjects than in the sessions with no self-selected subjects. 
 
Result 2: The profit differentials between skill-rank and random-rank rounds are not 
larger in sessions with self-selection than sessions with no self-selection. 
 
Support for Result 2: A t-test with equal variances comparing the skill-random profit 
differentials between sessions 3-4 and 5-8 does not find support for the hypothesis that 
differentials are larger in sessions with self-selection than with no self-selection (p-
value=0.782). In addition, I also used skill-random total profit differences to run a t-test, 
which does not detect a statistically significant difference (p-value=0.768) in the profit 
differences between self-selection and no self-selection sessions. This result is different 
to the one obtained by CL. For comparison, see Table 3.10. In CL reference group 
neglect produces a larger skill-random rank entry differential in sessions with self-
selected subjects. A t-test comparing the skill-random profit differentials for matched 
rounds between session 1-4 and 5-8 strongly rejects the hypothesis that differentials are 
the same in sessions with and without self-selection (p-value < 0.001). 
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Table 3.10 A Comparison of the Average per Round Industry Profit and the Test 
Results 
 
CL Replication 
Avg. profit random-rank $16.87 $29.28 
Avg. profit skill-rank $-1.56 $26.14 
Matched pairs t-test 
t = -7.43 
p < 0.001 
t = 1.755 
p = 0.084 
Avg. profit no self-selection, 
random rank 
$19.79 $25.21 
Avg. profit no self-selection, 
skill-rank 
$10.83 $23.75 
Avg. profit self-selection, random 
rank 
$13.96 $33.33 
Avg. profit self-selection, skill-
rank 
$-13.13 $28.54 
t-test 
t = -4.08 
p < 0.001 
t = 0.278 
p = 0.782 
 
Similarly as in the previous section, I used normalised entry rate instead of profit 
to test Hypothesis 2. Again, a t-test reports that the normalised entry rate skill-random 
rank differentials between self-selection and no self-selection sessions are not statistically 
significant (p-value=0.397). A t-test does not detect a statistically significant difference in 
the normalised entry rate between self-selection and no self-selection sessions either in 
random-rank rounds (p-value=0.110) or in skill-rank rounds (p-value=0.420). 
This suggests that entry rates in random-rank rounds as well as in the skill-rank 
rounds are roughly the same in self-selection and no self-selection sessions. For both 
random-rank and skill-rank rounds it appears that the entry rate does not depend on the 
procedure used to recruit subjects. In other words, those who self-selected themselves 
into the experiment do not have higher entry rates than those who were recruited without 
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knowing their payoff might depend on their skill. Similarly as with the industry profits in 
the previous section, this approach violates the independence assumption. In order to 
address this problem I ran the Mann-Whitney test with the average values of normalised 
entry rate per round, which are independent of each other. When looking at the averages 
of random-rank rounds, the Mann-Whitney test does not detect a difference between self-
selection and no self-selection sessions in the normalised entry rate (8 observations, p-
value=0.248). When considering only skill-rank rounds, again, the Mann-Whitney test 
does not detect a difference in normalised entry rate between self-selection sessions and 
no self-selection sessions (8 observations, p-value=0.387). 
 
3.5.3 Expected Profit Differences In Skill And Random Rounds 
The previous tests illustrate the effect of overconfidence on entry and demonstrate 
that self-selection does not make the effect stronger. These tests, however, do not control 
for all possible explanations. Excessive entry in the skill-rank rounds may not necessarily 
be due to overconfidence about skills, but due to the subjects underestimating how many 
subjects will enter (CL call this the “blind spot” hypothesis). If the number of expected 
entrants is underestimated, this influences the subjects’ payoffs because they enter even 
though they should not have. In order to test this I saliently asked subjects to forecast 
how many entrants they think there will be in each round.
42
 I then used these numbers to 
compute the profit that a subject expects the average entrant to earn. This has been 
calculated in a following way:  
 
                                                        
42 The question I asked in the experiment is: “How many people (including yourself) do you expect to enter the market in 
this round?” If a subject forecasted the number of entrants correctly, $1 was added to his payoff in a respective round. 
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Ej(πijt) = (50-10*(Fijt - cit))/ Fijt,      (1) 
 
where  Ej(πijt) is the expected average profit, Fijt is the forecast of subject j used to 
calculate the profit that subject j expects the average entrant to earn, and cit is the capacity 
in the particular round. 
This approach allows me to separate overconfidence from incorrect estimates of 
others’ entry. I test the hypothesis that the expected average profit is smaller in skill-rank 
rounds than in random-rank rounds. If subjects decide to enter in the skill-rank rounds 
because they think that fewer other subjects will enter, the expected average profit in the 
skill-rank rounds will be larger. Including Ej(πijt) in an entry regression will separate out 
the effect falsely attributed to skill. If, on the other hand, the subjects enter because they 
are more overconfident in the skill-rank rounds compared to random-rank rounds, not 
taking into account the number of entrants they expect to enter, the expected average 
profits will be smaller in skill-rank rounds than in random-rank rounds. The 
overconfident subjects will expect to earn more than the average entrant and enter even 
when the expected average profit is low.  
Table 3.11 reports the difference between expected average profits in random-
rank rounds (denoted πr) and in skill-rank rounds (denoted πs), using only the rounds in 
which subjects entered. Table 3.11 shows the mean difference πr - πs, averaged across 
entering subjects, the number and percentage of subjects who have a negative mean (i.e. 
who expect less average profit in skill-rank rounds), and the number and percentage of 
subjects whose expected average profit is negative, on average, across skill-rank rounds. 
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Table 3.11 The Average Differences In Expected Profits Per Entrant Between 
Random And Skill Rounds 
Measure Session 
1 
Session 
2 
Session 
3 
Session 
4 
Session 
5 
Session 
6 
Session 
7 
Session 
8 
Total 
Πr - Πs -1.126 -0.665 0.023 1.832 -1.094 -0.886 -1.718 4.483 1.036 
# of S’s 
with Πr - 
Πs<0 
(percent) 
5/9 
(55.6%) 
6/14 
(42.9%) 
7/13 
(53.8%) 
4/12 
(33.3%) 
9/11 
(81.8%) 
6/14 
(42.9%) 
8/13 
(61.5%) 
2/8 
(25%) 
47/94 
(50%) 
# of S’s 
with Πr 
<0 
(percent) 
0/9 
(0%) 
0/13 
(0%) 
3/12 
(25%) 
1/11 
(9%) 
0/10 
(0%) 
0/12 
(0%) 
0/11 
(0%) 
0/8 
(0%) 
4/86 
(4.7%) 
  
The mean difference πr - πs is negative in sessions one and two and positive in 
sessions three and four. A majority of subjects expect to earn more in skill-rank rounds. 
In session one 44% of the subjects expect to earn less in skill-rank rounds than in 
random-rank rounds. In session two, three and four, it is 50%, 46% and 67%, 
respectively. 
In the self-selection sessions (5-8), the mean difference πr - πs is negative in all 
sessions, except for session eight. Subjects expect to earn more in skill-rank rounds than 
in random-rank rounds. In session five only 18% of the subjects expect to earn less in the 
skill-rank rounds. In session six, seven and eight it is 57%, 38% and 75%, respectively. A 
t-test does not detect a difference in the average difference of expected profits per person 
between the self-selection treatments and the no self-selection treatments at a 10% 
significance level (p-value=0.913). 
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Result 3: The expected average profit is not smaller in skill-rank rounds than in random-
rank rounds. 
 
Support for Result 3: A t-test comparing the expected average profit per entrant in skill-
rank rounds and random-rank rounds does not provide evidence that these profits are 
different (p-value=0.879). 
 
3.5.4 Logistic Regression  
The size and significance of all variables’ effects at once can be tested using a 
fixed effects logistic regression with entry decision as independent variable (Table 3.12) 
and all the variables that could be influencing the independent variable, i.e. c, the 
expected average profit Ej(πijt), skill-rank dummy (Skill=1), subject pool dummy 
(students studying economics or business economics, ECON=1), self-selection condition 
dummy (sessions with Self-selection=1), gender (Male=1), dummy for sessions with the 
maze (Maze=1), the order of rounds (Random/Skill=1 if random-rank rounds were run 
first) and interaction variable Self-selection*Skill. The interaction term was included in 
the regression to control for the situation when Self-selection and Skill interact. This 
means the effect of Skill on the entry decision might depend on whether the self-selected 
recruitment procedure was used. Theory suggests that subjects, who self-selected 
themselves into the experiment based on the information they received in the recruitment 
email, will enter more in the skill-rounds. Expected average profit, Skill-rank, ECON, 
Self-selection, Male and Maze are all statistically significant. The results suggest that the 
higher the expected profit, the fewer subjects enter. Also, ECON students and those who 
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self-selected themselves into the experiment seem to enter less often. It appears that male 
subjects entered more often than female subjects and subjects in sessions with the maze 
entered more often than in the sessions with the quiz. 
Table 3.12 Fixed Effects Logistic Regression Of Entry Decision, Sessions 1-8, 
n=2832, Panel Data43 
Variable Coefficient 
(Robust Std Err) 
Marginal z-statistic 
(p-value) 
Intercept -0.410 
(0.237) 
 -1.73 
(0.084) 
c -0.031 
(0.023) 
-0.007 -1.33 
(0.182) 
E(πijt) -0.014*** 
(0.004) 
-0.003 -3.28 
(0.001) 
Skill 0.202* 
(0.109) 
0.046 1.85 
(0.064) 
ECON -0.447*** 
(0.084) 
-0.103 -5.29 
(0.001) 
Self-selection -0.246** 
(0.124) 
-0.057 -1.99 
(0.047) 
Male 0.491*** 
(0.079) 
0.113 6.22 
(0.001) 
Maze 0.325*** 
(0.118) 
0.075 2.76 
(0.006) 
Order Random/Skill 0.128 
(0.079) 
0.030 1.63 
(0.104) 
Self-selection*Skill -0.122 
(0.157) 
 -0.78 
(0.437) 
Round dummy yes   
  
Log-likelihood -1847.55 Pseudo R2=0.035 
Run on StataSE 12.0. Robust standard errors used. Round 24 is the omitted control variable. 
*, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
                                                        
43 Standard errors are not clustered to session level because of a small number of sessions.  
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3.5.5 Additional Analyses: Forecasts 
Recall that subjects had to forecast number of entering subjects in each round. If 
the forecast was correct, an additional $1 was added to subject’s payoff. Analysing the 
forecasting behaviour allows to distinguish between two types of over-entering the 
market. Over-entering can occur either because subjects forecast the amount of 
competition to be smaller than it actually is or because subjects are overconfident about 
their relative skill and decide to enter too often.  There are many studies showing that 
forecasts are usually biased and violate rationality of expectations (Camerer, Kagel, and 
Roth, 1995). Forecasts are usually correlated with observable variables and usually 
follow an adaptive process in which forecast changes are related to past forecast errors 
(Nerlove, 1958). 
Violations of rationality of naturally occurring forecasts could be due to Bayesian 
learning in an economy where the statistical process generating outcomes keeps changing 
(Caskey, 1985; Lewis, 1989). To control for changes in statistical process generating 
outcomes, several experiments examined forecasts of outcomes of a statistical process 
that is unknown to subjects but fixed throughout the experiment, and known to be fixed 
(Bolle, 1988; Garner, 1982; Schmalensee, 1976). Their results are generally inconsistent 
with rationality of expectations too, but suggest some learning and rationality in special 
setting. A notable exception is (Daniels and Plott, 1988) who studied forecasts in goods 
markets with price inflation that was induced by shifting supply and demand curves 
upward by 15% each round. Regressions indicated that subjects’ forecasts were rational 
rather than adaptive. 
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Figure 3.2 Forecasted And Actual Number Of Entrants in Random-Rank Rounds, 
Averages 
  
 
Figure 3.3 Forecasted And Actual Number Of Entrants in Skill-Rank Rounds, 
Averages 
 
 
Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 present the averages of number of expected and actual 
entrants in random-rank rounds and skill-rank rounds in each session. On average, the 
number of forecasted entrants in all sessions in random-rank rounds is 6.07 subjects and 
6.23 subjects in skill-rank rounds. The actual number of entrants in all sessions is on 
average 5.75 and 6.26 for random-rank rounds and skill-rank rounds, respectively. The 
difference between forecasted and actual entrants in random-rank rounds is not 
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statistically significantly different at the 10% significance level (Mann-Whitney p-
value=0.599). In skill-rank rounds this difference is not statistically significant either 
(Mann-Whitney p-value=0.916). In random-rank rounds subjects forecast about 0.32 
entrants too high and in skill-rank rounds they forecast is converging to the actual number 
of entrants. 
 
Figure 3.4 Matched-Pair Skill-Random Differentials In Number Of Entrants 
 
 
The time series of matched-pair skill-random differentials in number of entrants 
has a slight downward trend across rounds in sessions 1-2 and 5-6 and slight upward 
trend in sessions 3-4 and 7-8 (Figure 3.4). My data thus shows mixed trends.  
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When the number of entrants is averaged across rounds, the total skill-random 
differentials in entry have a slight upward trend as opposed to CL’s downward trend 
(Figure 3.5).  
 
Figure 3.5 Averaged Skill-Random Entry Differentials 
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3.6 Demographics 
As demographic data were collected in the post-experiment questionnaire I can 
test if any of these are influencing subjects’ entry decisions. All variables that were 
potentially relevant were used in the regression. The results from an OLS regression are 
reported in Table 3.13 below. 
NUMBER OF EXPECTED ENTRANTS is the number that each participant 
forecasted would enter the market in a respective round. SELF-SELECTION is a dummy 
variable that takes on the value of 1 for sessions 5-8, in which subjects were told in the 
recruitment process that their payoff will depend on their skill (current events and sports 
quiz). SKILL RANK is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 for rounds, in 
which the rank depends on the skill, i.e. 12 rounds in each session. MALE is a dummy 
variable that equals one when a subject reported their gender as male and 0 if female. 
NON NZ is a dummy variable that equals one when subjects selected a nationality of a 
country that was not New Zealand. Out of this group approximately 78.13% of Non New 
Zealanders chose an Asian nationality, and approximately 6.25% nominated a European 
nationality. ECON is a dummy variable that is 1 when subjects nominated an area of 
study that was ‘Economics’, or ‘Business Economics’. LIVE WITH OTHERS is the 
number of people that currently live in the subject’s household, MONEY is the amount of 
dollars that subjects nominated as their monthly non-accommodation budget, FINANCE 
STUDY is the proportion that subjects nominated as the fraction of their monthly budget 
that they fund themselves. 
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Table 3.13 Demographics Analysis, IN As Dependent Variable 
 
OLS Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Decision “IN” 
NUMBER OF EXPECTED ENTRANTS 0.023*** 
(0.001) 
SELF-SELECTION -0.090*** 
(0.001) 
SKILL RANK 0.031* 
(0.082) 
MALE 0.111*** 
(0.001) 
AGE -0.015*** 
(0.001) 
NON NZ -0.033* 
(0.181) 
SIBLINGS -0.031**** 
(0.001) 
ECON -0.079*** 
 (0.001) 
RELATIVE INCOME -0.020* 
(0.100) 
CITY SIZE 0.103*** 
(0.001) 
LIVE WITH OTHERS 0.026*** 
(0.001) 
MONEY 0.001 
(0.565) 
FINANCE STUDY 0.001 
(0.734) 
NO. OF PEOPLE KNOWN 0.010 
(0.362) 
RELY -0.002 
(0.605) 
CONSTANT 0.193** 
(0.020) 
Run on StataSE 12.0. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
RELATIVE INCOME is the income of subjects’ parents in comparison to other 
families in New Zealand when subjects were 16 years of age. The larger the stated family 
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income, the larger is the variable RELATIVE INCOME. When answering the question 
about RELATIVE INCOME, subjects had five possibilities to choose from, i.e. far below 
average, below average, average, above average, far above average.  CITY SIZE is the 
size of the community where the subject has lived the most time of his life. Subjects 
could choose from the following four options: up to 2 000 inhabitants, 2 000 to 10 000 
inhabitants, 10 000 to 100 000 inhabitants, more than 100 000 inhabitants. The more 
inhabitants they state the higher is the variable CITY SIZE. NO. OF PEOPLE KNOWN 
is the number subject knows in the session. RELY is a 9 point measure of how much a 
subject thinks the experimenter should rely on their data, where 9 is the most reliable. 
MONEY and FINANCE STUDY were included as measures to control for 
income.  NUMBER OF EXPECTED ENTRANTS has positive and significant effect on 
the decision to enter the market. This suggests that the more people the participants 
expect to enter, the more they tend to enter the market. Interestingly, the coefficient and 
the p-value of SELF-SELECTION indicates that in the self-selection sessions (5-8) the 
participants tend to enter the market less than in the sessions with no self-selection 
(sessions 1-4). In the SKILL RANK rounds the participants tend to enter the market more 
often than in the random rank rounds. NON NZ, MONEY, FINANCE STUDY, NO OF 
PEOPLE KNOWN and RELY are not significant at the 5% significance level. The 
variable ECON was used to control for the behaviour of economics students. Economics 
students are likely to have learnt about concepts such as rationality and backwards 
induction, and therefore tend to be more likely to play strategies closer to what standard 
game theory would predict. An interesting result of this analysis of demographics is the 
statistically significant coefficient related to the variable LIVE WITH OTHERS. This 
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suggests that the more people in the same household the higher the frequency of entering 
the market.  
 
3.7 Problems Arising In The Replication 
Replicating an experiment can be challenging as one has to understand in detail 
someone else’s ideas, what has been done, how it has been done and why. I came across a 
few issues I would like to address here. First of all, CL put a lot of emphasis on matching 
the industry profits from skill-rank rounds from one session with profits from random-
rank rounds from another session in order to perform a matched pairs t-test.  In this 
situation the order of capacities and the order of random vs. skill-ranks is important. CL 
compare session one with session two, three with four, five with six and seven with eight. 
All these session pairs have the same order of capacities except for the session one-
session two pair. CL do not explain how they matched these two sessions or why it was 
possible to match them.  
Later on, when seeking for an answer to the question if the profit differentials 
between skill-rank and random-rank rounds in four treatments with self-selection are 
larger than in the remaining four treatments with no self-selection, CL assume a normal 
distribution and use the t-test. The distribution, however, is not normal in skill-rank 
profits (Skewness and kurtosis test for normality, p-value=0.001) and random-rank 
profits (p-value=0.030). The data publicly available from this experiment was not 
complete, i.e. the data from two sessions were missing. I emailed prof. Camerer asking 
for missing data and clarification of some design aspects and tests used.  I did not hear 
back from him so I phoned prof. Lovallo but I was not successful in reaching him after 
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placing a call each day for 5 days. Then I sent an email to prof. Lovallo, to which he 
replied and told me where to find the instructions for the experiment. My remaining three 
emails about the design aspects and statistical tests remained unanswered. In 
Experimental Economics it is paramount to make exact and detailed description of 
procedures available in order to make the experiment available for later replications. As 
the exact procedures of CL experiment are not publicly available I was following them to 
the extent that was available from the paper. 
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3.8 Conclusion 
One of the explanations for possible business failure is overconfidence of those 
who decide to enter the market. In this experiment I test whether overconfidence about 
one’s skill influences the frequency of market entry decisions. I decided to replicate the 
experiment by CL, in which entrants’ payoffs depend on their skills. I have obtained the 
same results as CL but only to some extent.  I found support for the Hypothesis 1 that the 
industry profit is lower in skill-rank rounds than in random-rank rounds. The result from 
a matched pairs t-test suggests that there is more entry in the skill-rank rounds, resulting 
in lower industry profits in skill-rank than in random-rank rounds. This result suggests 
that subjects are overconfident about their skills. The profit differentials between skill-
rank and random-rank rounds in the treatments with self-selection are not different from 
the differentials in the treatments with no self-selection, thus I did not find support for my 
Hypothesis 2. The above-mentioned tests control for the capacity by using a matched 
pairs t-test. Since the capacities does not match up in sessions one and two, I had to 
exclude them from my data analysis. In order to make use out of the data from sessions 
one and two I have calculated a normalised entry rate, which controls for capacity. I then 
used this normalised entry rate to run my tests. Using this data I did not find support for 
my Hypothesis 1 or 2, i.e. normalised entry rate was not higher in skill-rank than in 
random-rank rounds and skill-random differentials are not higher in sessions with self-
selection than in sessions with no self-selection. As subjects forecasted expected number 
of entrants, I was able to test whether expected average profit is smaller in skill-rank than 
in random-rank rounds and found no statistically significant difference in expected 
average profits between these two ranks. 
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There might be more reasons to why I did not obtain the same results as CL. First 
of all, instead of using only male subjects in session three to eight, I used males and 
females in all of my sessions. Deaves, Luders, and Luo (2009) test among other things for 
gender effect in an experiment on overconfidence and they find little evidence that 
gender influences trading activity. Second, as detailed procedures were not available, it is 
possible that my procedures deviated from the original procedures to some extent. 
Finally, the subject pool was different as well (New Zealand students vs. US students). 
My results show that the overconfidence effect is very sensitive to experimental 
conditions. 
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Appendix A. Subject Instructions  
Session 1 Maze Rounds First Random Rounds Second 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
Anonymity 
The identity of the participants will not be revealed to other participants at any time 
during the experiment. 
Show-up Fee 
If you agree to participate in the experiment you will be given $5, which is yours to keep. 
Structure of the Experiment 
This experiment is computerized. If you have any problems entering your decision, 
please alert the experimenter. The experiment involves two sets of decisions. Each set of 
decisions consists of 12 rounds (i.e. 24 rounds in total). These two sets differ in how the 
rank is determined. In the first 12 rounds your rank will be determined by your speed of 
finishing the mazes (as will be explained later). In the second 12 rounds your rank will be 
determined randomly. 
In each round you are asked to decide whether to enter the market or not. In the 
beginning of each round the market capacity “c” for that round will be announced. You 
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can think of “c” as the size of the market. You will also be informed about the number of 
entrants in the previous round.  
Decision Making Task 
In each round you start with $10.  
If you decide not to enter the market, you earn nothing and lose nothing; your earnings 
for that round will be $10.  
If you decide to enter the market, your payoff in each round will depend on your rank 
relative to the ranks of other participants who entered the market and on the capacity “c”.  
If you entered the market 
Your rank and the capacity for that round determine if you are a successful or 
unsuccessful entrant. If your rank is less than or equal to the capacity, then you are a 
successful entrant. If your rank is greater than the capacity, then you are an unsuccessful 
entrant. The unsuccessful entrant will lose the $10 (s)he was given in the beginning of 
that round. The payoffs of successful entrants as a function of “c” are shown in the table 
below.  
ONE of all 24 rounds will be chosen randomly and your rank and decision in this round 
will determine your payoff. 
Rank 
Capacity “c” 
2 4 6 8 
1 33 20 14 11 
2 17 15 12 10 
3  10 10 8 
4  5 7 7 
5   5 6 
6   2 4 
7    3 
8    2 
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All participants will take part in both sets of decisions in the same order. In each round 
you will be also asked to estimate the number of people (including you) that you expect 
to enter the market in that round. If your estimation of the number of entrants is the same 
as the actual number of entrants in that round, additional $1 will be added to your payoff 
in that round.  
The Maze 
After you finish all 24 rounds in the decision making task, you will be given five mazes 
to solve. You need to find the shortest way from one end of the maze to another. If you 
have highlighted all the correct squares in the maze, the OK button will pop up. Click OK 
in order to continue. The participant, who finishes the mazes the fastest, will be ranked 
number 1. A participant, who is the second fastest, will be ranked number 2 and so on.  
 
Correct way:    Incorrect way:         Incorrect way: 
  
 
 
 
Example 
Suppose “c” is 2 and four participants decide to enter the market. The entrant with rank 
number 1 earns $33 and the entrant with rank number 2 earns $17. The entrants with rank 
number 3 and number 4 lose $10, i.e. their payoff for that round will be 0.  
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Payment of Experiment Earnings 
ONE of all 24 rounds will be chosen randomly and your rank and decisions in this round 
will determine your payoff.  
All money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. Because your decision 
is private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision or your earnings either during 
or after the experiment. We also ask you to not gather near the lab after you receive your 
payment. 
Are there any questions?  
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Session 2 Random Rounds First Maze Rounds Second 
INSTRUCTIONS 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
Anonymity 
The identity of the participants will not be revealed to other participants at any time 
during the experiment. 
Show-up Fee 
If you agree to participate in the experiment you will be given $5, which is yours to keep. 
Structure of the Experiment 
This experiment is computerized. If you have any problems entering your decision, 
please alert the experimenter. The experiment involves two sets of decisions. Each set of 
decisions consists of 12 rounds (i.e. 24 rounds in total). These two sets differ in how the 
rank is determined. In the first 12 rounds your rank will be determined randomly. In the 
second 12 rounds your rank will be determined by your speed of finishing the mazes (as 
will be explained later). 
 
In each round you are asked to decide whether to enter the market or not. In the 
beginning of each round the market capacity “c” for that round will be announced. You 
can think of “c” as the size of the market. You will also be informed about the number of 
entrants in the previous round.  
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Decision Making Task 
In each round you start with $10.  
If you decide not to enter the market, you earn nothing and lose nothing; your earnings 
for that round will be $10.  
If you decide to enter the market, your payoff in each round will depend on your rank 
relative to the ranks of other participants who entered the market and on the capacity “c”.  
If you entered the market 
Your rank and the capacity for that round determine if you are a successful or 
unsuccessful entrant. If your rank is less than or equal to the capacity, then you are a 
successful entrant. If your rank is greater than the capacity, then you are an unsuccessful 
entrant. The unsuccessful entrant will lose the $10 (s)he was given in the beginning of 
that round. The payoffs of successful entrants as a function of “c” are shown in the table 
below.  
ONE of all 24 rounds will be chosen randomly and your rank and decision in this round 
will determine your payoff. 
Rank 
Capacity “c” 
2 4 6 8 
1 33 20 14 11 
2 17 15 12 10 
3  10 10 8 
4  5 7 7 
5   5 6 
6   2 4 
7    3 
8    2 
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All participants will take part in both sets of decisions in the same order. In each round 
you will be also asked to estimate the number of people (including you) that you expect 
to enter the market in that round. If your estimation of the number of entrants is the same 
as the actual number of entrants in that round, additional $1 will be added to your payoff 
in that round.  
The Maze 
After you finish all 24 rounds in the decision making task, you will be given five mazes 
to solve. You need to find the shortest way from one end of the maze to another. If you 
have highlighted all the correct squares in the maze, the OK button will pop up. Click OK 
in order to continue. The participant, who finishes the mazes the fastest, will be ranked 
number 1. A participant, who is the second fastest, will be ranked number 2 and so on.  
 
Correct way:    Incorrect way:         Incorrect way: 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Example 
Suppose “c” is 2 and four participants decide to enter the market. The entrant with rank 
number 1 earns $33 and the entrant with rank number 2 earns $17. The entrants with rank 
number 3 and number 4 lose $10, i.e. their payoff for that round will be 0.  
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Payment of Experiment Earnings 
ONE of all 24 rounds will be chosen randomly and your rank and decisions in this round 
will determine your payoff.  
All money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. Because your decision 
is private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision or your earnings either during 
or after the experiment. We also ask you to not gather near the lab after you receive your 
payment. 
Are there any questions?  
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Sessions 3, 5, 7 Random Rounds First Quiz Rounds Second 
INSTRUCTIONS 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
Anonymity 
The identity of the participants will not be revealed to other participants at any time 
during the experiment. 
Show-up Fee 
If you agree to participate in the experiment you will be given $5, which is yours to keep. 
Structure of the Experiment 
This experiment is computerized. If you have any problems entering your decision, 
please alert the experimenter. The experiment involves two sets of decisions. Each set of 
decisions consists of 12 rounds (i.e. 24 rounds in total). These two sets differ in how the 
rank is determined. In the first 12 rounds your rank will be determined randomly. In the 
second 12 rounds your rank will be determined by your score on a quiz (as will be 
explained later). 
In each round you are asked to decide whether to enter the market or not. In the 
beginning of each round the market capacity “c” for that round will be announced. You 
can think of “c” as the size of the market. You will also be informed about the number of 
entrants in the previous round.  
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Decision Making Task 
In each round you start with $10.  
If you decide not to enter the market, you earn nothing and lose nothing; your earnings 
for that round will be $10.  
If you decide to enter the market, your payoff in that round will depend on your rank 
relative to the ranks of other participants who entered the market and on the capacity “c”.  
If you entered the market 
Your rank and the capacity for that round determine if you are a successful or 
unsuccessful entrant. If your rank is less than or equal to the capacity, then you are a 
successful entrant. If your rank is greater than the capacity, then you are an unsuccessful 
entrant. The unsuccessful entrant will lose the $10 (s)he was given in the beginning of 
that round. The payoffs of successful entrants as a function of “c” are shown in the table 
below.  
ONE of all 24 rounds will be chosen randomly and your rank and decision in this round 
will determine your payoff. 
Rank 
Capacity  “c” 
2 4 6 8 
1 33 20 14 11 
2 17 15 12 10 
3  10 10 8 
4  5 7 7 
5   5 6 
6   2 4 
7    3 
8    2 
 
All participants will take part in both sets of decisions in the same order. In each round 
you will be also asked to estimate the number of people (including you) that you expect 
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to enter the market in that round. If your estimation of the number of entrants is the same 
as the actual number of entrants in that round, additional $1 will be added to your payoff 
in that round.  
The Quiz 
After you finish all 24 rounds in the decision making task, you will be asked to 
participate in a multiple choice quiz. There are 30 sports & current events questions in the 
quiz, each question has only one correct answer. You will have 10 minutes to answer all 
questions. A participant with the most correct answers will be ranked number 1, etc. If 
two or more participants correctly answered the same number of questions, the ties will 
be broken by the shorter amount of time taken to answer all questions. 
Example 
Suppose “c” is 2 and four participants decide to enter the market. The entrant with rank 
number 1 earns $33 and the entrant with rank number 2 earns $17. The entrants with rank 
number 3 and number 4 lose $10, i.e. their payoff for that round will be 0. 
Payment of Experiment Earnings 
ONE of all 24 rounds will be chosen randomly and your rank and decisions in this round 
will determine your payoff.  
All money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. Because your decision 
is private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision or your earnings either during 
or after the experiment. We also ask you to not gather near the lab after you receive your 
payment. 
Are there any questions?  
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Sessions 4, 6, 8 Quiz Rounds First Random Rounds Second 
INSTRUCTIONS 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
Anonymity 
The identity of the participants will not be revealed to other participants at any time 
during the experiment. 
Show-up Fee 
If you agree to participate in the experiment you will be given $5, which is yours to keep. 
Structure of the Experiment 
This experiment is computerized. If you have any problems entering your decision, 
please alert the experimenter. The experiment involves two sets of decisions. Each set of 
decisions consists of 12 rounds (i.e. 24 rounds in total). These two sets differ in how the 
rank is determined. In the first 12 rounds your rank will be determined by your score on a 
quiz (as will be explained later). In the second 12 rounds your rank will be determined 
randomly. 
 
In each round you are asked to decide whether to enter the market or not. In the 
beginning of each round the market capacity “c” for that round will be announced. You 
can think of “c” as the size of the market. You will also be informed about the number of 
entrants in the previous round.  
 
 
220 
Decision Making Task 
In each round you start with $10.  
If you decide not to enter the market, you earn nothing and lose nothing; your earnings 
for that round will be $10.  
If you decide to enter the market, your payoff in that round will depend on your rank 
relative to the ranks of other participants who entered the market and on the capacity “c”.  
If you entered the market 
Your rank and the capacity for that round determine if you are a successful or 
unsuccessful entrant. If your rank is less than or equal to the capacity, then you are a 
successful entrant. If your rank is greater than the capacity, then you are an unsuccessful 
entrant. The unsuccessful entrant will lose the $10 (s)he was given in the beginning of 
that round. The payoffs of successful entrants as a function of “c” are shown in the table 
below.  
ONE of all 24 rounds will be chosen randomly and your rank and decision in this round 
will determine your payoff. 
Rank 
Capacity  “c” 
2 4 6 8 
1 33 20 14 11 
2 17 15 12 10 
3  10 10 8 
4  5 7 7 
5   5 6 
6   2 4 
7    3 
8    2 
 
All participants will take part in both sets of decisions in the same order. In each round 
you will be also asked to estimate the number of people (including you) that you expect 
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to enter the market in that round. If your estimation of the number of entrants is the same 
as the actual number of entrants in that round, additional $1 will be added to your payoff 
in that round.  
The Quiz 
After you finish all 24 rounds in the decision making task, you will be asked to 
participate in a multiple choice quiz. There are 30 sports & current events questions in the 
quiz, each question has only one correct answer. You will have 10 minutes to answer all 
questions. A participant with the most correct answers will be ranked number 1, etc. If 
two or more participants correctly answered the same number of questions, the ties will 
be broken by the shorter amount of time taken to answer all questions. 
Example 
Suppose “c” is 2 and four participants decide to enter the market. The entrant with rank 
number 1 earns $33 and the entrant with rank number 2 earns $17. The entrants with rank 
number 3 and number 4 lose $10, i.e. their payoff for that round will be 0. 
Payment of Experiment Earnings 
ONE of all 24 rounds will be chosen randomly and your rank and decisions in this round 
will determine your payoff.  
All money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. Because your decision 
is private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision or your earnings either during 
or after the experiment. We also ask you to not gather near the lab after you receive your 
payment. 
Are there any questions?   
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Appendix B. Control Questions 
 
1. How much would you earn in a round if c=6, you entered and your rank was 5 
among the entrants?  
 
2. How much would you earn in a round if c=2, you entered and your rank was 4 
among the entrants?  
 
3. How much would you earn in a round if you decided not to enter the market? 
 
4. How many rounds are there in total in this experiment? 
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Appendix C. The Quiz 
1. Which of the following countries is no longer in the hunt for a spot at the 2015 
Rugby World Cup? 
A. Zimbabwe 
B. Uruguay 
C. Hong Kong 
D. Madagascar 
 
2. How many consultants are being hired to help the NFL deal with domestic 
violence issues? 
A. 1 
B. 2 
C. 3 
D. 4 
 
3. Who won the Wimbledon men’s title in 2008? 
A. Roger Federer 
B. Rafael Nadal 
C. Novak Djokovic 
D. Andy Murray 
 
4. Which famous yacht race starts on Boxing Day each year? 
A. Transpacific Yacht Race 
B. Newport to Bermuda 
C. The Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race 
D. Regata del Sol al Sol 
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5. How many gold medals did Michael Phelps win at the 2008 Olympics? 
A. Eight 
B. Seven 
C. Ten 
D. Nine 
 
6. How many red balls are there in the snooker? 
A. 15 
B. 16 
C. 17 
D. 18 
 
7. Who became the first non-European to win the Tour de France cycle race? 
A. Cadel Evans 
B. Greg Lemond 
C. Lance Armstrong 
D. Geraint Thomas 
 
8. When did the first Olympic mascot appear? 
A. 1956 
B. 1972 
C. 1980 
D. 1984 
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9. Who has been named honorary president of World Cup organisers England 
Rugby 2015? 
A. Prince Charles 
B. Prince William 
C. Prince Harry 
D. Prince Andrew 
 
10. Who has been appointed as the United Nations representative on climate change? 
A. Brad Pitt 
B. George Clooney 
C. Leonardo DiCaprio 
D. Russell Crowe 
 
11. Which city did ‘Vogue’ recently name as the Coolest Little City in the World? 
A. Wellington 
B. Nelson 
C. Christchurch 
D. Taupo  
 
12. How long was the longest successful basketball shot? 
A. 33.45 m 
B. 43.45 m 
C. 47.45 m 
D. 49.45 m 
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13. In what year was Matthew Ridge first named in the All Blacks? 
A. 1989 
B. 1991 
C. 1993 
D. 1995 
 
14. Which book won the top New Zealand Post Book Award this year? 
A. Eleanor Catton: The Luminaries 
B. Peter McLeavey: The life and times of a New Zealand art 
dealer 
C. Bruce Ansley and Jane Ussher: Coast: A New Zealand journey 
D. Damien Wilkins: Max Gate 
 
15. Who hosted the 66th Emmy Awards? 
A. Ellen DeGeneres 
B. Tina Fey 
C. Seth Meyers 
D. Oprah 
 
16. What cyclist was dubbed with the nickname “The Cannibal”? 
A. Marco Pantani 
B. Francesco Moser 
C. Bernard Hinault 
D. Eddy Merckx 
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17. What sport was Jack Dempsey famous for? 
A. Baseball 
B. Rugby 
C. Boxing 
D. Soccer 
 
18. Which soccer team won the 2006 FIFA world cup in Germany? 
A. Italy 
B. Germany 
C. Netherlands 
D. France 
 
19. In swimming, which stroke would one be performing when they put two arms 
over their head at once? 
A. Front crawl 
B. Butterfly 
C. Backstroke 
D. Trudgen 
 
20. Who won the very first Grand Prix in motor racing in 1906? 
A. Felice Nazzaro 
B. Georges Boilot 
C. Ferenc Szisz 
D. Albert Clement 
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21. What is the sum of the dots on opposite sides of a standard die? 
A. 5 
B. 7 
C. 8 
D. 9 
 
22. Where were the 2004 Olympics? 
A. Athens, Greece 
B. Sydney, Australia 
C. Beijing, China 
D. Atlanta, United States 
 
23. Which tennis player won 9 women’s singles championships at Wimbledon? 
A. Serena Williams 
B. Martina Hingis 
C. Anna Kournikova 
D. Martina Navratilova 
 
24. How many black squares are there on a chessboard? 
A. 24 
B. 32 
C. 40 
D. 48 
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25. In which year was the water polo event introduced in Olympics? 
A. 1904 
B. 1912 
C. 1900 
D. 1908 
 
26. In Judo, the Black belt is the highest, what colour is the second highest? 
A. Red 
B. Purple 
C. Brown 
D. Green 
 
27. Which of these horses won the Melbourne Cup three times in a row? 
A. Americain 
B. Makybe Diva 
C. Sunline 
D. Phar Lap 
 
28. Who holds the record for the most victories in a row on the professional golf tour? 
A. Jack Nicklaus 
B. Arnold Palmer 
C. Byron Nelson 
D. Ben Hogan 
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29. The Wimbledon tennis tournament is played on what kind of surface? 
A. Clay 
B. Grass 
C. Asphalt 
D. Cement 
 
30. Which Formula One driver claimed top honours at the British Grand Prix in 
Silverstone? 
A. Lewis Hamilton 
B. Fernando Alonso 
C. Felipe Massa 
D. Jenson Button 
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Appendix D. Questionnaire 
Please state your gender. 
 
How old are you? 
 
What is your nationality? 
 
How many siblings do you have? 
 
If you are a student, what is your subject? 
 
When you were 16 years of age, what was the income of your parents in comparison to 
other families in New Zealand? 
 
How large was the community where you have lived the most time of your life? 
 
How many people live in your household (including yourself)? 
 
How large is your monthly budget (without expenses for accommodation)? 
 
What share of your monthly expenses do you finance yourself? 
 
Can you state the percentage we can rely on the data you provided?  
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Appendix E. Screenshots From The Software 
First round: 
 
 
Second round (and all the following rounds with different “c”): 
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Appendix F. Human Ethics Committee Approval
 
 
 
234 
References 
Abbink, K., Irlenbusch, B., & Renner, E. (2000). The moonlighting game: An 
experimental study on reciprocity and retribution. Journal of Economic Behavior 
& Organization, 42 (2), 265-277. 
Abeler, J., Altmann, S., Kube, S., & Wibral, M. (2010). Gift Exchange and Workers' 
Fairness Concerns: When Equality Is Unfair. Journal of the European Economic 
Association, 8 (6), 1299-1324. 
Adams, J. S. (1965). Inequity in social exchange. Advances in experimental social 
psychology, 2 (267-299). 
Akerlof, G. A., & Yellen, J. L. (1990). The fair wage-effort hypothesis and 
unemployment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 255-283. 
Alewell, D., & Nicklisch, A. (2006). Wage Differentials, Fairness, and Social 
Comparison: An Experimental Study of the Co-Employment of Permanent and 
Temporary Agency Workers. MPI Collective Goods Preprint (2006/8). 
Alicke, M. D. (1985). Global self-evaluation as determined by the desirability and 
controllability of trait adjectives. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
49 (6), 1621. 
Alicke, M. D., Klotz, M. L., Breitenbecher, D. L., Yurak, T. J., & Vredenburg, D. S. 
(1995). Personal contact, individuation, and the better-than-average effect. 
Journal of personality and social psychology, 68 (5), 804. 
Anderson, C. M., & Putterman, L. (2006). Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of 
demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism. 
Games and Economic Behavior, 54 (1), 1-24. 
Armantier, O. (2006). Do wealth differences affect fairness considerations? International 
Economic Review, 47 (2), 391-429. 
Arrow, K. J. (1982). Risk perception in psychology and economics. Economic inquiry, 20 
(1), 1-9. 
Babcock, L., Wang, X., & Loewenstein, G. (1996). Choosing the wrong pond: Social 
comparisons in negotiations that reflect a self-serving bias. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 1-19. 
Baddeley, M. (2010). Herding, social influence and economic decision-making: socio-
psychological and neuroscientific analyses. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 365 (1538), 281-290. 
Barber, B. M., & Odean, T. (2000). Too many cooks spoil the profits: Investment club 
performance. Financial Analysts Journal, 56 (1), 17-25. 
Barber, B. M., & Odean, T. (2001). Boys will be boys: Gender, overconfidence, and 
common stock investment. Quarterly journal of Economics, 261-292. 
Bardsley, N. (2010). Experimental economics: Rethinking the rules: Princeton University 
Press. 
Ben-David, I., Graham, J. R., & Harvey, C. R. (2007). Managerial overconfidence and 
corporate policies: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2002). Self-confidence and personal motivation. Quarterly 
journal of economics, 871-915. 
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2003). Self-knowledge and self-regulation: An economic 
approach. The psychology of economic decisions, 1, 137-167. 
 
 
235 
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games 
and economic behavior, 10 (1), 122-142. 
Bewley, T. F. (1999). Why wages don't fall during a recession: Harvard University Press. 
Beyer, S. (1990). Gender differences in the accuracy of self-evaluations of performance. 
Journal of personality and social psychology, 59 (5), 960. 
Bolle, F. (1988). Learning to make good predictions in time series. In Bounded Rational 
Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets (pp. 37-50): Springer. 
Bolton, G. E. (1991). A comparative model of bargaining: Theory and evidence. 
American Economic Review, 1096-1136. 
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000). ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and 
competition. American Economic Review, 166-193. 
Bosman, R., Sutter, M., & van Winden, F. (2005). The impact of real effort and emotions 
in the power-to-take game. Journal of Economic Psychology, 26 (3), 407-429. 
Bosman, R., & van Winden, F. (2002). Emotional hazard in a power-to-take experiment. 
Economic Journal, 112 (476), 147-169. 
Brandts, J., & Charness, G. (2011). The strategy versus the direct-response method: a 
first survey of experimental comparisons. Experimental Economics, 14 (3), 375-
398. 
Cabrales, A., & Charness, G. (2000). Optimal contracts, adverse selection, and social 
preferences: An experiment. 
Camerer, C. (1992). The rationality of prices and volume in experimental markets. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 51 (2), 237-272. 
Camerer, C., Kagel, H., & Roth, A. (1995). The handbook of experimental economics. 
The Handbook of Experimental Economics. 
Camerer, C., & Lovallo, D. (1999). Overconfidence and excess entry: An experimental 
approach. American economic review, 306-318. 
Camerer, C. F. (2003). Behavioural studies of strategic thinking in games. Trends in 
cognitive sciences, 7 (5), 225-231. 
Camerer, C. F., & Hogarth, R. M. (1999). The effects of financial incentives in 
experiments: A review and capital-labor-production framework. Journal of risk 
and uncertainty, 19 (1-3), 7-42. 
Camerer, C. F., Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (2004). Neuroeconomics: Why economics 
needs brains. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 106 (3), 555-579. 
Cárdenas, J. C., De Roux, N., Jaramillo, C. R., & Martinez, L. R. (2013). Is it my money 
or not? An experiment on risk aversion and the house-money effect. Experimental 
Economics, 1-14. 
Carlsson, F., He, H., & Martinsson, P. (2013). Easy come, easy go: The role of windfall 
money in lab and field experiments. Experimental Economics, 16 (2), 190-207. 
Carpenter, J. P. (2007). The demand for punishment. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 62 (4), 522-542. 
Caskey, J. (1985). Modeling the formation of price expectations: A Bayesian approach. 
The American Economic Review, 768-776. 
Charness, G. (2004). Attribution and reciprocity in an experimental labor market. Journal 
of Labor Economics, 22 (3), 665-688. 
Charness, G., Cobo-Reyes, R., Lacomba, J. A., Lagos, F., & Perez Sanchez, J. M. (2013). 
Social comparisons in wage delegation: Experimental evidence. 
 
 
236 
Charness, G., & Kuhn, P. (2007). Does pay inequality affect worker effort? Experimental 
evidence. Journal of labor economics, 25 (4), 693-723. 
Charness, G., & Kuhn, P. (2011). Lab labor: What can labor economists learn from the 
lab? Handbook of Labor Economics, 4, 229-330. 
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002). Understanding social preferences with simple tests. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (3), 817-869. 
Cherry, T. L., Frykblom, P., & Shogren, J. F. (2002). Hardnose the dictator. American 
Economic Review, 92 (4), 1218-1221. 
Clark, A., Masclet, D., & Villeval, M. C. (2006). Effort and comparison income: 
Experimental and survey evidence. 
Clark, A. E., Masclet, D., & Villeval, M. C. (2010). Effort and comparison income: 
Experimental and survey evidence. Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 63 (3), 
407-426. 
Clark, A. E., & Senik, C. (2010). Who compares to whom? the anatomy of income 
comparisons in europe*. The Economic Journal, 120 (544), 573-594. 
Clark, J. (2002). House money effects in public good experiments. Experimental 
Economics, 5 (3), 223-231. 
Clark, K., & Sefton, M. (2001). The sequential prisoner's dilemma: evidence on 
reciprocation. Economic Journal, 111 (468), 51-68. 
Clemens, M. A. (2015). The Meaning of Failed Replications: A Review and Proposal: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). 
Clingingsmith, D. (2013). Mental Accounts, Selective Attention, and the Mutability of 
Altruism: An Experiment with Online Workers. Working paper. 
Costa-Gomes, M., & Zauner, K. G. (2001). Ultimatum bargaining behavior in Israel, 
Japan, Slovenia, and the United States: A social utility analysis. Games and 
Economic Behavior, 34 (2), 238-269. 
Cox, J. C., & Deck, C. A. (2005). On the nature of reciprocal motives. Economic Inquiry, 
43 (3), 623-635. 
Cox, J. C., Friedman, D., & Gjerstad, S. (2007). A tractable model of reciprocity and 
fairness. Games and Economic Behavior, 59 (1), 17-45. 
Cox, J. C., Friedman, D., & Sadiraj, V. (2008). Revealed Altruism. Econometrica, 76 (1), 
31-69. 
Cox, J. C., & Hall, D. T. (2010). Trust with private and common property: Effects of 
stronger property right entitlements. Games, 1 (4), 527-550. 
Cox, J. C., Sadiraj, K., & Sadiraj, V. (2008). Implications of trust, fear, and reciprocity 
for modeling economic behavior. Experimental Economics, 11 (1), 1-24. 
Cox, J. C., Servátka, M., & Vadovič, R. (2014). Status Quo Effects in Fairness Games: 
Reciprocal Responses to Acts of Commission vs. Acts of Omission. University of 
Canterbury working paper. 
Croson, R., & Gächter, S. (2010). The science of experimental economics. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, 73 (1), 122-131. 
Croson, R. T. (1996). Information in ultimatum games: An experimental study. Journal 
of Economic Behavior & Organization, 30 (2), 197-212. 
Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D., & Subrahmanyam, A. (1998). Investor psychology and 
security market under‐and overreactions. the Journal of Finance, 53 (6), 1839-
1885. 
 
 
237 
Daniels, B. P., & Plott, C. R. (1988). Inflation and expectations in experimental markets. 
In Bounded rational behavior in experimental games and markets (pp. 198-218): 
Springer. 
Danziger, L., & Katz, E. (1997). Wage secrecy as a social convention. Economic Inquiry, 
35 (1), 59-69. 
Davis, D. D., & Holt, C. A. (1993). Experimental economics: Princeton university press. 
De Bondt, W. F., & Thaler, R. H. (1995). Financial decision-making in markets and 
firms: A behavioral perspective. Handbooks in Operations Research and 
Management Science, 9, 385-410. 
De Long, J. B., Summers, L. H., & Waldmann, R. J. (1991). The Survival of Noise 
Traders in Financial Markets. Journal ofBusiness, 64 (1). 
Deaves, R., Luders, E., & Luo, G. Y. (2009). An Experimental Test of the Impact of 
Overconfidence and Gender on Trading Activity. Review of Finance, 13, 555-575. 
Deutsch, M. (1975). Equity, equality, and need: What determines which value will be 
used as the basis of distributive justice? Journal of Social issues, 31 (3), 137-149. 
Dewald, W. G., Thursby, J. G., & Anderson, R. G. (1986). Replication in empirical 
economics: The journal of money, credit and banking project. The American 
Economic Review, 587-603. 
Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2004). A theory of sequential reciprocity. Games 
and Economic Behavior, 47 (2), 268-298. 
Dunning, D., Meyerowitz, J. A., & Holzberg, A. D. (1989). Ambiguity and self-
evaluation: The role of idiosyncratic trait definitions in self-serving assessments 
of ability. Journal of personality and social psychology, 57 (6), 1082. 
Duvendack, M., Palmer-Jones, R. W., & Reed, W. R. (2015). Replications in Economics: 
A Progress Report. Scholarly Comments on Academic Economics, 12 (2), 164-
191. 
Engelmann, D., & Strobel, M. (2000). An experimental comparison of the fairness 
models by Bolton and Ockenfels and by Fehr and Schmidt: Discussion Papers, 
Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of 
Economic Processes. 
Erev, I., & Rapoport, A. (1998). Coordination,“magic,” and reinforcement learning in a 
market entry game. Games and economic behavior, 23 (2), 146-175. 
Erkal, N., Gangadharan, L., & Nikiforakis, N. (2011). Relative Earnings and Giving in a 
Real-Effort Experiment. American Economic Review, 101 (7), 3330-3348. 
Falk, A., Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003). On the nature of fair behavior. Economic 
Inquiry, 41 (1), 20-26. 
Falk, A., Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2008). Testing theories of fairness—Intentions 
matter. Games and Economic Behavior, 62 (1), 287-303. 
Falk, A., & Fischbacher, U. (2006). A theory of reciprocity. Games and Economic 
Behavior, 54 (2), 293-315. 
Falk, A., & Heckman, J. J. (2009). Lab experiments are a major source of knowledge in 
the social sciences. science, 326 (5952), 535-538. 
Falk, A., & Knell, M. (2004). Choosing the Joneses: Endogenous goals and reference 
standards. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 106 (3), 417-435. 
Fang, H., & Moscarini, G. (2005). Morale hazard. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52 
(4), 749-777. 
 
 
238 
Fehr, E., & Falk, A. (2002). Psychological foundations of incentives. European 
Economic Review, 46 (4), 687-724. 
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000). Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. 
American Economic Review, 90 (4), 980-994. 
Fehr, E., Gächter, S., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1997). Reciprocity as a contract enforcement 
device: Experimental evidence. Econometrica, 833-860. 
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (3), 817-868. 
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human relations, 7 (2), 
117-140. 
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. 
Experimental Economics, 10 (2), 171-178. 
Forbes, W. (2009). Behavioural finance: John Wiley & Sons. 
Frank, R. H. (1984). Are workers paid their marginal products? The American economic 
review, 549-571. 
Gächter, S. (2009). Improvements and future challenges for the research infrastructure in 
the field'experimental economics'. 
Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2002). Fairness in the labour market: Springer. 
Gächter, S., & Thöni, C. (2010). Social comparison and performance: Experimental 
evidence on the fair wage–effort hypothesis. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 76 (3), 531-543. 
Garner, C. (1982). Experimental evidence on the rationality of intuitive forecasters. 
Research in experimental economics, 2, 113-128. 
Gervais, S., & Goldstein, I. (2007). The positive effects of biased self-perceptions in 
firms. Review of Finance, 11 (3), 453-496. 
Gervais, S., Heaton, J. B., & Odean, T. (2011). Overconfidence, compensation contracts, 
and capital budgeting. The Journal of Finance, 66 (5), 1735-1777. 
Gervais, S., & Odean, T. (2001). Learning to be overconfident. Review of Financial 
studies, 14 (1), 1-27. 
Gneezy, U., & List, J. A. (2006). Putting behavioral economics to work: Testing for gift 
exchange in labor markets using field experiments. Econometrica, 74 (5), 1365-
1384. 
Golder, P. N., & Tellis, G. J. (1993). Pioneer advantage: Marketing logic or marketing 
legend? journal of Marketing Research, 158-170. 
Greiner, B. (2004). An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments. In K. 
Kremer & V. Macho (Eds.), Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003 
(Vol. 63, pp. 79-93). Göttingen: Ges. für Wiss. Datenverarbeitung. 
Guala, F. (2005). The methodology of experimental economics: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Güth, W., Huck, S., & Ockenfels, P. (1996). Two-level ultimatum bargaining with 
incomplete information: An experimental study. The Economic Journal, 593-604. 
Güth, W., Königstein, M., Kovács, J., & Zala-Mezõ, E. (2001). Fairness within firms: 
The case of one principal and multiple agents. Schmalenbach Business Review, 53 
(2), 82-101. 
 
 
239 
Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982). An experimental analysis of 
ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 3 (4), 367-
388. 
Hackbarth, D. (2008). Managerial traits and capital structure decisions. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 43 (04), 843-881. 
Hamermesh, D. S. (2007). Viewpoint: Replication in economics. Canadian Journal of 
Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 40 (3), 715-733. 
Harrison, G. W. (2007). House money effects in public good experiments: Comment. 
Experimental Economics, 10 (4), 429-437. 
Heaton, J. B. (2002). Managerial optimism and corporate finance. Financial 
management, 33-45. 
Henrich, J. (2000). Does culture matter in economic behavior? Ultimatum game 
bargaining among the Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazon. American 
Economic Review, 973-979. 
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., & McElreath, R. 
(2001). In search of homo economicus: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale 
societies. American Economic Review, 73-78. 
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C., & Gächter, S. (2008). Antisocial punishment across societies. 
Science, 319 (5868), 1362-1367. 
Hertwig, R., & Ortmann, A. (2001). Experimental practices in economics: A 
methodological challenge for psychologists? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24 
(03), 383-403. 
Ho, T.-H., & Su, X. (2009). Peer-induced fairness in games. The American Economic 
Review, 99 (5), 2022-2049. 
Hoelzl, E., & Rustichini, A. (2005). Overconfident: Do You Put Your Money On It?*. 
The Economic Journal, 115 (503), 305-318. 
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., & Smith, V. (1994). Preferences, property rights, 
and anonymity in bargaining games. Games and Economic Behavior, 7 (3), 346-
380. 
Hoffman, E., & Spitzer, M. L. (1985). Entitlements, rights, and fairness: An experimental 
examination of subjects' concepts of distributive justice. Journal of Legal Studies, 
14, 259. 
Hoorens, V., & Buunk, B. P. (1993). Social Comparison of Health Risks: Locus of 
Control, the Person‐Positivity Bias, and Unrealistic Optimism1. Journal of 
Applied Social Psychology, 23 (4), 291-302. 
Hunter, J. E. (2001). The desperate need for replications. Journal of Consumer Research, 
28 (1), 149-158. 
Isaac, R. M., McCue, K. F., & Plott, C. R. (1985). Public goods provision in an 
experimental environment. Journal of Public Economics, 26 (1), 51-74. 
Jones, E. E. (1985). Major developments in social psychology during the past five 
decades. The handbook of social psychology, 1, 47-107. 
Kagel, J. H., Kim, C., & Moser, D. (1996). Fairness in ultimatum games with asymmetric 
information and asymmetric payoffs. Games and Economic Behavior, 13 (1), 
100-110. 
 
 
240 
Kahneman, D. (1988). Experimental economics: A psychological perspective. In 
Bounded rational behavior in experimental games and markets (pp. 11-18): 
Springer. 
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. (1986). Fairness as a constraint on profit 
seeking: Entitlements in the market. The American economic review, 728-741. 
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1990). Experimental tests of the 
endowment effect and the Coase theorem. Journal of political Economy, 1325-
1348. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, values, and frames. American 
psychologist, 39 (4), 341. 
Klayman, J., Soll, J. B., Gonzalez-Vallejo, C., & Barlas, S. (1999). Overconfidence: It 
depends on how, what, and whom you ask. Organizational behavior and human 
decision processes, 79 (3), 216-247. 
Knez, M. J., & Camerer, C. F. (1995). Outside options and social comparison in three-
player ultimatum game experiments. Games and Economic Behavior, 10 (1), 65-
94. 
Konow, J. (1996). A positive theory of economic fairness. Journal of Economic Behavior 
& Organization, 31 (1), 13-35. 
Krueger, A. B., & Summers, L. H. (1988). Efficiency wages and the inter-industry wage 
structure. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 259-293. 
Kruger, J. (1999). Lake Wobegon be gone! The" below-average effect" and the 
egocentric nature of comparative ability judgments. Journal of personality and 
social psychology, 77 (2), 221. 
Kube, S., Maréchal, M., & Puppe, C. (2012). The currency of reciprocity-gift-exchange 
in the workplace. American Economic Review, 102 (4). 
Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Vol. 
Lawler, E. E. (1990). Strategic pay: Aligning organizational strategies and pay systems: 
Jossey-Bass. 
Leventhal, G. S. (1976a). The distribution of rewards and resources in groups and 
organizations. Advances in experimental social psychology, 9, 91-131. 
Leventhal, G. S. (1976b). Fairness in social relationships: General Learning Press 
Morristown, NJ. 
Lewis, K. K. (1989). Can learning affect exchange-rate behavior?: The case of the dollar 
in the early 1980's. Journal of Monetary Economics, 23 (1), 79-100. 
Libby, R., & Lipe, M. G. (1992). Incentives, effort, and the cognitive processes involved 
in accounting-related judgments. Journal of Accounting Research, 249-273. 
Lundeberg, M. A., Fox, P. W., & Puncochar, J. (1994). Highly confident but wrong: 
Gender differences and similarities in confidence judgments. Journal of 
educational psychology, 86 (1), 114. 
Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2005). CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. The 
journal of finance, 60 (6), 2661-2700. 
Marwell, G., & Ames, R. E. (1981). Economists free ride, does anyone else?: 
Experiments on the provision of public goods, IV. Journal of public economics, 
15 (3), 295-310. 
 
 
241 
Menkhoff, L., Schmidt, U., & Brozynski, T. (2006). The impact of experience on risk 
taking, overconfidence, and herding of fund managers: Complementary survey 
evidence. European Economic Review, 50 (7), 1753-1766. 
Messick, D. M., Bloom, S., Boldizar, J. P., & Samuelson, C. D. (1985). Why we are 
fairer than others. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 21 (5), 480-500. 
Miller, A. G., Ashton, W. A., McHoskey, J. W., & Gimbel, J. (1990). What price 
attractiveness? Stereotype and risk factors in suntanning behavior. Journal of 
Applied Social Psychology, 20 (15), 1272-1300. 
Moore, D. A., & Cain, D. M. (2007). Overconfidence and underconfidence: When and 
why people underestimate (and overestimate) the competition. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 103 (2), 197-213. 
Nerlove, M. (1958). Adaptive expectations and cobweb phenomena. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 227-240. 
Nikiforakis, N. (2008). Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can 
we really govern ourselves? Journal of Public Economics, 92 (1), 91-112. 
Nikiforakis, N., & Engelmann, D. (2011). Altruistic punishment and the threat of feuds. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 78 (3), 319-332. 
Nikiforakis, N., & Normann, H.-T. (2008). A comparative statics analysis of punishment 
in public-good experiments. Experimental Economics, 11 (4), 358-369. 
Odean, T. (1998). Are investors reluctant to realize their losses? The Journal of finance, 
53 (5), 1775-1798. 
Odean, T. (1999). Do Investors Trade Too Much? American Economic Review, 1279-
1298. 
Ostrom, E., & Walker, J. (2005). Trust and reciprocity: Interdisciplinary lessons from 
experimental research (Vol. 6): Russell Sage Foundation Publications. 
Ostrom, E., Walker, J., & Gardner, R. (1992). Covenants with and without a sword: Self-
governance is possible. American Political Science Review, 404-417. 
Oxoby, R. J., & Spraggon, J. (2008). Mine and yours: Property rights in dictator games. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 65 (3), 703-713. 
Pereira, P. T., & Silva, N. (2006). Positive and negative reciprocity in the labor market. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 59 (3), 406-422. 
Perloff, L. S., & Fetzer, B. K. (1986). Self–other judgments and perceived vulnerability 
to victimization. Journal of Personality and social Psychology, 50 (3), 502. 
Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American 
Economic Review, 1281-1302. 
Reinstein, D., & Riener, G. (2012). Decomposing desert and tangibility effects in a 
charitable giving experiment. Experimental Economics, 15 (1), 229-240. 
Requate, T., Waichman, I., & Siang, C. (2011). On the role of social wage comparisons 
in gift-exchange experiments. Economics Letters, 112 (1), 75-78. 
Roll, R. (1986). The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. Journal of business, 197-
216. 
Roth, A. E. (1994). Lets keep the con out of experimental econ.: a methodological note. 
In Experimental Economics (pp. 99-109): Springer. 
Roth, E. A. (2001). Form and function in experimental design. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 24 (3), 427-428. 
 
 
242 
Rutström, E. E., & Williams, M. B. (2000). Entitlements and fairness:: an experimental 
study of distributive preferences. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 
43 (1), 75-89. 
Schmalensee, R. (1976). An experimental study of expectation formation. Econometrica: 
journal of the Econometric Society, 17-41. 
Scott, R. E. (2003). A theory of self-enforcing indefinite agreements. Columbia Law 
Review, 1641-1699. 
Selten, R. (1967). Ein Marktexperiment. W: H. Sauermann (red.). Beiträge zur 
experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung, 1. 
Shefrin, H. (2001). Behavioral corporate finance. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 
14 (3), 113-126. 
Slonim, R., & Roth, A. E. (1998). Learning in high stakes ultimatum games: An 
experiment in the Slovak Republic. Econometrica, 569-596. 
Smith, V. L., & Walker, J. M. (1993). Monetary rewards and decision cost in 
experimental economics. Economic Inquiry, 31 (2), 245-261. 
Soll, J. B. (1996). Determinants of overconfidence and miscalibration: The roles of 
random error and ecological structure. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 65 (2), 117-137. 
Straub, P. G., & Murnighan, J. K. (1995). An experimental investigation of ultimatum 
games: Information, fairness, expectations, and lowest acceptable offers. Journal 
of Economic Behavior & Organization, 27 (3), 345-364. 
Svenson, O. (1981). Are we all less risky and more skillful than our fellow drivers? Acta 
Psychologica, 47 (2), 143-148. 
Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988). Illusion and well-being: a social psychological 
perspective on mental health. Psychological bulletin, 103 (2), 193. 
Thaler, R. (1985). Mental accounting and consumer choice. Marketing science, 4 (3), 
199-214. 
Thaler, R., & Johnson, E. J. (1990). Gambling with the house money and trying to break 
even: The effects of prior outcomes on risky choice. Management Science, 36 (6), 
643-660. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1986). Rational choice and the framing of decisions. 
Journal of business, S251-S278. 
Weinberg, B. A. (2009). A model of overconfidence. Pacific Economic Review, 14 (4), 
502-515. 
Weinstein, N. D. (1980). Unrealistic optimism about future life events. Journal of 
personality and social psychology, 39 (5), 806. 
Weinstein, N. D. (1982). Unrealistic optimism about susceptibility to health problems. 
Journal of behavioral medicine, 5 (4), 441-460. 
Weinstein, N. D. (1984). Why it won't happen to me: perceptions of risk factors and 
susceptibility. Health psychology, 3 (5), 431. 
Weinstein, N. D. (1987). Unrealistic optimism about susceptibility to health problems: 
Conclusions from a community-wide sample. Journal of behavioral medicine, 10 
(5), 481-500. 
Weinstein, N. D. (1989). Optimistic biases about personal risks. Science, 246 (4935), 
1232-1233. 
 
 
243 
Weinstein, N. D. (1998). Accuracy of smokers' risk perceptions. Annals of behavioral 
medicine, 20 (2), 135-140. 
Weinstein, N. D., & Klein, W. M. (1995). Resistance of personal risk perceptions to 
debiasing interventions. Health psychology, 14 (2), 132. 
Wilson, R. K., & Isaac, R. M. (2007). Political Economy and Experiments. In The 
Political Economist: Newsletter of the Section on Political Economy. 
Windschitl, P. D., & Chambers, J. R. (2004). The dud-alternative effect in likelihood 
judgment. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 30 (1), 198. 
 
